Davis v. Lakeside Motor Company Inc

Filing 157

OPINION AND ORDER: The defendant ORDERED to pay Mr. Davis $9,690 in attorneys fees relative to the motions for sanctions. Further the Court ORDERS Lakeside to conduct a de novo review of its document production, as described herein, to ensure th at it has fully produced all documents responsive to Mr. Davis requests. Lakeside must certify its compliance with this order within 45 days of todays date. The Defendants motion to vacate the clerks notice of costs to be taxed 151 is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 7/7/14. (jld)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JAMES DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKESIDE MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:10-CV-405 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are the Plaintiff James Davis’ Bill of Costs relative to his two
motions for sanctions, and the Defendant Lakeside Motor Company, Inc.’s response to the
Court’s order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 11 and Rule 26.
A.

Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs
Upon receiving Lakeside’s trial exhibits in this matter, Mr. Davis discovered that several

of the exhibits contained documents that should have been produced in discovery but were not.
Accordingly, he filed two motions for sanctions against Lakeside: one for failing to produce
several documents as required by Rule 37(c), and one for violating Court orders relative to third
party subpoenas and for failing to produce subpoenaed documents, pursuant to Rule 37(b) and
(c). The Court granted both motions in part, and in addition to excluding certain documents from
trial, awarded Mr. Davis his attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing these motions.1 [DE 140]. Mr.

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Under Rule 37(c), if a court finds that a party has failed to provide information as
required during discovery, it “may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This
language is broader than Rule 37(a), to which Lakeside cites, which permits a court to award a
prevailing movant’s attorneys’ fees “incurred in making the motion” to compel discovery. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, the only harm Mr. Davis identifies as having been caused by
these failures was that he had to bring two motions for sanctions, so the Court agrees that the
appropriate fees here are those incurred in bringing the motions.

Davis then filed a bill of costs in which he seeks a total of $17,762.50 for work that two of his
attorneys and a paralegal performed in connection with the motions. Lakeside opposes this
amount on the grounds that certain amounts of time were either excessive or unrelated to these
motions, and that the hourly rates are unreasonable.
Awards of attorneys’ fees are calculated using the lodestar method, which entails
“multiplying the ‘number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
rate.’” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)) (internal alterations omitted). The Court first considers
Lakeside’s objections to the number of hours expended by Mr. Davis’ counsel. Lakeside objects
to billing entries from January 17 and 20, 2014 relating to a page-by-page review Mr. Davis’s
counsel conducted of all of Lakeside’s trial exhibits, contending that they were not incurred for
the purpose of the motions for sanctions themselves. Mr. Davis responds that he could not have
brought the motions for sanctions if he had not reviewed all of the exhibits to determine which
ones had been produced. This review confirmed which documents Lakeside had not produced,
that those documents were responsive to Mr. Davis’ discovery requests, and that they should
have been produced given Lakeside’s discovery responses and correspondence and the Court’s
orders, all of which was instrumental to the motions for sanctions. Had Lakeside fulfilled its
discovery obligations, this task would not have been necessary, so it is compensable. The Court
agrees, though, that the one-hour conference between two attorneys and a paralegal prior to
embarking on this review is excessive, so the Court awards Mr. Davis only the 12 hours billed by
the paralegal for this work.
Lakeside next objects to the total amount of time spent on the basis that it is unreasonably
excessive in light of the length and complexity of the briefing. Only time that was “reasonably

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expended” should be compensated, meaning that a party seeking fees “should make a good faith
effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from
his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an
important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed
to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”).
In determining the reasonableness of the total time spent on a matter, courts consider, among
other factors, the length of the filings, the complexity of the issues, and the amount of legal
authority cited in the filings. United Consumers Club, Inc. v. Prime Time Mktg. Mgmt. Inc., 2:07CV-358, 2011 WL 1375160, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 12, 2011) (collecting cases).
Here, counsel billed 25 hours in preparing the two motions, and an additional 18.5 hours
in preparing the two reply briefs. The Court believes that this amount of time is excessive and
that sound billing judgment would have resulted in reductions in the amount of time billed. The
two motions were seven and ten pages long, the latter of which included three pages of block
quotations from discovery responses, and portions of the factual background and legal analysis
are identical between the two motions. There is some degree of factual complexity in distilling
the relevant facts from correspondence, discovery requests and responses, and previous motions
and orders, but these motions were supported by only sparse citations to relevant legal authority.
The reply briefs are five and nine pages long, and again focus primarily on discussions of facts
rather than on legal analysis. Therefore, in approximating the amount of time that might have
been reasonably billed to a client for these tasks, the Court finds that 15 hours were reasonably
spent preparing the motions, and 11 hours were reasonably spent preparing the replies, on top of
the time spent by the paralegal, as addressed above.

