Williams v. Canarecci et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER granting plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant Huffvine in his individual capacity for damages on the claim that he used excessive and unnecessary force, and against Warden Julie Lawson in her individual capacity for damages on the claim that she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. All other claims are dismissed. Parties Frank Canarecci, Sgt Gardner, Jane Doe, John Doe, and All unknown defendants are dismissed. US Marshals Service directed to effect service of process on Defendants Huffvine and Lawson. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/17/11. (ksc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK CANARECCI, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:11-CV-47

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court sua sponte pursuant to 28
U.S.C. section 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant N. Huffvine
in his individual capacity for damages on the claim that he used
excessive and unnecessary force on the Plaintiff, allows him to
proceed against Warden Julie Lawson in her individual capacity for
damages on the claim that she was deliberately indifferent to the
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, and DISMISSES, pursuant to
section 1915A, all other claims and Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Michael Williams (“Williams”) is a state prisoner currently
confined at the Westville Correctional Facility. His complaint
deals with events that occurred while he was confined at the St.
Joseph County Jail in October 2010.

The Defendants are Sheriff

Frank Canarecci, Jail Warden Lawson, Custody Captain N. Huffvine,
Custody Sergeant Gardner, and several John or Jane Doe defendants.

Williams alleges that the Defendants violated rights protected by
the

United

States

Constitution’s

Fourth,

Eighth,

Tenth,

and

Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive and unnecessary force on
him and denying him medical attention.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915A(a), district courts must
review the merits of any “complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity,” and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts
apply the same standard under section 1915A as when addressing a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621,

624 (7th Cir. 2006).
The pleading standards in the context of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim are that the “plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Bell Atlantic v.

A court should assume the

veracity of a complaint’s allegations, and then determine whether
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they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50; 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 884 (2009).
In the context of pro se litigation, the Supreme Court stated
that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to meet the requirements
of Rule 8(a).

The Court further noted that a “document filed pro

se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 127

S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007).
The Plaintiff refers to his complaint as a “verified Bivens”
action, and also references 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (DE 1 at 1).

A

claim that federal officials violated a plaintiff’s Constitutional
rights is brought by means of a Bivens action. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).

Claims that state or municipal officials violated a

plaintiff’s rights must be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section
1983, which provides a cause of action to redress the violation of
federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state
law. Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2004).
Because the Defendants are municipal officials acting under color
of state law, the Plaintiff’s claims arise under section 1983.
To state a valid cause of action under section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and must show that a person

3

acting under color of state law committed the alleged deprivation.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

The first inquiry in every

section 1983 case is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
Williams asserts that St. Joseph County Jail officials used
excessive and unnecessary force against him and denied him medical
attention. He alleges that the Defendants’ actions violated the
Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
“In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,
analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.”
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394, (1989).

The Tenth Amendment

deals with “powers not delegated to the United States,

by the

constitution,” and has no application to the circumstances of this
case. The Plaintiff may have intended to cite the Ninth Amendment,
which provides that the enumeration of certain rights in the
Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”

But the Ninth Amendment deals only with

rights not specifically enumerated in other amendments, and the
right of citizens to be free from excessive use of force by state
officials is specifically enumerated in the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.

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“All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness standard.’”
(emphasis in original).

Id.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive use of force, and
the

Eighth

Amendment’s

cruel

and

unusual

punishments

clause

protects those convicted of crimes from excessive use of force.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979).
Williams does not state whether he was at the St. Joseph
County Jail as a pretrial detainee or serving time on a conviction
when he alleges that jail officials used excessive force on him.
But that will not effect the screening of his claims because
“[a]lthough

the

Eighth

Amendment

only

applies

to

convicted

prisoners, this court has previously stated that the same standard
applies to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause.”

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th

Cir. 2007), citing Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 620 (7th
Cir.2003)

(“The

Eighth

Amendment

does

not

apply

to

pretrial

detainees, but as a pretrial detainee, [a prisoner] was entitled to
at least the same protection against deliberate indifference to his
basic needs as is available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment”).

Accordingly, the Court will analyze the Plaintiff’s

claims under Eighth Amendment standards.

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Excessive Use of Force Claim
A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause consists of two elements: (1) objectively,
whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2)
subjectively, whether the prison official’s actual state of mind
was one of “deliberate indifference” to the deprivation.

Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Williams alleges that Defendant Huffvine, without provocation:
aggressively slammed Plaintiff into a metal rack and cart
with metal lining while grabbing Plaintiff around the
neck chocking Plaintiff causing Plaintiff[‘s] neck to
snap back in a whip blast motion and further slammed
Plaintiff’s right wrist into a metal rack and Plaintiff’s
lower back. Defendant N. Huffvine[‘s] actions caused
Plaintiff extreme pain, [a] tingly sensation and seminumbness in Plaintiff’s neck, right wrist and lower back.
DE 1 at 2, ¶ 3.
A custody officer’s use of physical force against an inmate
may give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). In
evaluating whether an officer used excessive force, the court is to
consider factors such as the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used, and the
extent of injury inflicted. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 321-22.
Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set
out in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith
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effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
“Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 establishes a system of notice pleading,”
and a claim may not be dismissed at the pleadings stage “unless no
relief could be granted ‘under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.’”

