Henderson v. Phillips et al
Filing
128
ORDER denying 121 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Telephone Conference set for 10/25/2012 09:00 AM (Central/Hammond time) in US District Court. Order provided to plf Henderson and correctional facility by regular mail. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 10/17/2012. (nac)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DUKE HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
PHILLIPS et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 3:09-CV-119 PS
OPINION AND ORDER
Duke Henderson is a state prisoner who alleges that correctional officers did not honor
his medical pass for a bottom bunk, required him to sleep on the floor of his cell for fourteen
days without a mattress, and then beat him savagely in retaliation for filing a grievance about the
incident. I screened Henderson’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and granted him
leave to proceed against the Defendants for damages in their personal capacities on all of his
claims (DE13). Henderson filed an amended complaint (DE 92), which replead his original
claims and added the names of several defendants who he obtained through discovery.
The Defendants unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the ground that Henderson
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint (DE 49). They have now
filed a partial motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, seeking judgment
only on the “Plaintiff’s claim regarding his sleeping on the floor” (DE 121 at 1). Summary
judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, I must construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft
v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003).
Henderson claims that on January 16, 2008, he was given a medical transfer from another
facility to the Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”). He alleges that when he was placed into
general population at the MCF, correctional officers ignored his disability and medical need by
disregarding his doctor’s order that he be given a lower bunk (DE 92 at 3). In his deposition,
Henderson stated that when he couldn’t get a lower bunk he placed his mattress on the floor but
that three correctional officers then removed his mattress from the cell, forcing him to sleep on
the concrete floor (DE 121-1 at 8).
The Defendants do not contest that because of Henderson’s medical condition a doctor
gave him a medical pass for sleeping on a bottom bunk. Nor do they contest that MCF
correctional officers refused to honor his bottom bunk pass and assigned him to an upper bunk
he could not use. They also agree that when Henderson put his mattress on the floor they
removed it from his cell, forcing him to sleep on the bare concrete floor. Here’s how the
defendants put it in their briefing: “Henderson slept on the floor without a mattress for
approximately 14 days,” though he “had a blanket while sleeping on the floor” (DE 123 at 3).
These actions, according to Henderson, violate the Eighth Amendment.
A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause consists of
two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of
the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) subjectively, whether the prison
official’s actual state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or
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safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)
(clarifying that an 8th Amendment violation requires the inmate to show deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs).
The Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment is in the nature of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(c) because they do not contest the facts
alleged by the Plaintiff’s amended complaint; rather, they argue that these facts are insufficient
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support of the proposition that sleeping on
the floor without a mattress for fourteen days does not violate the Eighth Amendment, the
Defendants rely on several cases, but none of them mandate the conclusion that the defendants
request. See Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 138-39 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that denial for
three days of an inmate’s request for dry bedding and clothing after water had accidentally been
thrown on him did not rise to level of cognizable Eighth Amendment violation); Rodgers v.
Thomas, 879 F.2d 380, 383-84 (8th Cir. 1989) (sleeping for five days on a mattress on the floor
states no claim upon which relief can be granted); Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir.
1986) (determining that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to elevated beds, and may be
required to sleep on mattresses on the floor); and Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that the fact that due to overcrowding a prisoner “temporarily had to
sleep upon a mattress on the floor or on a table is not necessarily a constitutional violation”). The
Defendants also cite to Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1988), in which the First
Circuit held that a pretrial detainee who allegedly slept on a mattress on the floor for 27 days
stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim upon which relief can be granted because it
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might have been considered punishment, and pretrial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, must
be afforded due process before being punished.
When I screened Henderson’s complaint and amended complaint, I concluded that
forcing a disabled prisoner who could not use the top bunk to which the Defendants assigned
him to sleep on the floor for fourteen days without a mattress, where a mattress was available,
stated an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted. None of the cases cited
by the Defendants deal with a prisoner who slept directly on the floor without a mattress, and
none of those cases where the court found no Eighth Amendment claim to have been stated dealt
with a period of time longer than five days. Accordingly, none of the cases cited by the
Defendants establishes, or even suggests, that the Defendants’ conduct in forcing Henderson to
sleep on the floor without a mattress for two weeks states no Eighth Amendment claim upon
which relief can be granted. Because I find that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
ignoring Henderson’s medical pass and forcing him to sleep on the floor without a mattress for
fourteen days violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, I will deny the Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment (DE
121) is DENIED. This matter is now set for a telephonic conference on October 25, 2012 at
9:00 am. The purpose of the conference will be to discuss the scheduling of trial and the
possible appointment of counsel for Mr. Henderson.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 17, 2012
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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