Jones v. Bates et al

Filing 35

OPINION AND ORDER denying 30 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 5/25/11. (ksc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
DAVID MICHAEL JONES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
BATES, et al.,
Defendants.

CAUSE NO.: 3:08-CV-545-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
On November 25, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Prisoner Complaint [ECF No. 1] seeking
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court denied the Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and
subsequently ordered his case dismissed for non-payment of the filing fee. After a successful
appeal, the Court screened his Complaint in an Opinion and Order issued on April 5, 2011 [ECF
No. 27]. This matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [ECF No.
30], which was filed on April 29, 2011.
The Court construes the Motion as a Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider its prejudgment
interlocutory decision to dismiss certain claims and Defendants. Rule 54(b) provides in relevant
part:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.
A court may reconsider prejudgment interlocutory decisions at any time prior to final judgment.
In re 949 Erie St., Racine, Wis., 824 F.2d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Cameo Convalescent
Ctr., Inc. v. Percy, 800 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1986)). Although a court may, under the “law of
the case” doctrine, refuse to reconsider or reopen an issue that it has already decided in the same

case, the court has “the discretion to make a different determination of any matters that have not
been taken to judgment or determined on appeal.” Percy, 800 F.2d at 110; see also Pickett v.
Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Unlike the case in which a judgment is sought to be
vacated, . . . a motion to reconsider a ruling is constrained only by the doctrine of the law of the
case. And that doctrine is highly flexible, especially when a judge is being asked to reconsider
his own ruling.”). A motion to reconsider serves a limited function, and it must be based on a
need to “correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “A ‘manifest error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of
the losing party. It is the ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling
precedent.’” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sedrak v.
Callahan, 987 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill.1997)). “Reconsideration is not an appropriate
forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard
during the pendency of the previous motion.” CBI Indus., 90 F.3d at 1270.
The Plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its dismissal of Defendants Morton,
Hill, Delao, and Ayres because, in his view, they are liable to him based upon him telling them
that he was in danger and their refusal to place him in protective custody. As previously
explained, the Plaintiff was in segregation when he was attacked and injured on January 29,
2008. Although he wanted to be moved to a different housing unit—both before and after he was
placed in segregation—an inmate has no right to pick his housing assignment. While “prison
officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations and internal punctuation omitted), the Plaintiff’s

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placement in segregation should have accomplished that goal by restricting his contact with
other inmates. As the Plaintiff described in his Complaint, the attack in segregation only
occurred because a non-defendant prison guard violated policy by releasing two other inmates at
the same time during his recreation time. “Prisons are dangerous places,” McGill v. Duckworth,
944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), and no system is error-free. The Eighth Amendment is
violated only if “deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by
allowing it to happen . . . .” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996). Liability cannot be
established by showing that a prison guard was negligent, Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102
(7th Cir. 1994), or merely failed to act reasonably, Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th
Cir. 1995). Here, based on these allegations, there is not a basis for a finding that these
Defendants acted unreasonably when they did not move the Plaintiff out of segregation prior his
being attacked.
The Plaintiff also argues that the unknown defendant(s) should not have been dismissed
from the case so that he could conduct discovery to identify them. The Complaint named only
eight Defendants and did not include a “John Doe” defendant. Thus, the Court did not dismiss
any “John Doe” defendant with its screening order. Nevertheless, if the Plaintiff named “John
Doe” as a defendant, the Court would have dismissed that defendant because “it is pointless to
include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the
door to relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, nor can it otherwise help the
plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Because the
statute of limitations has already passed as to the Plaintiff’s claims, even if he were to identify

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“John Doe” defendants, it would be too late amend the complaint to add any person as a
defendant.
The Court, being duly advised, DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [ECF No.
30].
SO ORDERED on May 25, 2011.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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