Nance v. Vieregge, 147

F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998), quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Giving the Plaintiff the benefit of the

inferences to which he is entitled at the pleadings stage, he has
stated a plausible excessive use of force claim against Captain
Huffvine under the standards set forth in Hudson v. McMillian and
Whitley v. Albers.
Denial of Medical Treatment Claim
In paragraphs five and six of his complaint, Williams alleges
that Defendants Lawson and Gardner denied him timely medical
treatment for the injuries inflicted on him by Defendant Huffvine.
The Eighth Amendment requires the government “to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”

Snipes v.

DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.1996) (cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1126 (1997) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
In medical cases, the Eighth Amendment test is expressed in terms
of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d

710, 714 (7th Cir. 2007); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369
7

(7th Cir. 1997).

A medical need is “serious” for Eighth Amendment

purposes if it is either one that a physician has diagnosed as
mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and if
untreated could result in further significant injury or unnecessary
pain, and that significantly affects the person’s daily activities
or features chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at
1373.
In Paragraph five, Williams states that Warden Lawson “refused
to call for medical staff after Plaintiff informed he[r] of his
injuries as a result of the battery that was committed by defendant
N. Huffvine and Cpl. John Doe” (DE 1 at 2, ¶ 5).

Williams

plausibly alleges that he had a serious medical need, that he
informed Defendant Lawson of that need, and that she refused to
allow him to be seen by medical personnel. Giving the Plaintiff the
benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled at the pleadings
stage, the court cannot say that he can prove no set of set of
facts consistent with his claim that Defendant Lawson was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

In Paragraph six,

Williams asserts that:
he informed defendant Sgt. Gardner of the battery . . .
and he immediately got on his radio and called medical
staff for Plaintiff’s neck, back and right wrist injuries, which medical staff refused to come and provide
medical attention . . . Sgt. Gardner failed to provide
Plaintiff with a “Duty of Care” and violated Plaintiff’s
civil rights when he failed to call his superior[s] and
inform them of the situation.
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DE 1 at 2 ¶ 6.
When Williams asked Sgt. Gardner for medical treatment, he
responded

by

contacting

medical

staff

who,

according

to

the

complaint, refused to see Williams. These facts state no deliberate
indifference claim against Sgt. Gardner because he attempted to
obtain help for Williams; it was the medical staff who declined to
come.

Jail officials are entitled to rely on the judgment of

medical professionals. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th
Cir. 2005). The Plaintiff suggests that Sgt. Gardner should have
informed his superiors “of the situation” (DE 1 at 2 ¶ 6). But his
superiors, Warden Lawson and Captain Huffvine, were already aware
of the situation.
Claims against Sheriff Canarecci
In Paragraph eight of his complaint, Williams seeks to bring
individual and official capacity damage claims against St. Joseph
County Sheriff Frank Canarecci.

In his individual capacity damage

claim, Williams alleges that Sheriff Canarecci is liable “through
respondate (sic) superior directly and indirectly for the” actions
of his subordinates (DE 1 at 3 ¶ 8).
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for damages based on
personal liability; a plaintiff must show the defendant’s personal
involvement,

participation,

or

direct

responsibility

for

the

conditions of which he complains. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269,
273 (7th Cir. 1986). The doctrine of respondeat superior, under
9

which a supervisor may be held liable for an employee’s actions,
has no application to section 1983 actions.

Gayton v. McCoy, 593

F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). Supervisory liability will be found
only

if

the

supervisor,

with

knowledge

of

the

subordinate’s

conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it.

That is, to

be liable for the conduct of subordinates, a supervisor must be
personally involved in that conduct.

Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d

527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1995).
[S]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing to
detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not
liable . . .
The supervisors must know about the
conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or
turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They
must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.
Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir
1998).
The complaint does not allege that Sheriff Canarecci had any
personal knowledge of or involvement in the alleged excessive use
of force against Williams by his subordinates or their denial of
medical treatment to him. Williams seeks to hold Sheriff Canarecci
responsible for his subordinates’ actions using the doctrine of
respondeat superior.

But because that doctrine does not apply to

section 1983 actions, he states no individual capacity claim
against Sheriff Canarecci.
In his official capacity damage claim, Williams alleges that
Sheriff Canarecci’s “training, customs, and policies” have allowed

10

his subordinates to disregard the Constitution.

(DE 1 at 3 ¶ 8).

An official capacity damage claim against a municipal official “is
not a suit against the official as an individual; the real party in
interest is the entity.” Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Indiana,
839 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 1988).

Municipalities cannot be held

liable for damages under section 1983 unless a governmental policy
or custom caused the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights.
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A “custom” or “policy” can take one of three forms: (1)
an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice, that,
although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to
constitute a “custom or usage” with force of law; or (3)
an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused
by a person with final policy-making authority.
Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1113 (7th Cir. 2000).
“Ordinarily, one incident is not sufficient to establish a custom
that can give rise to Monell liability.” Williams v. Heavener, 217
F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Calusinski v. Kruger, 24 F.3d
931, 936 (7th Cir.1994).
Nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendants Huffvine and
Lawson’s actions were the result of a policy or practice established or sanctioned by Sheriff Canarecci.

