Wehmeyer v. Bolka et al
Filing
103
OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff until 8/30/19 to present a Motion for Leave to Amend with the proposed Second Amended Complaint for review regarding her claims. If the Plaintiff does not file a Motion for Leave to Amend by 8/30/19, the Court will direct the Clerk to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 7/31/19. (Copy mailed to pro se party). (nal)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JANET WEHMEYER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAUSE NO.: 2:18-CV-15-TLS
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
SERVICES, TERRY J. STIGDON, Director
of the Indiana Department of Child Services
(“DCS”), and DEREK BOLKA (individually
and in his official capacity as Family Case
Manager for DCS),
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants, Indiana Department of Child Services
(IDCS), Derek Bolka, and Terry Stigdon, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure
to State a Claim [ECF No. 95] pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Janet Wehmeyer, individually and as next friend of her children, E.W. and
C.W. brings this action asserting various claims against the Defendants. The Plaintiff first filed a
pro se Complaint against the Defendants on January 11, 2018 [ECF No. 1]. The Plaintiff
subsequently obtained legal counsel [ECF No. 48] and the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
[ECF No. 59], filed on May 16, 2018, is now the operative complaint in this case. 1 The
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint centers around involvement of the Defendants in an
1
The Plaintiff’s legal counsel subsequently withdrew in June 2018 [ECF Nos. 70–71] and the Plaintiff again
proceeds pro se.
1
investigation of alleged child abuse between August 2015 and January 2016, the removal of her
children and their placement into foster care, and the alleged abuse her children endured during
their time in foster care.
The Plaintiff brings five counts against the Defendants: Count I is a First Amendment
Retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II is a Fourth Amendment claim alleging
that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III is a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim alleging
violation of the Plaintiff’s liberty interest in familial relations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Count IV is a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
Count V is a state-law assault and battery claim. 2
Defendants IDCS, Bolka, and Stigdon filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
and Failure to State a Claim [ECF No. 95] on April 16, 2019. The Defendants argue that subjectmatter jurisdiction is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, the Defendants argue in
the alternative that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim as Defendant IDCS is entitled to immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, and the Plaintiff’s official and individual capacity claims
against Defendants Stigdon and Bolka are deficient. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 2, ECF No. 96. The
Plaintiff filed several responses in opposition [ECF Nos. 98–101], which did not address the
Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments. The Defendants filed a reply [ECF No. 102] and the matter
is now ripe for review.
2
The Court notes that the Plaintiff includes two Count IV section in her First Amended Complaint – a procedural
due process claim and an assault and battery claim. Accordingly, the Court interprets this as a scrivener’s error and
treats the Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim as Count V.
2
LEGAL STANDARD
The Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is deficient for a lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and, in the alternative, fails to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Under 12(b)(1), the Defendant argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s Complaint because the requested relief
would require the Court to disrupt a final judgment of the state court. Rule 12(b)(1) provides that
a party may assert the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the first question in every case, and if the court
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction it must proceed no further.” Illinois v. City of Chi., 137 F.3d
474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698,
701 (7th Cir. 2003).
Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, “challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that
it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers,
Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court presumes that all well-pleaded allegations are
true, views these well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, and
accepts as true all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the allegations. Whirlpool Fin.
Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995). Surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
“requires more than labels and conclusions . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
It is The First Amended Complaint, which was filed when the Plaintiff was represented
by counsel, that is the subject of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.3 Regardless of the
Plaintiff’s representation status, the Plaintiff remains responsible for proving that jurisdictional
requirements have been met. Ctr. For Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. V. Burwell, 770 F.3d
586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is obligated to monitor its own jurisdiction and dismiss the
case if the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649,
656 (7th Cir. 2004).
A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims
The Plaintiff brings various federal claims against the Defendants, which the Defendants
maintain the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Under the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts in
civil cases. See Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010) (first citing Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005); then citing Johnson v.
Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008)). The doctrine “prevents a state-court loser from bringing
suit in federal court in order effectively to set aside the state-court judgment,” and applies “even
3
The Court acknowledges that the Plaintiff has alternately proceeded pro se and with representation throughout the
course of this litigation. The Plaintiff’s original Complaint [ECF No. 1] was filed pro se, while the First Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 59] was filed while she had counsel. The Court must liberally construe pro se complaints. Id.
(citation omitted); see also Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir.1996) (“It is, by now,
axiomatic that district courts have a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints liberally”). The pleadings of
plaintiffs proceeding pro se are held to a less stringent standard than those of a represented party. Alvarado v.
Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d
652 (1972)) (per curiam). As noted above, however, the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was filed while she
had legal representation.
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though the state court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Gilbert, 591 F.3d
at 900 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine “bars federal claims in two
instances. The first involves a plaintiff’s request of a federal district court to overturn an adverse
state court judgment. The second, and more difficult instance, involves federal claims that were
not raised in state court or do not on their face require review of a state court’s decision.” Brown
v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374
F.3d 529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2004)). In the second case, “Rooker–Feldman will act as a
jurisdictional bar if those claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Id.
(quoting Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533). Although the Seventh Circuit has described the inextricably
intertwined inquiry as “a somewhat metaphysical concept,” a district court must determine
whether it “is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.” Taylor, 374 F.3d
at 533 (quotation marks omitted). “In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the
federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.”
Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). If the suit does not seek to vacate the
judgment of the state court and instead seeks damages for independently unlawful conduct, it is
not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769, 773 (7th
Cir. 2014).
The Defendants argue that the second instance of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies,
as the Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with state court judgments. The
Defendants argue that there are three state court judgments that apply to the Plaintiff’s claims:
(1) a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) proceeding in Lake County during which the Plaintiff’s
children were adjudicated as children of need in services; (2) a dispositional hearing during
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which the state court ordered the Plaintiff’s children to remain in her custody; and (3) the review
hearing that resulted in the removal of the Plaintiff’s children to a foster home. Pl.’s First Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 28, 34, 38. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s allegations all result from the
original CHINS proceeding and the Plaintiff’s action would not have ensued if not for this state
court judgment. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. at 5–6. As such, the Defendants argue that RookerFeldman bars the Plaintiff’s claims.
The Plaintiff’s responses did not address these alleged jurisdictional deficiencies. Rather,
the responses reiterate the facts asserted in the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. “Failure to
respond to an argument raised in a motion to dismiss results in waiver.” Pelham v. Albright, No.
3:11 CV 99, 2012 WL 1600455, at *5 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2012) (citing Bonte v. United States
Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir.2010)). “Additionally, if the defendant presents plausible
reasons why a complaint should be dismissed, the Court has no responsibility to conduct
research on behalf of a plaintiff in order to discover whether the plaintiff could prevail against
the defendant's plea for dismissal.” Gluck v. WNIN Tri–State Public Media, Inc., No. 2–12–cv–
32–JMS–DKL, 2012 WL 2953074, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2012) (citing Kirksey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir.1999)). The Court will not create or infer
arguments on behalf of the Plaintiff beyond what is required at the motion to dismiss stage. “Our
system of justice is adversarial, and our judges are busy people. If they are given plausible
reasons for dismissing a complaint, they are not going to do the plaintiff's research and try to
discover whether there might be something to say against the defendants' reasoning.” Kirksey,
168 F.3d at 1041.
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1.
Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim (Count I)
The Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim alleges that the Defendants retaliated against her
due to reports that the Plaintiff made regarding the Defendants’ alleged misconduct during the
child abuse investigations. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–47. The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants’ retaliation took the form of a false substantiation of abuse, retaliatory investigations,
detention of the children, and findings of neglect that the evidence did not support. Id. ¶ 48. The
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim fails because her claim is
inextricably intertwined with the previous state-court judgments. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 14.
The Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment injury is not distinct from the state court judgments
she challenges, as these injuries all result from the state court judgments. In such cases, “the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if
the state court judgment was erroneous or unconstitutional.” Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 713
(7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Count I of the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
2.
