Reynolds v. Gunite Corporation
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 62 Motion for Summary Judgment; DENYING 64 Motion for Trial. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Gunite Corporation and against Plaintiff Diana Reynolds, who shall take nothing by way of her complaint ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 7/25/12. (jld)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DIANA REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GUNITE CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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No. 3:08 CV 301
OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant’s third motion for summary
judgment. (DE # 62.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
In 2007, plaintiff Diana Reynolds filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC
against defendant Gunite Corporation, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); the Rehabilitation Act; and Title 42, Section
1981. (Id. at 1-2.). (DE # 14-2.) After the EEOC issued plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of
Rights, plaintiff filed a pro se employment discrimination complaint with this court on
June 20, 2008. (DE # 1.) Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s
ADEA and Section 1981 claims, and the court granted that motion on August 31, 2009.
(DE # 30.)
On October 8, 2009, Accuride Corporation, of which defendant is a domestic
corporate entity, filed a bankruptcy petition to commence its Chapter 11 case, Case No.
09–13449, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. (See DE # 51-1 at
1.)1 The Bankruptcy Court established November 30, 2009, as a bar date for filing proofs
of claim against defendant and the other debtors involved in the case. (DE # 51-4.) It is
undisputed that plaintiff did not file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case with regard
to the present discrimination suit. On February 18, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court
confirmed the debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization. (DE # 51-1, 51-2,
51-3.) The Plan discharged the debtors, including defendant, from claims that arose
before the confirmation date (DE # 51-8 at 13) and enjoined the prosecution of any
discharged claims (id. at 14).
On September 8, 2011, defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment
(DE # 62), arguing that plaintiff’s claims were discharged pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Court’s confirmation of defendant’s Chapter 11 Plan. On November 10, 2011, plaintiff
filed a “Motion for Trial” (DE # 64), which the court construes as a response to the
motion for summary judgment, claiming that she did not file a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court because defendant’s lawyers told her not to return the papers mailed
to her to the bankruptcy court. Defendant replied on November 28, 2011 (DE # 65),
pointing out that plaintiff’s response was filed over one month past the deadline
provided by the Local Rules of this district and that plaintiff does not dispute that her
The court takes judicial notice of the events occurring in the bankruptcy
proceedings pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 201. United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th
Cir. 1991) (“The district court may also take judicial notice of matters of public record.”).
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claim arose before the date of the Plan’s confirmation or that she failed to file a proof of
claim before the bar date. The motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 requires the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate–in fact, is mandated–where there
are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law.
In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.
1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’-that is,
pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has met his
burden, the non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing that there is a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
The court’s role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the
truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable
fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th
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Cir. 1994). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations,
weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for
a factfinder. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255). In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966
(7th Cir. 1998); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443. Importantly, the court is “not required to draw every
conceivable inference from the record [in favor of the non-movant]-only those
inferences that are reasonable.” Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th
Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim
because the Bankruptcy Court discharged plaintiff’s claims when it confirmed the Plan.
As stated in the United States Code, “the confirmation of a plan . . . discharges the
debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . whether or not
. . . a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section 501 of
this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
In this case, plaintiff has alleged that the actions on which her claims are based
began approximately two years before her termination in July of 2007. (DE # 14-2.)
Plaintiff sued on these actions on June 20, 2008. (DE # 1.) It is undisputed that the
Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization on
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February 18, 2010. (DE # 51-1, 51-2, 51-3.) Given these undisputed facts, it is clear that
plaintiff’s claims against defendant arose before the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the
Plan. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims were discharged when the Plan was confirmed by
the Court, and summary judgment for defendant is appropriate.
The Plan also permanently enjoined the holder of any discharged claim from the
“commencement or prosecution by any Person or Entity, whether directly, derivatively
or otherwise, of any Claims, obligations, suits, judgments, damages, demands, debts,
rights, Causes of Action, or liabilities released pursuant to the Release set forth in the
Plan.” (DE # 51-2 at 32.) Accordingly, summary judgment is also appropriate on
plaintiff’s claims because the Plan discharged those claims and permanently enjoined
plaintiff from pursuing her claims against defendant. Cox v. Zale Delaware, Inc., 239 F.3d
910, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (creditor who attempts to collect a discharged debt is violating
not only a statute but also an injunction and is therefore in contempt of the bankruptcy
court that issued the order of discharge).
Plaintiff essentially argues that defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings should not
bar her claim because the bankruptcy proceedings were flawed. Specifically, plaintiff
states that defendant’s attorneys told her “not to return the papers mailed to me to the
bankruptcy court.” (DE # 64.) Whether defendant’s attorneys behaved improperly
during bankruptcy proceedings is not an issue before this court. If plaintiff wishes to
reopen bankruptcy proceedings, she must look first to the bankruptcy court. Gagan v.
Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 968 (7th Cir. 1996); Parrillo v. Reilly, 59 Fed. Appx. 129,
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*3 (7th Cir. 2003) (litigant’s concerns about how underlying bankruptcy case was
handled should be addressed through bankruptcy appeal, not in civil suit).
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE # 62)
is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s “motion for trial” (DE # 64) is DENIED. The Clerk is
directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT, stating:
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Gunite Corporation
and against Plaintiff Diana Reynolds, who shall take nothing
by way of her complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 25, 2012
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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