Bey v. Biden et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER: For reasons stated in order, Petitioners Points and Authorities in Support of Response/Motion to Reconsider/Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment DE #6 is DENIED. However, the Court clarifies that the previous dismissal of the case DE #3 is without prejudice. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 08/01/2022. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(sej)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JAMIL MALIK BEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOE BIDEN, THE UNITED STATES,
Defendants.

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) CAUSE NO. 2:22-CV-152-PPS-JEM
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OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff, Jamil Malik Bey, filed a motion titled “Petitioner’s Points and
Authorities in Support of Response/Motion to Reconsider/Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment.” [DE 6.] Bey claims that my order dismissing his case pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), was erroneous. [DE 6 at 2.] Consistent with the title of the
motion, I consider Bey’s motion for reconsideration to be filed under Rule 59(e)
“because it is a substantive motion for reconsideration of an appealable order filed
within twenty-eight days of entry of that appealable order.” Grissom v. United States,
No. 4:19-cv-00232-TWP-DML, 2021 WL 325967, at * 1 n.1 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2021)
(citation omitted). Here, judgment was entered on June 7, 2022 [DE 4], and the instant
motion was filed exactly 28 days later, on July 5, 2022.
Rule 59(e) requires the moving party to clearly establish a manifest error of law
or an intervening change in the controlling law, or present newly discovered evidence.
See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). “Ultimately, a motion for
reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of

finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” McGrath v. Everest Nat’l Ins. Co.,
668 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1110 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (quotation omitted). Moreover, it is not
appropriate to grant reconsideration when a claimant “merely restates the arguments”
made previously. Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2014).
In this case, I dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), on the
basis that it was frivolous. As the Supreme Court has held, “a court may dismiss a
claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category
encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court
went on to state that it was “confident that the district courts, who are ‘all too familiar’
with factually frivolous claims, are in the best position to determine which cases fall
into this category.” Id. at 33 (quotation omitted). “[T]he frivolousness determination is
a discretionary one.” Id.
In this case, Bey has not alleged any new facts or cited any additional law that
clearly establishes a manifest error of fact or law. He continues to maintain he is
entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against the President and the United States
because the United States Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have been
operating a state-sanctioned program employing private contractors to cruelly and
unlawfully target him based upon his political and national status being Moorish
Moroccan Consanguinity. [DE 6 at 10.] He alleges he is under 24-hour surveillance and
is being harassed by aircraft and electronic harassment. Id. at 14. Additionally, Bey

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filed a declaration stating he also filed a zip drive with the court showing numerous
photographs and videos allegedly depicting helicopters and other aircraft targeting him
and harassing him, as well as encounters with conspirators. [DE 7.] With all due respect
to Mr. Bey (and unlike the insinuation in Footnote 4 [DE 6 at 11]), I cast no
characterizations or judgment whatsoever on his character or his mental state, but
nothing in his motion to reconsider changes my opinion that his claims are not
plausible, and I stand by my prior ruling.
My order simply dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as is
this court’s usual practice. [DE 3.] Bey asserts that the case should have been dismissed
without prejudice (instead of with). [DE 6 at 17.] The court hereby clarifies that the
dismissal is without prejudice. See, e.g., Denton, 504 U.S. at 34 (dismissal pursuant to
section 1915(e)(2)(B) is without prejudice because “a § 1915(d) dismissal is not a
dismissal on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the in
forma pauperis statute, the dismissal does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint
making the same allegations. It could, however, have a res judicata effect on
frivolousness determinations for future in forma pauperis petitions.”).

Conclusion
For all of these reasons, “Petitioner’s Points and Authorities in Support of
Response/Motion to Reconsider/Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” [DE
6] is DENIED. However, the Court clarifies that the previous dismissal of the case [DE
3] is without prejudice.
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SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 1, 2022.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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