Cobb v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES the relief requested in Plaintiff's Opening Brief 20 and AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 9/9/19. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
THOMAS COBB III,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:18-CV-136-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff Thomas Cobb, III
on April 6, 2018, and Plaintiff’s Opening Brief [DE 20], filed September 24, 2018. Plaintiff
requests that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. On November 5, 2018, the Commissioner filed a response. Plaintiff did not file a
reply. For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
I.

Background
On January 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed applications for benefits alleging that he became

disabled on November 1, 2007. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. On July 7, 2011, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Marlene R. Abrams issued
a partially favorable decision, finding Plaintiff disabled as of December 5, 2010. Plaintiff appealed
and the Appeals Council denied review. On January 10, 2013, the District Court remanded the
ALJ’s decision pursuant to the parties’ joint motion. Two additional hearings were held, on
October 15, 2013 and May 6, 2014, with ALJ Romona Scales. On July 23, 2014, the ALJ issued a
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time after his alleged onset date. The Appeals
Council remanded the matter back to the ALJ on January 29, 2016. An additional hearing was held
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on October 28, 2016 before ALJ Scales, at which Plaintiff, with an attorney, an impartial medical
expert (“ME”), and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. On July 27, 2017, the ALJ issued a
decision again finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.
The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:
1.

The claimant’s date last insured is June 30, 2009.

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November
1, 2007, the alleged onset date.

3.

Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe
impairments: morbid obesity, obstructive sleep apnea (“OSA”), and
degenerative disc disease.

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one the listed impairments in
20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5.

Through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except that he can only occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and/or crouch, but he can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or crawl. The work must not require
driving as a condition of employment, and he must avoid all exposure to
work at unprotected heights and/or around dangerous moving machinery or
on slippery/uneven wet surfaces. The claimant must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme cold, and pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors,
dusts, gases, and areas of poor ventilation as well as vibration. Lastly, the
claimant may require the need to alternate between sitting and standing,
once each hour, for 10 minutes, while remaining at the workstation and on
task.

6.

The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.

7.

The claimant was 32 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age
18-44, on the alleged disability onset date.

8.

The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English.

9.

Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a
finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
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transferable job skills.
10.

Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.

11.

The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, at any time from November 1, 2007, the alleged onset date, through
the date of this decision.

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate
Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and

indicates that the Commissioner’s factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an
erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial
evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v.
Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).
A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the
evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment
for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227
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F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the
question upon judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ
“uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Roddy v.
Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618
(7th Cir. 2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart,
381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law,” the Court
may reverse the decision “without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual
findings.” White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780,
782 (7th Cir. 1997)).
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his or her analysis of the evidence in order to allow
the reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured that the ALJ considered the
important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55
F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the
evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of the
agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant] meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483,
487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 297 F.3d at 595); see also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618
(“An ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’
between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny
benefits.”).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s sleep disorders in assessing the
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RFC, and erred in evaluating the opinion of the medical expert’s testimony. The Commissioner
argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to a logical bridge from the evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s sleep apnea to the restrictions in the RFC. Plaintiff notes that although the ALJ found his
sleep apnea to be a “severe impairment” at step two, the RFC does not include any limitations
outlined in the regulatory definitions for “basic work activities,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522, despite the
fact that a severe impairment by definition limits an individual’s capacity to perform basic workrelated activities. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *11 (October 25, 2017) (“A severe
impairment is one that affects an individual’s ability to perform basic work-related activities.”).
The ALJ’s findings were not contradictory merely because she did not list a “basic” activity in the
RFC; the term “basic work activities” refers generally to “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to
do most jobs,” such as “physical functions.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). The ALJ addressed
Plaintiff’s physical capabilities in the RFC, including limitations on driving, balance, and sitting
and standing for long periods. And while the ALJ was required to thoroughly explain the basis for
the RFC findings, she was not required to explicitly match particular impairments to corresponding
functional limitations in the RFC. See Knox v. Astrue, 327 F. App’x 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
expression of a claimant’s RFC need not be articulated function-by-function; a narrative discussion
of a claimant’s symptoms and medical source opinions is sufficient.”) (citations omitted);
Vujnovich v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-43 JD, 2011 WL 1157499, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2011)
(finding that an ALJ needs to “explain how the evidence supports her conclusions,” but need not
provide a function-by-function explanation); Pinder v. Astrue, No. 3:09-CV-363-TS, 2010 WL
2243248, at *6 (N.D. Ind. June 1, 2010) (explaining that while ALJs must undertake a function-byfunction “assessment,” the expression of a claimant’s RFC need not be articulated function-by5