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Lakeside also objects to several billing entries for time spent in meetings or performing
similar tasks on the basis that they are unreasonably duplicative. The fact that multiple
individuals bill time on a matter does not necessarily mean that their fees were duplicative, so
long as they made unique contributions to the end product rather than duplicating each other’s
work. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir.2007); Kurowski v.
Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 776 (7th Cir.1988). Here, having already determined the amount of
time reasonably spent on the motions, the Court will address these concerns by allocating all of
those hours to Mr. Wrage’s entries, as he performed the most work on the motions. Accordingly,
Mr. Davis is entitled to be compensated for 26 hours of Mr. Wrage’s time, plus 12 hours of the
paralegal’s time.
Lakeside finally objects to the hourly rates of $350 per hour for Mr. Wrage and $125 for
the paralegal. The Seventh Circuit has defined a reasonable hourly rate as one that is “derived
from the market rate for the services rendered.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 664
F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2003));
Montanez v. Simon, 13-1692, 2014 WL 2757472 (7th Cir. June 18, 2014). The Court presumes
that an attorney’s actual billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate.
Pickett, 644 F.3d at 640. Having recognized the difficulty of determining the hourly rate of an
attorney who uses contingent fee agreements, the Seventh Circuit has advised district courts to
rely on the “next best evidence” of an attorney’s market rate, namely “evidence of rates similarly
experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of
fee awards the attorney has received in similar cases.” Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (quoting Spegon
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999)); Montanez, 2014 WL 2757472, at
*4. Of these two alternatives, the Seventh Circuit has indicated a preference for third party

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affidavits that attest to the billing rates of comparable attorneys. Id. (citing Spegon, 175 F.3d at
556).
The fee applicant bears the burden of “produc[ing] satisfactory evidence—in addition to
the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community.” Pickett, 664 F.3d 632 at 640 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11
(1984)). If the fee applicant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the other party to offer
evidence that sets forth “a good reason why a lower rate is essential.” Id. (citations omitted).
However, if the fee applicant does not satisfy its burden, the district court has the authority to
make its own determination of a reasonable rate. Id. (citing Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176
F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1999)).
As to Mr. Wrage’s rate, the affidavit from Mr. Barkes, one of Mr. Davis’ attorneys, states
that Mr. Wrage’s “standard hourly billing rate” is $350 per hour. This stops short of stating that
Mr. Wrage actually bills this amount to Mr. Davis or to other clients in similar matters, though.
In a previous fee submission in this matter, Mr. Wrage stated that his hourly rate in 2012 was
$300, and Lakeside did not object to that amount. [DE 64, 76]. In support of that previous fee
submission, Mr. Wrage also submitted an affidavit from Mark L. Phillips of Newby Lewis
Kaminski & Jones, LLP, in which Mr. Phillips states that he is familiar with Mr. Wrage’s work,
experience, and reputation, as well as the fees charged by similar attorneys in employment
discrimination matters, and that the reasonable hourly rate for such attorneys ranges from $300
to $375 per hours. In response to the current submission, Lakeside did not provide any counter
affidavits (until it attached an affidavit from a different case to its reply brief, which is too late),
and cited two inapposite cases, one awarding $150 per hour in a § 1983 action, and one awarding
up to $250 per hour in a copyright case for work performed in 2006. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch.

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Corp., 981 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 (N.D. Ind. 2013); Eagle Servs. Corp. v. H2O Indus. Servs., Inc.,
2:02-CV-36, 2012 WL 3255606 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2012).
Of this, the most direct evidence of Mr. Wrage’s reasonable hourly rate is the $300 per
hour rate he received in this matter just over a year ago. But Mr. Wrage is now seeking $350 per
hour, and he has not offered any explanation for the increase in his hourly rate of over fifteen
percent in one year. While Mr. Phillips’ affidavit provides some support for a higher rate, it only
represents Mr. Phillips’ opinion as to a reasonable rate, and does not indicate that any other
attorneys actually bill up to $375 per hour in similar matters. See Montanez, 2014 WL 2757472,
at *5 (“We’ve held that conclusory affidavits from attorneys ‘merely opining’ on the
reasonableness of another attorney’s fee—unlike affidavits describing what ‘comparable
attorneys charge for similar services’—have little probative value.”). The Court therefore finds
that a more limited increase in Mr. Wrage’s prior hourly rate is justified, and awards Mr. Wrage
an hourly rate of $315 per hour.
As to the paralegal’s rate, Mr. Barkes’ affidavit similarly states that the “current standard
hourly billing rate for [the firm’s] employment law paralegal is $125 per hour.” Though
Lakeside raised a conclusory objection that this amount was excessive, none of its evidence or
arguments addressed the reasonable rate for a paralegal. The Court finds that $125 per hour is
reasonable in this context, and awards Mr. Davis $125 per hour for the paralegal’s time.
Therefore, multiplying Mr. Wrage’s 26 hours reasonably expended by his reasonable
hourly rate of $315, plus the paralegal’s 12 hours multiplied by $125 per hour, the Court awards
Mr. Davis $9,690 in attorneys’ fees for the motions for sanctions. The Defendant’s motion to
vacate the clerk’s notice of costs to be taxed as premature [DE 151] is DENIED as moot.

