Smith v. Kompassionate Care LLC et al

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER STRIKING 1 Pro Se Complaint. DENYING 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Jerry A Smith. GRANTING the Pla until 4/11/2025, to file an amended complaint and either pay the filing fee or file a renewed in forma pauperis motion and CAUTIONING the Pla that if he does not respond by the deadline, this case is subject to dismissal without further notice for failure to prosecute. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 3/12/2025. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mrm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JERRY A. SMITH
Plaintiff,
v.
KOMPASSIONATE CARE LLC,
ABIDON BABALOLA, KARENA
RICHARDSON SEALS, and BELINDA
GAIL,
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER
Jerry A. Smith, representing himself, filed a complaint on February 19, 2025,
against Kompassionate Care LLC, two Kompassionate Care LLC employees, and a
fourth defendant whom he describes as a “health patient.” [DE 1.] Smith also filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. [DE 2.] There are several issues with Smith’s
claims as currently pled, so I will strike Smith’s complaint and deny his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. I will also grant Smith an additional 30 days to correct the
deficiencies in his complaint that I discuss below.
As best I can tell, on February 6 or 7, 2025, Kompassionate Care LLC
(“Kompassionate”) offered Smith a job as a personal care assistant contingent upon him
passing a background check. [DE 1-1 at 10–12.] On February 13, Kompassionate
rescinded Smith’s conditional offer of employment purportedly because of the results of
Smith’s background check. [Id. at 8.] According to Smith, the real reason Kompassionate

rescinded his conditional offer of employment is because of the interference of
defendant Karena Richardson Seals.
The nature of Smith’s relationship with Seals is not clear. Smith alleges that from
September 2024 through February 2025 he operated the “Saving Lives 2x Program” at
an address in Hammond, Indiana. [DE 1 at 3.] As part of that program, Smith says he
provided healthcare services to Seals. [Id.] Smith tells me that Seals requested
“structured payments for housing and non-profit space to avoid being taken off SSI.”
[Id.] I have no idea what that means. Smith also alleges that Seals demanded personal
care services without compensation, coerced intimate relationships, forced immediate
eviction (seemingly of Smith’s Saving Lives 2x Program at the listed Hammond
address), and contacted Kompassionate to interfere with Smith’s contingent offer of
employment. Again, this is all very murky.
According to Smith, defendant Abidon Babalola, a manager at Kompassionate,
has a personal relationship with Seals and privately met with Seals to discuss Smith. [Id.
at 4.] Smith alleges that there is no documentation of the meeting, no witnesses, and,
because of that meeting, Kompassionate used Smith’s “24-year-old juvenile record as an
excuse” to rescind Smith’s contingent offer of employment. [Id.] Smith’s final allegations
concern defendant Belinda Gail Bennet. Smith alleges Bennet created a hostile work
environment, made threats while under the influence of controlled substances, and
forced Smith to “seek shelter in a vehicle overnight.” [Id. at 5.]

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As I see it, there are three issues with Smith’s complaint. First, there is a potential
venue issue because it is not clear whether the events at issue took place in Hammond
or in Indianapolis (located in the Southern District of Indiana) where Kompassionate
appears to be based. Second, and related, Smith seems to have pleaded unrelated claims
against Seals in the same lawsuit. While he alleges that Seals interfered with his
employment relationship with Kompassionate, his other claims against Seals
concerning payments, eviction, and coercion appear unrelated to his claims against
Kompassionate and its employees. Third, Smith fails to sufficiently plead the type of
discrimination he faced. He also asserts employment discrimination claims against
individual employees at Kompassionate, which is improper.
To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Smith is proceeding without
counsel, I must give his allegations liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007).
According to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), there are three ways to establish proper venue
in federal court (in this case, the Northern District of Indiana). A civil action may be
brought in—

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(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this §, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Smith alleges that Gail is a resident of Illinois, which eliminates 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1) as a basis for venue. And given that Kompassionate is in Indianapolis (which
is in the Southern District of Indiana), I have concerns regarding whether “a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this district. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). From Kompassionate’s website it appears that they may provide
services throughout Indiana, which could include the Northern District of Indiana, but I
do not have enough based on the complaint to assure myself that this Court is the
proper venue for Smith’s lawsuit. Smith alleges vague allegations concerning his
eviction from a property in Hammond, but as I will now discuss it is unclear that these
allegations are related to Smith’s case against Kompassionate.
Plaintiffs may bring multiple, unrelated claims against a single defendant, but
unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits. George v. Smith,
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507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ultiple claims against a single party are fine, but
Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits . . .
.”). It is unclear to the Court how Smith’s claims against Seals concerning eviction,
demand of personal care services without compensation, and coerced intimate
relationships relate to Smith’s claims concerning his contingent offer of employment
with Kompassionate.
Smith’s allegations concerning Seals interfering with his employment
relationship with Kompassionate seem related to his claims against Kompassionate, but
his other allegations against Seals appear unrelated so may not be brought in the same
suit. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health Servs,, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]
complaint may present claim # 1 against Defendant A, and claim # 2 against Defendant
B, only if both claims arise ‘out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences.’”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)). When a pro se plaintiff
files a lawsuit with unrelated claims, this Court’s general practice is to “allow him to
decide which claim (or group of related claims) to pursue in the instant case and to
allow him to decide whether to bring the remaining claims in separate lawsuits.” Carson
v. Payne, CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-464-RLM-MGG, 2021 WL 4427175, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept.
27, 2021). Smith will be provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint that
includes only the related claims that he wants to pursue in this cause of action.

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Finally, as currently pled, Smith’s employment discrimination claims are
insufficient in two respects. First, Smith does not allege the type of discrimination he
faced. In the employment discrimination context, the Seventh Circuit has said that the
pleading requirements mean “a plaintiff must advance plausible allegations that she
experienced discrimination because of her protected characteristics.” Kaminski v. Elite
Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022). Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion,
and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on a protected
characteristic that creates a hostile or abusive work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). Smith has not alleged discrimination on the basis of
any of the protected characteristics in Title VII.
Second, Smith impermissibly asserts employment discrimination claims against
individual employees at Kompassionate. An “employer” is defined under Title VII as “a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees .
. . and any agent of such a person[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). As is important here, the
Seventh Circuit held that Title VII does not impose “employer” liability on a supervisor
in his individual capacity for acts which violate the statute. Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d
552, 553–55, (7th Cir. 1995). Instead, the individual must independently meet the
definition of an “employer” under Title VII before individual liability for employment
discrimination can be imposed. Id. Smith has not alleged facts sufficient to support suit
against that Kompassionate employees Babalola or Gail in their individual capacity.
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In sum, I will grant Smith approximately 30 days to correct the following errors.
First, he must include allegations that establish the Northern District of Indiana as the
proper venue for this suit. Second, Smith must either clarify how his allegations against
Seals relate to his employment action against Kompassionate or choose which related
claims to pursue in his amended complaint. And finally, Smith must clarify the type of
Title VII employment discrimination he asserts against Kompassionate. His claims
against Babalola or Gail in their individual capacity do not state a claim.
For these reasons, the Court:
(1) STRIKES the complaint [DE 1];
(2) DENIES the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [DE 2];
(3) GRANTS the plaintiff until April 11, 2025, to file an amended complaint and
either pay the filing fee or file a renewed in forma pauperis motion; and
(4) CAUTIONS the Plaintiff that if he does not respond by the deadline, this case
is subject to dismissal without further notice for failure to prosecute.
SO ORDERED on March 12, 2025.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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