Pruitt v. Superintendent

Filing 41

OPINION AND ORDER denying 38 Motion to Alter Judgment. Court expands the certificate of appealability to include all of Claim II (a certificate already was given as to all of Claim VIII). Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/27/13. (smp) Modified on 3/28/2013 to change document type (smp).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
TOM R. PRUITT,
Petitioner,
vs.
BILL WILSON, SUPERINTENDENT
Respondent

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CAUSE NO. 3:09cv380RLM

OPINION and ORDER
Tom Pruitt moves to alter or amend, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, the denial of
his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He focuses on two of the rulings that went
into that decision: the ruling that his claim that trial counsel were ineffective in
not presenting evidence that he was returned to special education classes in the
eighth grade was procedurally defaulted (doc. 36, at 35-38), and the ruling that
his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in final argument was procedurally
defaulted (doc. 36, at 70-77). Mr. Pruitt raises one argument directed at both
rulings, and another directed only at the ineffective assistance claim.
The common argument is drawn from Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912
(2012), and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). Mr. Pruitt argues that if
these arguments were procedurally defaulted, his post-conviction relief counsel
must have been constitutionally ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), to have allowed that to happen. Accordingly, Mr. Pruitt reasons,
he should have been allowed to “complete factual development of his cause and
prejudice arguments against post-conviction counsel in terms of proving his

misconduct and gross negligence during the post-conviction proceedings . . ..”
Mr. Pruitt reads Maples and Martinez too expansively. This case isn’t
Maples, in which the petitioner’s counsel truly abandoned the petitioner by telling
neither the petitioner nor the court when they left their law firm and leaving the
case inactive while the time ran. Mr. Pruitt had active and zealous post-conviction
relief counsel. Nor is this case Martinez, in which the Court held that if a state
forbids ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised until postconviction relief, post-conviction relief petitioners are entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. Indiana allows (and in some instances, requires) ineffective
assistance claims to be raised on direct appeal. See Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d
1208, 1220 (Ind. 1998).
Mr. Pruitt argues that Martinez still applies because the post-conviction
relief petition was his first opportunity to raise these claims. The Court doesn’t
read Martinez as reaching states that allow (and in some instances require)
criminal appellants to raise Strickland arguments on direct appeal. Indiana simply
does not require the what the Martinez Court called “initial-review collateral
proceedings,” 132 S. Ct. at 1115, to be post-appeal.
Mr. Pruitt’s second argument, directed at the default holding relating to the
eighth grade special education Strickland claim, is simply that the Indiana
Supreme Court was wrong when it held that Mr. Pruitt hadn’t raised the argument
in his post-conviction relief. Hence, he argues, this court was wrong in finding a
procedural default. The court believes that the analysis in the opinion denying Mr.
Pruitt’s habeas corpus is correct and adequate, and that no further discussion is

needed.
For these reasons, the court DENIES the petitioner’s motion to alter or
amend (doc. 38). The court EXPANDS the certificate of appealability to include all
of Claim II (a certificate already was granted as to all of Claim VIII).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:

March 27, 2013

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge
United States District Court