Snyder et al v. Tiller et al

Filing 124

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 107 Snyders' Motion for review. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 10/5/11. (smp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DAVID SNYDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JACK D. TILLER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:08-CV-470 JD

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order on
Defendants’ Motion for Rule 35 Examination [DE 107]. Magistrate Judge Christopher
Nuechterlein issued the order in question on June 20, 2011. Plaintiffs filed their motion, styled as
a “Rule 72 Objection,” on July 1.1 Defendants responded on July 15, and Plaintiffs filed a reply
on July 22. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion.
BACKGROUND
David Snyder and his wife Dorothy filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
federal constitutional violations, state constitutional and statutory violations, and torts in the
course of Jack Tiller’s September 2007 arrest of Snyder. Snyder alleges that he sustained various
injuries during the illegal arrest, including post-traumatic stress disorder, and aggravation of his
multiple sclerosis. See DE 96 at 1. Snyder has sought treatment for his injuries both locally and
in Chicago, Illinois. Id. at 2.
Snyder has agreed to be examined by expert physicians within the Northern District of

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The Court laments Plaintiffs’ mis-styling of their motion for review, and it is not without consequence:
Properly filing motions as such ensures that the Court is aware that a matter requires its ruling, and had Plaintiffs
correctly styled their “objection” as a motion, doubtless the Court would have issued this ruling some time ago.

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Indiana, including in Merrillville, Indiana, near to the Illinois border. But he refuses to travel
outside the judicial district to Chicago to meet with Defendants’ expert physicians. On May 26,
2011, Defendants filed a motion to compel Snyder to be examined in Chicago. They argued that
Snyder should be subject to examination and that traveling into Chicago would not be an undue
burden on Snyder, especially in light of the fact that he travels outside the judicial district
regularly and has traveled to Chicago by train at least eleven times to receive treatment for the
very injuries at issue in this case. Id. at 5. Defendants have also offered to pay Snyder’s travel
expenses to Chicago for the examination. Id.
Snyder did not object to Defendants’ right to conduct an independent medical
examination, or the qualifications of the experts that Defendants have selected. See DE 102 at 2.
His sole contention was that he should not be required to travel outside of the Northern District
of Indiana because the stress of travel could aggravate the symptoms of his injury. Id. The
magistrate judge granted the motion and ordered Snyder to travel to Chicago for the
examination. Id. at 3. The magistrate judge noted that while Snyder claimed that travel could
aggravate his symptoms, he offered no evidence to support that claim. Id. Further, the magistrate
judge concluded that the evidence showed that conducting the examination in Chicago would not
be an undue burden: Snyder routinely traveled outside the district, including driving a greater
distance to Indianapolis and taking the train to Chicago for medical treatment several times. Id.
The magistrate judge also noted that any financial burden caused by the trip was alleviated by
Defendants’ offer to pay for the trip. Id.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing a magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive matter, a district court
must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indust. Co.,
126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). “Clear error is an extremely deferential standard of review,
and will only be found to exist where the ‘reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d
879, 888 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
Snyder raises two objections in his motion for review, but neither compel the Court to set
aside or modify the magistrate judge’s order. First, he argues that the order was contrary to law
because it deviated from the general rule that Rule 35 examinations are to occur in the forum
where the action is pending. An order is contrary to law “when it fails to apply or misapplies
relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” In re Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., No.
3:05-MD-527, 2009 WL 5217341, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 28, 2009) (internal citations omitted).
But even if examinations within the forum were a well-established general rule, despite Snyder’s
inability to point to any decisions reflecting this rule within the Seventh Circuit, his argument
would not support his motion for review. At most, it would suggest (as Snyder argues) that the
burden should be upon Defendants to justify an out-of-district examination. And it is clear from
the magistrate judge’s order that he found an examination in Chicago—the closest major
metropolitan area to the district and located only a few miles from the district’s western
border—was appropriate regardless of who was required to establish the existence or lack of
undue burden. Given the evidence of Snyder’s frequent trips to Chicago and other points outside
the district, the magistrate judge’s factual finding in this regard was not clearly erroneous.
Synder’s second objection fares no better. He argues that the magistrate judge erred when
he “indicate[d] that the Plaintiffs provided no evidence that travel outside the judicial district
was unduly burdensome to Plaintiffs.” See DE 107 at 2–3. This was error, according to Snyder,

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because he did have evidence that he is uncomfortable traveling by train and in crowded
atmospheres. What the order actually says, however, is that Snyder did not have any evidence to
support his contention “that traveling long distances could cause an aggravation of his
symptoms.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). That statement was accurate. And it was not clearly
erroneous for the magistrate judge to conclude that Snyder’s objections to traveling to Chicago
were both unconvincing (in light of his regular use of the South Shore train) and outweighed by
the evidence that he had already agreed to travel within the district and regularly traveled outside
the district for his own purposes.
CONCLUSION
Because the magistrate judge’s order is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, the
Court DENIES Snyder’s motion for review [DE 107].
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

October 5, 2011

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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