function) (citing SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996)). In this case, the ALJ provided a
thorough narrative discussion of the record and the medical opinions. Plaintiff does not identify
evidence the ALJ ignored, nor does he argue that any additional limitations would have been
appropriate. See Kinsey v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-CV-69-PRC, 2017 WL 1101140, at *8 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 24, 2017) (“Plaintiff does not acknowledge the ALJ’s thorough discussion and treatment of
the records. Nor does Plaintiff argue what additional limitations should be included in the RFC
based on these impairments and symptoms or how the RFC does not account for them.”).
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the testimony of medical
expert Dr. Keith Holan. The ALJ must evaluate all medical opinions, accounting for factors such
as the relationship with the claimant, familiarity with the claimant’s medical history, and whether
the opinion is supported by the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Dr. Holan testified that he could
not opine as to the severity of Plaintiff’s narcolepsy or sleep apnea after 2010, due to a lack of
medical records. AR 861 ([ALJ]: “So at this point, Doctor, you have no way of gauging the severity
of the narcolepsy or sleep apnea beyond the 2010 testing, is that correct? [Dr. Holan]: “That’s
correct.”). However, when asked how much Plaintiff would be off task due to his sleep disorders,
Dr. Holan testified that Plaintiff would be off task at least ten percent of the work day. AR 865-66.
The ALJ addressed Dr. Holan’s testimony and found that it was “outdated and based on an
incomplete record,” but granted “some preference” to his opinion that Plaintiff could perform
sedentary work with limitations. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was required to specifically account
for Dr. Holan’s testimony that Plaintiff would be off-task for more than ten percent of the day due
to his sleep disorders. Having explained the basis for her conclusions about the doctor’s testimony
on that topic, the ALJ was not required to explicitly consider every limitation he proposed. “An
ALJ need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’
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between the evidence and his conclusions.” O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618. The ALJ provided
the required logical bridge by explaining why the record Dr. Holan relied on was inadequate. See
Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868-69 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that ALJs are “not required to afford
any particular weight” to non-treating physicians’ opinions, and need only “minimally articulate”
their reasoning in rejecting them) (quoting Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to discuss several instances of Plaintiff falling
asleep in public places. In addressing Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, the ALJ must “evaluate whether
[those] statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence,” and
“explain” which symptoms were found to be consistent or inconsistent with the evidence. SSR 163p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *6, *8; see also Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001)
(remanding where ALJ failed to “explain[] the inconsistencies” between a claimant’s activities of
daily living, his complaints of pain, and the medical evidence) (citing Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870-72).
The ALJ discussed several examples of Plaintiff allegedly falling asleep in public places, including
those cited in Plaintiff’s brief. See, e.g., AR 793 (discussing Plaintiff sleeping at hearings and in the
emergency room); AR 796 (discussing Plaintiff’s separation from his job after falling asleep). In
each case, the ALJ evaluated whether those allegations were consistent with the other evidence and
explained her reasons for finding that they were not. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *8. She was
not required to recite every allegation of Plaintiff falling asleep, as long as she provided a logical
bridge to her conclusions and did not “ignore [the] entire line” of evidence. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at
888.
More generally, the ALJ discussed at length why she found that Plaintiff’s sleep disorders,
and the attendant symptoms he alleged, did not prevent him from working. See AR 793, 796-798.
The ALJ found that the medical records indicated that Plaintiff’s sleep disorders were effectively
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treated, which is supported by substantial evidence in the record. In September 2007, Plaintiff
attended a sleep study that indicated his sleep apnea that could be resolved with a continuous
positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) mask. AR 320. A follow-up treatment note from February 2008
noted that Plaintiff was “ok to work/drive.” AR 343. In 2008, it was found that Plaintiff was not
tolerating CPAP, and bilevel positive airway pressure (“BiPAP”) retitration was introduced, which
was found to be “effective.” AR 462. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s treatment for his sleep
disorders, and noted that while Plaintiff had reported fatigue during this period, he reported to other
doctors that he was refreshed after receiving treatment. AR 797.
The ALJ also addressed Plaintiff’s diagnoses of narcolepsy and sleep apnea following
another sleep study in 2010. The ALJ noted that after that date, Plaintiff expressed “few symptoms
or limitations” relating to his sleep until 2016, despite numerous visits to medical providers over
that period, and explained why she found that record inconsistent with the symptoms he alleged.
AR 802-805. The ALJ discussed the testimony of the medical expert at the October 2016 hearing,
Dr. Ashik Jilhewar, who stated that the medical record did not corroborate Plaintiff’s allegations of
constantly falling asleep without control. AR 807. The ALJ likewise explained why she found that
this was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations. Id.
While Plaintiff may not agree with the ALJ’s analysis, the Court will not “reweigh evidence,
resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgement for that of the
Commissioner.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). The ALJ thoroughly analyzed
the record, Plaintiff’s reported symptoms, and the medical opinions. Because the ALJ’s conclusions
are supported by substantial evidence and an adequate discussion of the issues, the decision must
stand. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES the relief requested in Plaintiff’s

Opening Brief [DE 20] and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
SO ORDERED this 9th day of September, 2019.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc: All counsel of record

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