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B.

Show Cause Order for Rule 11 and Rule 26 Sanctions
The Court next addresses the show cause order. In the previous order, the Court found

that Lakeside failed to comply with its obligations under Rule 26(e) to supplement its discovery
responses, so pursuant to Rule 37(c), the Court barred Lakeside’s use of several documents at
trial and awarded Mr. Davis his attorneys’ fees for the motions. In ruling on those motions, the
Court also noted that certain of Lakeside’s factual assertions, both in its discovery responses and
in its briefing on the motions for sanctions, had no evidentiary support and were contradicted by
the record. Court therefore ordered Lakeside to show cause why it should not be sanctioned
under Rule 11(c) and Rule 26(g)(3) for falsely certifying that the factual contentions in its briefs
had evidentiary support, in violation of Rule 11(b)(3), and that its discovery responses were
“complete and correct” at the time they were made, in violation of Rule 26(g)(1)(A). [DE 140].
Lakeside responded as ordered on April 14, 2014, [DE 142], and Mr. Davis submitted a response
on April 28, 2014. [DE 146].
As background, Mr. Davis requested during discovery that Lakeside produce the
personnel file of Mike Nichols (Mr. Davis’s former supervisor and the individual who allegedly
harassed and discriminated against him), including his performance reviews, and all documents
that Lakeside produced to or received from the EEOC relative to his charge of discrimination.
[DE 133-1]. Lakeside declined to produce any such documents, stating: “These documents were
provided to the EEOC in the course of its investigation. The plaintiff has indicated that he
already requested said information from the EEOC and is in possession of the same.” [Id.]. This
was only partly true, as Mr. Davis had already requested a copy of the EEOC’s case file but had
not yet received it. Lakeside had already received its copy of the EEOC file by that time, but
never produced a copy of the file to Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis finally received the file from the
EEOC several months later, at which time he sent a copy to Lakeside.
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When Lakeside disclosed its trial exhibits to Mr. Davis, those exhibits contained a
number of documents that were responsive to Mr. Davis’s discovery requests but that Lakeside
had never produced. Among them was a 2006 performance review of Mr. Nichols. Mr. Davis
moved to exclude that document from trial under Rule 37(c), and Lakeside responded by
repeating its unequivocal assertion that “the employment evaluation was produced to the EEOC
by the defendant during the EEOC’s investigation” and that Mr. Davis received the document
during discovery in the EEOC file. [DE 134 p. 4; see also p. 9 (stating that Lakeside “believed
and continues to believe that opposing counsel had the EEOC file and Evaluation Form, which
was contained within the EEOC file”)]. Based on the complete lack of evidentiary support for
this fact, the Court ordered Lakeside to provide evidentiary support for this assertion and to
detail the nature and extent of the inquiries upon which it had based this assertion.
In response, Lakeside has provided no documentary or other direct evidence that it ever
produced this document to the EEOC, as it has repeatedly claimed. It has not provided any
correspondence by which Mr. Ninkovich purportedly sent the document or any correspondence
in which the EEOC requested the document, and it did not verify the documents in the EEOC’s
possession with a subsequent FOIA request, for example. However, it has submitted affidavits
from two of its attorneys, Court Farrell and Jennifer Davis, and from the Lakeside employee in
charge of the matter, Mike Ninkovich. Mr. Farrell consulted with Mr. Ninkovich when
compiling Lakeside’s discovery responses in 2011 and asked Mr. Ninkovich for Mr. Nichols’
personnel file, among other documents. Mr. Ninkovich recalls advising Mr. Farrell that any such
documents had been submitted to the EEOC, but he has no present recollection of having sent
the document or any documentation of having done so. Mr. Ninkovich does not indicate the basis
for his belief at the time that the document had been sent to the EEOC. Mr. Farrell represents that

