Schenck v. Rogers et al
Filing
121
OPINION AND ORDER granting 117 Second MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Sam Naves and directs Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 7/11/2011. (kds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEVEN M. SCHENCK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRAD ROGERS, Captain, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:09-CV-238
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Second Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed by Lieutenant Samuel Naves on June 1,
2011.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant
Naves’s motion for summary judgment and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter
judgment
in
this
case
in
favor
of
Defendants
and
against
complaint
and
amended
Plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Steven
Schenck
filed
a
complaint alleging that Sheriff Mike Books, Captain Brad Rogers,
and Lieutenant Sam Naves failed to treat him for a serious dental
problem and deprived him of a nutritious diet while he was confined
at the Elkhart County Jail. The Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, which the Court granted in part and denied in
part.
(DE 111).
The Court granted summary judgment to Defendants
Books and Rogers, and granted summary judgment to Defendant Naves
on the diet claim.
The Court denied summary judgment to Defendant
Naves on the denial of dentures claim, with leave to file a second
summary judgment motion if he “believes he has admissible evidence
establishing that CCS medical staff made a determination that
dentures were not medically necessary.” (DE 111 at 14). Defendant
Naves has now filed his second motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant
to
Rule
56(c)
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corporation
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
In other words, the
record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the
nonmovant.
Karazanos v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d
332, 335 (7th Cir. 1991).
See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, a court must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Trade Finance
Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 2009).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of
“the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,” if any, that the
movant believes demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has met
this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but
“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Stephens v. Erickson, 569
2
F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assocs.,
Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990).
“Whether a fact is
material depends on the substantive law underlying a particular
claim and ‘only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.’”
Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th
Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“[A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate,
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of
material fact which requires trial.” Beard v. Whitley County REMC,
840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).
See also
Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an
essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment will not be appropriate. In this situation,
there can be “‘no genuine issue as to any material fact’, since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving
party’s
immaterial.”
case
necessarily
renders
all
other
facts
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
DISCUSSION
In his amended complaint, Schenck alleged that while he was at
the Elkhart County Jail he did not have “any top teeth or back
bottom teeth . . . causing great pain when trying to chew food.”
(DE 14 at 4).
Eighth
He asserted that Lieutenant Naves violated the
Amendment’s
prohibition
3
against
cruel
and
unusual
punishments by refusing to provide him dentures.
A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively,
whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2)
subjectively, whether the defendant’s actual state of mind was one
of
“deliberate
indifference”
to
the
deprivation.
Farmer
v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294
(1991).
The Eighth Amendment requires the government “to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.1996) (cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1126 (1997) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976). “Dental care is one of the most important medical needs of
inmates.”
Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001),
quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 576 (10th Cir.1980).
In medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test is expressed in
terms of whether a defendant was deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d
710, 714 (7th Cir. 2007); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369
(7th Cir. 1997).
A medical need is “serious” for Eighth Amendment
purposes if it is either one that a physician has diagnosed as
mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and if
untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary
pain, and that significantly affects the person’s daily activities
4
or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111
F.3d at 1373.
Deliberate
indifference
is
comparable
to
criminal
reck-
lessness, and is shown by “something approaching a total unconcern
for [the plaintiff’s] welfare in the face of serious risks, or a
conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm.”
Duane v. Lane, 959
F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1992) (Citations omitted).
“A prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Lt. Naves
submits his own affidavit, the affidavit of Dennis Carter, D.D.S.,
and portions of Schenck’s dental records.
When Defendants’ first
summary judgment motion was before the Court the parties submitted
other materials, including Schenck’s deposition, which presents his
version of events.
The parties’ submissions establish that Schenck lost many of
his teeth when he was struck in the face with a baseball bat.
100-3 at 7-8).
(DE
Schenck wore partial dentures, but by the time he
arrived at the jail he could no longer wear them and was having
problems with many of his remaining teeth.
(DE 100-3 at 25).
The jail contracted with Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”) to
provide medical and dental services to inmates.
(DE 100-6 at 1).
On February 8, 2009, Schenck began experiencing dental pain and
5
over the next few weeks he saw CSS medical and dental personnel on
a number of occasions for evaluation and treatment.
(DE 100-3 at
20)
0n February 17, 2009, Dr. Carter extracted four of Schenck’s
teeth because they were “periodontally involved and nectoric.” (DE
100-6 at 4).
On March 23, 2009, Dr. Carter extracted two more of
Schenck’s teeth.
(DE 100-6 at 4).
On May 11, 2009, Dr. Carter
extracted another of Schenck’s teeth because it was infected (DE
100-6 at 6).
This left Schenck with “six or seven” teeth in the
bottom of his mouth but no upper teeth.
(DE 100-3 at 6).
Schenck asserts that his need for new dentures became acute
beginning on March 24, 2009, when his last upper teeth were
removed.
Jail officials placed him on a soft diet, but Schenck
states that even so, he could not eat some of the food that was
served to him.
(DE 100-3 at 20-21).
Between April 20 and April
22, 2009, Schenck went on a hunger strike.
(DE 100-3 at 18).
After his hunger strike ended, Lt. Naves authorized upper dentures
for Schenck, and Aspen Dental fitted him with a complete set of top
dentures, which he received on June 12, 2009.
(DE 100-3 at 34).
Schenck was never provided lower dentures, and alleges that he was
unable to eat solid food without the lower dentures that would have
provided him back teeth.
Schenck did not sue the dentist who treated him while he was
at the jail. Instead, he sued jail officials, including Lt. Naves.
According to Schenck, Lt. Naves denied him dentures before his
6
hunger strike, and the parties agree that Lt. Naves was the
official who eventually made the decision to provide Schenck with
upper dentures but not lower dentures.
(DE 100-3 at 910; DE 100-6
at 8).
Lt. Naves asserts that Schenck did not need dentures.
In his
affidavit he states that Dr. Carter, the dentist who was treating
Schenck, told Lt. Naves “that he had evaluated Schenck [and] had
determined that dentures were not medically necessary for Schenck.”
(DE 119-2 at 3).
If Dr. Carter told Lt. Naves that Schenck had no serious
medical need for dentures then any delay by Lt. Naves in providing
the top dentures and his refusal to provide bottom dentures did not
constitute deliberate indifference.
Carter’s
recommendation
was
wrong
This is true even if Dr.
because
custody
staff
are
entitled to rely on the judgment and recommendations of medical
professionals.
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts a
non-medical prison official will generally be justified
in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This
follows naturally from the division of labor within a
prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing
responsibility for various aspects of inmate life among
guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a
non-medical prison official liable in a case where a
prisoner was under a physician’s care would strain this
division of labor.
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (ellipsis
omitted) citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir.
2004).
Dr. Carter’s affidavit supports Lt. Naves’s position. He
7
states that:
10. Based upon my education as a dentist, and based
upon my evaluation and treatment of Schenck while he was
incarcerated at the Corrections Facility, it was and is
my determination that it was not medically necessary for
Schenck to receive dentures.
11. Former Corrections Facility Warden Samuel Naves
spoke with me about Schenck’s requests for dentures. I
advised Naves that I had evaluated Schenck, I had
determined that dentures were not medically necessary for
Schenck, and therefore I was not going to order dentures
for Schenck.
DE 119-1 at 3.
Lt. Naves based his decisions on providing Schenck with
dentures
on
the
advise
of
the
dentist
treating
Schenck.
Accordingly, he was not deliberately indifferent to Schenck’s
serious medical needs and is entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Naves’s
motion for summary judgment (DE 117), and DIRECTS the Clerk to
enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.
DATED: July 11, 2011
/S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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