Plaintiff’s Due Process Claims (Counts III and IV)
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated her due process rights and liberty
interest in familial relations. As with the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the alleged injuries
– such as the removal of the children from the Plaintiff’s care and use of false information in
state court proceedings – all result from the state court judgments. Although the Plaintiff raises
civil rights claims, a plaintiff may not circumvent the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
simply by casting [a] complaint in the form of a federal civil rights action.” Maples Lanes, Inc. v.
Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1999). “The reason a litigant gives for contesting the statecourt’s decision cannot endow a federal district court with authority. . .” Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d
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728, 730–731 (7th Cir. 2015). For her due process claims, the Plaintiff essentially asks the Court
to find that the process by which the custody determination was made violated her statutory and
constitutional rights. Those “constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the
state court judgments of necessity call upon the district court to review the state court decision
and are thus beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.” Edwards v. Ill. Bd. Of Admissions to Bar,
261 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001) (first quoting Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir.
1996); and then quoting Dist. of Col. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983)).
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts III and IV of the
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
3.
Plaintiff’s Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims (Count II)
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated her right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure when they searched the Plaintiff’s home and school without a court order,
warrant, or parental notification to consent. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50–53. In response, the
Defendants argue that these actions all occurred after the Plaintiff’s children had been
adjudicated as children in need of services at a court hearing. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 14. The
Plaintiff essentially asks that the Court evaluate the state court proceedings that led to the alleged
unreasonable search and seizure. The Court cannot do so.
“Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional
rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and then to the Supreme Court.” See
Nationscredit Home Equity Servs. Corp. v. City of Chi., 135 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (collecting cases) (citing Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699, 702 (7th
Cir.1998)); see also Iqbal, 780 F.3d at 729 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is concerned not
with why a state court’s judgment might be mistaken . . . but with which federal court is
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authorized to intervene.”) (emphasis in original); Ritter v. Ross, 922 F.2d 750, 755 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that, when the state court judgment is an essential part of the federal
claim, Rooker-Feldman applies, even if the federal plaintiff complains of notice issues). Because
the Plaintiffs’ injury is the state court judgment itself, the issues of the notice regarding that
judgment do not give this Court jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court finds the Defendants’ arguments that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars the Plaintiff’s federal claims persuasive. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Counts I–IV of the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
B. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claim (Count V)
The Plaintiff also brings state law assault and battery claims for the alleged abuse her
children endured while in foster care. The Defendants argue that the Court is not obligated to
retain jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims should the Court dismiss all the Plaintiff’s
federal claims. Id. The Defendants are correct. The federal statute that allows supplemental
jurisdiction of state law claims also provides that the district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[T]he general rule is that, when all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law
claims rather than resolving them on the merits.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d
1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that established law of this circuit is that the “usual practice” is to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed before
trial). “[T]he principle of comity encourages federal courts to relinquish supplemental
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jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(3).” Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551
F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Groce, 193 F.3d at 501).
Considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, see Wright, 29 F.3d at
1251, this Court does not find a basis to retain jurisdiction of the case. Sanchez & Daniels v.
Koresko, 503 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that “the court must choose the course that
best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness and comity which underlie the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine…”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indiana state courts
are better positioned to adjudicate a state-law claim involving only Indiana citizens. Accordingly,
the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Count V of the Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Indiana Department of Child Services, Derek
Bolka, and Terry Stingdon, Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 95]. The Court DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts I–V of the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiff will be permitted to file a Motion to Amend her Complaint, wherein the
Plaintiff must address the defects in her Complaint that the Court noted within its Opinion and
Order. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff until August 30, 2019 to present a Motion for Leave to
Amend with the proposed Second Amended Complaint for review regarding her claims. If the
Plaintiff does not file a Motion for Leave to Amend by August 30, 2019, the Court will direct the
Clerk to close this case.
SO ORDERED on July 31, 2019.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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