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when he served Lakeside’s discovery responses in June 2011, he relied on Mr. Ninkovich’s
statement that the document had been produced.
Mr. Farrell and Ms. Davis also state that the performance evaluation at issue is currently
located in a paper file at the firm that they believe to contain the investigation file they received
from the EEOC. Mr. Farrell has no present recollection of whether this document was in the file
when he received it from the EEOC, but he does not recall having received it from Mr.
Ninkovich directly or from any other source either. Ms. Davis represents that while preparing for
trial in January 2014, she reviewed the file and listed the employment evaluation on Lakeside’s
exhibit list in case it became necessary to rehabilitate Mr. Nichols after questioning by Plaintiff’s
counsel. She states that she was unaware that the document had not been produced to Mr. Davis,
and that she believed Mr. Davis had received the document when he received his copy of the file
from the EEOC.
Based on these representations, the Court is satisfied that Lakeside’s counsel’s
certification of the initial discovery response complied with Rule 26(g) at the time the
certification was made in 2011. Under Rule 26(g), every discovery response must be signed by
an attorney, certifying that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry,” the response is consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Here, defense counsel relied on Mr. Ninkovich’s representation that the document had been sent
to the EEOC in so stating in Lakeside’s discovery response on June 13, 2011. It appears that Mr.
Ninkovich was mistaken, but Mr. Farrell had reason to trust him since, as the person who
interacted with the EEOC for Lakeside, Mr. Ninkovich should have had firsthand knowledge of
this fact. Perhaps Mr. Farrell should have inquired further, particularly since none of the
correspondence between Lakeside and the EEOC investigator contained any request for or

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reference to Mr. Nichols’ personnel file or performance evaluations. But, counsel had no other
reason to disbelieve his client at that time, so the Court finds that his inquiry was reasonable
under Rule 26(g). Henderson v. Jupiter Aluminum Corp., No. , 2006 WL 361063, at *7 (N.D.
Ind. Feb. 15, 2006) (holding that sanctions were not warranted where the attorney reasonably
relied on his client’s factual representations); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1983)
(“In making the inquiry, the attorney may rely on assertions by the client . . . as long as that
reliance is appropriate under the circumstances.”).
Before considering whether the defendant complied with Rule 11 when later reiterating
those assertions in its submissions to the Court, the Court must first consider the applicability of
that rule. Though neither party raised the issue, subsection (d) to Rule 11 states, “This rule does
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules
26 through 37.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments,
which added this subsection, state:
Rules 26(g) and 37 establish certification standards and sanctions that apply to
discovery disclosures, requests, responses, objections, and motions. It is
appropriate that Rules 26 through 37, which are specially designed for the
discovery process, govern such documents and conduct rather than the more
general provisions of Rule 11. Subdivision (d) has been added to accomplish this
result.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. The filing that prompted this Court’s order was
Lakeside’s response to Mr. Davis’ Rule 37 motion, so under a strict application of this
subsection, Rule 11 does not apply. In addition, there is no direct analogue to Rule 11 in Rules
26 or 37 in these circumstances where the objectionable conduct is separate from the party’s
underlying discovery violation and its justification in opposing the motion.
Nonetheless, “[a] district court has the inherent power ‘to fashion an appropriate sanction
for conduct which abuses the judicial process.’” Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d
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787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)).
Sanctions may be appropriate under a court’s inherent authority where a party “acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46, and bad
faith in this context encompasses both reckless and intentional conduct, Mach v. Will Cnty.
Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 2009); Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP,
719 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1026 (2014) (“There is no single
litmus test for determining what constitutes bad faith, though more than mere negligence is
required.”). Therefore, the Court proceeds under its inherent power, with reference to Rule 11 for
the appropriate standard of care in these circumstances.
In applying that standard here, the Court finds that while Lakeside may have initially
been justified in relying on its client’s representation, that was no longer the case when it
responded in opposition to Mr. Davis’ motion for sanctions on February 26, 2014, several years
later. In fact, contrary to Lakeside’s assertion that it had no reason to believe it had not sent the
document to the EEOC or that Mr. Davis had not received it, it had many reasons by that time.
First, in a July 5, 2011 letter responding to Lakeside’s discovery responses, Mr. Davis
specifically pointed out that the documents Lakeside produced contained no indication that it had
sent the personnel records to the EEOC:
Contained within the Plaintiff’s personnel file produced by [Lakeside] are
document requests it received from EEOC federal investigator, Carol Rawlins,
which seeks [sic] the following: an employee list, information for Jennifer
Blackburn and Charles Stevens, a copy of your attendance and absenteeism policy
in effect since Sept. 1, 2008, and names of other employees under Mike Nichols
who violated the attendance policy. (Ex. B, pp. 1, 2) From those documents you
can see that Harbor’s claim that the EEOC requested and received personnel files
is simply incorrect.
[DE 147-7 p. 8].