Accordingly, Williams

has not stated an official capacity damage claim against the
Sheriff based on policy or practice.
Williams

also

asserts

that

properly train his subordinates.

Sheriff

Canarecci

failed

to

This is another species of

official capacity claim. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 906 (7th Cir.
11

2005) (failure to train claim “could only be asserted against
employees in their official capacities”).
An allegation of a “failure to train” is available only
in limited circumstances. To prevail, Cornfield must show
that District 230’s “failure to train its employees in a
relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ ”
to the rights of students. City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412
(1989). Deliberate indifference itself is an elusive
standard. The Supreme Court reasoned that policymakers
would be deliberately indifferent when “in light of the
duties assigned to the specific ... employees[,] the need
for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights.” Id. In order to ensure that
isolated instances of misconduct are not attributable to
a generally adequate policy or training program, we
require a high degree of culpability on the part of the
policymaker. Coupled with a causation requirement, this
standard ensures that the violation alleged is not too
far removed from the policy or training challenged as
inadequate. Taken together, these two considerations
amount to a requirement that liability be based on a
finding that the policymakers have actual or constructive
notice that a particular omission that is likely to
result in constitutional violations. Otherwise, we would
risk creating de facto respondeat superior liability,
which is contrary to Monell. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
693-94, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38.
Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991
F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993).
Allegations of inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts
to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
police come into contact.

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989).
[T]his court [has] listed three showings required to
support a claim that a municipality's failure to train
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amounted to “deliberate indifference” of the rights of
citizens: (1) that “a policy maker ... know[ ] ‘to a
moral certainty’ that ... employees will confront a given
situation”; (2) that “the situation either presents the
employee with a difficult choice of the sort that
training or supervision will make less difficult or that
there is a history of employees mishandling the situation”; and (3) that “the wrong choice by the ... employee
will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's
constitutional rights.”
Kitzman-Kelley, on behalf of Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d
454, 459 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting Young v. County of Fulton, 160
F.3d 899, 903-4 (2nd Cir. 1988).
The courts have established high standards for a “failure to
train” theory, and “[i]solated instances of misconduct are not
attributable to a generally adequate policy or training program, we
require

a

high

policymaker.”

degree

of

culpability

on

Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327.

the

part

of

the

The need for training

must be obvious, and the supervisors must have known of an ongoing
problem and been deliberately indifferent to it [Id.].
The allegation that Sheriff Canarecci failed to train Captain
Huffvine and Warden Lawson does not meet the high standard for
allowing a failure to train claim to proceed.

Neither situation -

presents jail officials with a difficult choice of the sort that
training or supervision will make less difficult.

The facts

alleged by the Plaintiff simply do not support a failure to train
claim against Sheriff Canarecci.
John and Jane Doe Defendants
In Paragraph four of his complaint, Williams alleges that
13

Corporal John Doe was also involved in Captain Huffvine’s excessive
use of force; in paragraph two he seeks to sue a Jane Doe officer
who he alleges called for assistance, falsely asserting that
Williams had threatened her; and in paragraph seven, he seeks to
sue “Jane and John Doe (medical staff)” for not treating him after
Sgt. Gardner called them (DE 1 at 3, ¶ 7). But Williams may not
pursue claims against these jail officials until he has identified
them by name.
The United States Marshal’s office is charged with effecting
service of process for inmates confined in state penal institutions.

“When the district court instructs the Marshal to serve

papers on behalf of a prisoner, the prisoner need furnish no more
than the information necessary to identify the defendant.” Sellers
v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1990). “The Marshals
Service needs from the prisoner information sufficient to identify
the guard (‘John Doe No. 23' won't do).”

Id. at 602.

Because

Williams has not provided the information necessary to identify the
Doe defendants in this case, the Marshal can not serve them with
process, and the Court cannot acquire personal jurisdiction over
them.
[I]t is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does
not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.
Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
14

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Doe defendants. If
Williams is later able to identify these jail officials through
discovery, he may seek to amend his complaint to add them as
defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant
Captain N. Huffvine in his individual capacity for damages on the
claim that he used excessive and unnecessary force on the Plaintiff, and allows him to proceed against Warden Julie Lawson in her
individual capacity for damages on the claim that she was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s serious medical needs;
(2) DISMISSES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915A, all other
claims and DISMISSES Sheriff Frank Canarecci, Sergeant Gardner,
Officer John Doe, Officer Jane Doe, and the Jane and John Doe
medical staff;
(3) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS that
Defendants Huffvine and Lawson respond to the complaint as provided
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(4) DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process
on Defendants Huffvine and Lawson on the Plaintiff’s behalf, and
DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to ensure that a copy of this order is
served on them along with the summons and complaint.
DATED: June 17, 2011

/S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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