Wright v. Lake County et al

Filing 88

OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion to dismiss 54 is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 03/05/2025. (jdb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
TORRIE WRIGHT, Appointed
Administrator of the Estate of
DONALD J. CHATMAN, JR.,

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Plaintiff,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:23 CV 195

OPINION and ORDER
I.

BACKGROUND
Donald J. Chatman, Jr., was a pretrial detainee in the Lake County Jail when he

died in 2023. (DE # 24.) Plaintiff Torrie Wright is the Appointed Administrator of
Chatman’s estate. (Id.) According to the complaint, Chatman suffered from serious
mental illness while he was held as a detainee (DE # 48 at 5), but received an abject lack
of medical or mental health treatment. (Id. at 7.) The complaint further alleges that after
Chatman had spent two weeks consuming little to no food or liquids, jail staff
administered an antipsychotic medication but failed to monitor and observe him
thereafter. (Id. at 10.) Chatman was found lifeless in his cell twelve hours after the
medication was administered. (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff sued numerous defendants, including Lake County, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violations of Chatman’s constitutional rights. (Id.) Before the court is the

motion to dismiss filed by Correctional Health Indiana, Inc. (“CHI”), and its President
and CEO, Dr. William Forgey, to dismiss some of plaintiff’s claims. (DE # 54.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). A court reviewing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must
construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-movant. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc., 896 F.3d 834,
839 (7th Cir. 2018).
Under the liberal notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “While the federal
pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ray v. City
of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
To meet this standard, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but
it must go beyond providing “labels and conclusions” and “be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint must give
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“enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds
together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the truth of
the facts alleged appears doubtful, and recovery remote or unlikely, the court cannot
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if, when the facts pleaded are taken as
true, a plaintiff has “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Dr. Forgey’s Liability Under Section 1983

Defendants first argue that plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Dr. Forgey, the
President and CEO of CHI, was personally involved in depriving Chatman of his
constitutional rights in violation of Section 1983. It is well-established that a Section 1983
plaintiff may not rely solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. N.Y. City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Put another way, supervisory employees
are not liable under Section 1983 simply because they are in charge of a wrong-doer. See
id. Rather, a supervisory employee must have personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation to be held liable. Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., Ill., 40 F.4th 824,
828 (7th Cir. 2022).
In a similar case in this district, the court considered the sufficiency of a
plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Forgey knew about the victim’s condition and denial of
medical care, failed to transport him to surgery, and inadequately supervised and
trained staff. Hullinger v. Forgey, No. 2:20-CV-417 -PPS-JEM, 2021 WL 1264914, at *6
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(N.D. Ind. Apr. 5, 2021). The court held that, while the allegations were “fairly skimpy,”
they still plausibly alleged that Dr. Forgey bore personal responsibility under Section
1983. Id. Similarly, in this case, plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Forgey knew of Chatman’s
deteriorated condition and mental illness, yet did nothing to ensure he was properly
treated and monitored. (DE # 48 at ¶¶ 20, 27, 42, 43.) Like the allegations in Hullinger,
plaintiff’s allegations are “fairly skimpy” but nonetheless state a plausible claim under
the standards set forth by Rule 8 and Twombly. The motion to dismiss is denied as to
this claim.
B.

CHI’s Liability Under Section 1983

Defendants argue that plaintiff impermissibly relies on the theory of respondeat
superior with respect to the complaint’s Section 1983 claim against CHI. According to
defendants, this claim should be dismissed. The court grants the motion to dismiss on
this claim, as the unavailability of respondeat superior liability under Section 1983 is wellsettled. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
C.

Indemnification

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim seeking indemnification by CHI is
premature and should be dismissed. The argument is well-taken. This court only has
subject-matter jurisdiction over a case in which the controversy is ripe, and a claim is
not ripe if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
may not occur at all. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). Thus, any claim for
indemnification is not ripe until liability has been established, and plaintiff’s claim must
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be dismissed without prejudice. Wilborn v. Hutton, No. 3:23-CV-00910-CCB-MGG, 2024
WL 3916238, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2024); Smith v. Lake County, No. 2:15-CV-123, 2017
WL 568590, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2017); Hobson v. Dominguez, No. 210-CV-429-TLS,
2012 WL 4361537, at *16 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2012).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE # 54) is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
SO ORDERED.
Date: March 5, 2025
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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