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In addition, when Mr. Davis’ counsel finally received a copy of the investigation file
from the EEOC, he sent a copy of the file to Lakeside, at which point Lakeside knew precisely
which documents Mr. Davis possessed. Lakeside discounts this fact, stating, “Although a review
of the plaintiff’s EEOC file, when finally received by defense counsel, could have revealed that
the same did not include the subject document, there is no requirement that defense counsel was
obligated to undertake such a duty . . . .” [DE 142 p. 12]. The Court does not agree. Lakeside
imposed that obligation on itself by refusing to provide the documents directly to Mr. Davis and
stating instead that he would receive them from the EEOC. Having chosen to proceed in this
circuitous and cavalier fashion, Lakeside cannot then bury its head in the sand when Mr. Davis
follows up to confirm exactly which documents he received from the EEOC.
Finally, Mr. Davis filed a motion for sanctions relative to Lakeside’s failure to produce
the document. Even if defense counsel had inadvertently missed the above indications, this
placed Lakeside squarely on notice that its facts were mistaken and that Mr. Davis never
received the document. Lakeside had ample reason at this point to doubt whether it had sent the
document to the EEOC and whether Mr. Davis had received it—Lakeside has no documentation
of having sent the document to or received the document from the EEOC, the communications in
the EEOC file contain no request for or reference to the document, and Mr. Davis identified this
discrepancy to Lakeside, provided Lakeside with his own copy of the file, and finally moved for
sanctions. Yet, Lakeside apparently conducted no further inquiry before repeating its unqualified
assertion that the document had been provided to the EEOC and that Mr. Davis had received it.
The Court finds that this does not constitute “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” as
would be required by Rule 11(b)(3), and that this reckless conduct justifies the imposition of
sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority.

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In considering the appropriate recourse, the Court is guided by the principle that “[i]n the
normal course of events, justice is dispensed by the hearing of cases on their merits.” Musser v.
Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court also notes that it has already
granted Mr. Davis’ motion to exclude the document from trial and awarded him his reasonable
attorneys’ fees for that motion.2 The Court also recognizes, however, that this is not the first
instance in which the defendant has failed to exercise the appropriate degree of diligence in this
matter. Lakeside failed to disclose its receipt of several sets of subpoenaed documents and failed
to produce them to Mr. Davis, it failed to disclose several workplace policies it later sought to
use in its own behalf, and as discussed, it failed to produce Mr. Nichols’ performance review and
failed to conduct reasonable investigation into the facts it invoked in defense of its failure to
produce that document. All of this conduct came to light only through Lakeside’s disclosure of
the documents it intended to use at trial—likely meaning those most favorable to it. The Court
can only wonder whether other documents that are not so favorable to Lakeside remain
undisclosed.
Resolving this case on the merits demands that Mr. Davis have access to all the
discoverable documents he has requested in order to fully present his case. Accordingly, the
Court ORDERS Lakeside to conduct a de novo review of its document production to ensure that
it has fully produced all documents responsive to Mr. Davis’ requests. Lakeside’s counsel must
review their own files and review the document requests with their client (after sufficiently
imparting to it the need to be thorough and complete) to verify that it has provided them with all
responsive documents. To the extent Lakeside previously objected to any document requests and
declined to produce documents on that basis, it must review those objections and any subsequent
2

Mr. Davis does not specify what further relief he seeks, but asks this Court to impose whatever
sanctions it deems appropriate.
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correspondence with Mr. Davis relative to those objections to ensure that the factual bases for
those objections remain accurate. Lakeside must complete these tasks, provide Mr. Davis with
any supplemental production and responses, and file a certification of compliance within 45 days
of today’s date. The Court views this remedy as most appropriate under the circumstances and
most geared towards resolving this case on its merits, and the Court does not believe that any
more severe sanctions are warranted at this time.
C.

Conclusion
The Court ORDERS the defendant to pay Mr. Davis $9,690 in attorneys’ fees relative to

the motions for sanctions. Further, as to the Court’s show cause order, the Court ORDERS
Lakeside to conduct a de novo review of its document production, as described herein, to ensure
that it has fully produced all documents responsive to Mr. Davis’ requests. Lakeside must certify
its compliance with this order within 45 days of today’s date. The Defendant’s motion to vacate
the clerk’s notice of costs to be taxed [DE 151] is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 7, 2014

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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