Campbell v. Cowen
Filing
75
OPINION AND ORDER denying 48 Motion to Dismiss and 60 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 5/9/2012. (kds)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DAVID CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
OSCAR COWEN, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:11 CV 74
OPINION and ORDER
David Campbell, a pro se prisoner, brought this suit against Starke County Sheriff
Oscar Cowen and Starke County Jail employees Bob Simms, Eddy Dierssen, and Dawn
Schumacher for housing him under inhumane conditions at the jail. (DE # 41.) Before
the court are two motions filed by the defendants. Dierssen moves to dismiss the claim
against him pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (DE # 48), and Schumacher moves for
summary judgment on the ground that Campbell failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing suit. (DE # 60.) The court addresses each motion in turn.
I.
Motion to Dismiss
To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards, a complaint must contain
enough factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v.
Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603.
In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court must construe the
complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded
facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, “[a] document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Here, Campbell alleges that on or about December 17, 2009, he and four other
pretrial detainees were placed in the “drunk tank” at the Starke County Jail, where they
were kept for 10 days in “total darkness” in a filthy cell without proper bedding or
hygiene supplies. (DE #38 at 3-5.) He claims that as a result of these conditions he lost
weight, developed a rash, and suffered an exacerbation of his mental problems, which
include agoraphobia, anxiety disorders, and paranoid schizophrenia. (Id. at 3-8.) With
respect to Dierssen, Campbell alleges that on December 17, 2009, Dierssen became
aware of the conditions under which he and the others were being housed. Dierssen
contacted Simms to inform him that the detainees in the detox cell were being housed in
total darkness. Simms allegedly told Dierssen to leave them in the dark, which he did.
(Id. at 6.) It can be plausibly inferred from the complaint that Dierssen took no further
action to remedy the situation during the 10 days Campbell and the others remained in
the dark.
As was fully explained in the screening order, the conditions Campbell describes
satisfy the objective component of the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry by showing that
2
he was deprived of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (inadequate bedding constituted
denial of civilized measure of life’s necessities); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 720-21
(7th Cir. 1995) (inmate stated Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate heat,
clothing, and bedding); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992) (prisoner
stated Eighth Amendment claim where he was held in a filthy cell that lacked adequate
heating and contained inadequate bedding).
However, Dierssen argues that Campbell’s allegations are inadequate to
establish that he was deliberately indifferent to Campbell’s health and safety. (DE # 48.)
Admittedly the allegations against Dierssen are sparse, but they are sufficient to state a
plausible claim under federal pleading standards.
As recounted above, Campbell alleges that Dierssen was personally aware of the
conditions under which he and the other detainees were being housed. It can be
plausibly inferred that Dierssen simply turned a blind eye to these conditions despite
being aware that the detainees had no bedding, lights, or hygiene supplies. According
to the complaint, these conditions continued for another 10 days after Dierssen became
aware of them. Although further factual development may show that Dierssen did take
some action to remedy the situation, or that it was beyond his control to do so, giving
Campbell the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he has stated a plausible
claim against Dierssen. See Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (conduct is
deliberately indifferent when the defendant knew “that the plaintiff was at serious risk
3
of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring”);
Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (where inmate complained about
severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate
indifference”); Jackson, 955 F.2d at 22 (finding adequate evidence of deliberate
indifference where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants “visited his unit routinely,
observed the conditions described in it, but failed to take adequate corrective
measures”).
Dierssen gives considerable weight to a statement in Campbell’s complaint
expressing concern that he did not have “enough factual matter” to state a claim against
Dierssen. (See DE # 38 at 6.) Based on this statement, Dierssen argues that Campbell has
pled himself out of court. (DE # 48 at 2.) The court disagrees. A pro se prisoner’s own
assessment of the adequacy of his pleading is irrelevant; the operative question is
whether this court views the complaint as sufficient. As stated above, Campbell’s
allegations satisfy federal pleading standards. At this stage, Campbell could not be
expected to know what transpired between Dierssen and the other defendants, or who
among them should be held responsible for his 10-day detention in total darkness. See
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 763 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that a pro se prisoner often
may not know who among a group of defendants wronged him since an inmate’s
opportunities for conducting a precomplaint inquiry are “virtually nil”). All Campbell
alleges that he knows is that Dierssen was fully aware of the deplorable conditions
under which Campbell was housed and did nothing to help him. Campbell has
4
adequately stated a claim against Dierssen, and accordingly, the motion to dismiss will
be denied.
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th
Cir. 2003). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not
rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading, but rather must “marshal and
present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners are prohibited
from bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions until “such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of
proof. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). “To exhaust remedies, a
prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
5
Nevertheless, inmates are only required to exhaust administrative remedies that
are “available.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684
(7th Cir. 2006). The availability of a remedy is not a matter of what appears “on paper,”
but rather whether the process was in actuality available for the prisoner to pursue.
Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684. Thus, when prison officials prevent an inmate from using the
administrative process, such as by failing to provide him the necessary forms,
administrative remedies are not considered to be “available.” Id. In essence, “[p]rison
officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy
becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance
or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole,
438 F.3d at 809.
Here, Schumacher has submitted evidence that the jail has a grievance process in
place through which detainees can complain about the conditions of their confinement.
(DE # 61-2 at 1-3.) Campbell does not dispute that he failed to avail himself of the
grievance process, but asserts that he did not do so for two reasons. (DE ## 58, 69.) He
asserts that he was never made aware of the existence of the grievance process, and
furthermore, even if he had been aware of the process, he would have been unable to
file a grievance because he was housed in “total darkness without any supplies to write
with.” (DE # 69.)
6
Schumacher faults Campbell’s assertions for being “self-serving” and thus
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.1 (DE # 72 at 2.) However, there is no question
that a non-moving party’s affidavit can be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003). An affidavit is not deficient
simply because it serves the affiant’s own interests:
The defendant points to a number of cases from this Circuit for the
proposition that self-serving, uncorroborated, and conclusory statements in
testimony are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. It is not
the self-serving nature of the affidavits, however, that sealed their fate in
these cases. After all, most affidavits submitted for these purposes are
self-serving. Instead, these affidavits fail to thwart summary judgment
because they are not based on personal knowledge as required by both the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on summary judgment, Rule 56(e) . . . and by
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 . . . . Furthermore, although personal
knowledge may include reasonable inferences, those inferences must be
grounded in observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must
not be flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors about
matters remote from that experience.
Schumacher’s reply brief is somewhat confusing, and it is not clear if she is
arguing that one of Campbell’s documents was not submitted in the form of an
affidavit. (See DE # 72; see also DE # 69.) Campbell submitted an affidavit attesting to
being housed in total darkness with no hygiene supplies, bedding, or personal items.
(DE # 58.) In a separate document, which is not notarized, he asserts that he was not
made aware of the grievance process. (DE # 69.) Although not in the form of an
affidavit, the statements in this document are based on Campbell’s own personal
knowledge and would be admissible through his testimony at trial. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(c)(2), (4). The court is cognizant of Campbell’s pro se status, and also takes into
account the added confusion caused by the fact that Schumacher originally filed a
motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), despite attaching outside documents for
the court’s consideration. (See DE # 60.) The motion was converted to a motion for
summary judgment, but Campbell’s response indicates that he may be confused about
the nature of the proceedings, as he requests that the court not “dismiss” his case. (See
DE # 69.) Under these circumstances, the court finds it appropriate to consider
Campbell’s filing.
1
7
Payne, 337 F.3d 772. Campbell’s assertions do not suffer from these deficiencies. Instead
he makes assertions about two matters within his personal knowledge. There is nothing
inherently implausible about his assertions, and the court cannot reject them simply
because they serve Campbell’s interests.
Other than attacking Campbell’s responsive documents as “self-serving,”
Schumacher does not offer specific evidence to refute his assertions. She submitted an
affidavit from Sheriff Cowen along with her original motion, which indicates that the
jail has a general practice of informing detainees about the grievance process at the time
they are booked in the jail. (DE # 61-2.) This assertion does not directly undercut
Campbell’s claim that he was not told about the grievance process, nor does it appear
from Sheriff Cowen’s affidavit that he was the jail employee who booked Campbell or
that he otherwise has personal knowledge of what occurred in connection with
Campbell’s booking. (See id.)
Nevertheless, even if Sheriff Cowen’s affidavit created factual dispute over
whether Campbell was told about the grievance process, as stated above, Campbell
provides another reason why he did not file a grievance. He claims that he was unable
to submit a written grievance in any event because he was housed in total darkness and
had no access to writing supplies, paper, or the necessary forms. (DE # 58, 69.) He
further asserts that he and the other detainees made repeated oral complaints to the
correctional officers about the conditions of their confinement, but instead of being
given a written grievance form to complete they were told simply to “talk to the
8
Sheriff.” (DE # 69.) Campbell attests that when they did speak to the Sheriff, he told
them, “F--- you, you little bastards. You can rot in there.” (Id.) In addition to his own
affidavit, he submits an affidavit from another detainee held in the drunk tank who
attests to the lack of lighting and other conditions Campbell describes. (DE # 74 at 3.)
He also submits an affidavit from a former Starke County Jail officer, who attests that
he witnessed Campbell and the other detainees being held in “terrible” conditions
without lights, adequate bedding, or other items. (DE # 74 at 1.)
Schumacher has not submitted evidence to refute these assertions. Therefore, the
undisputed facts show that under the circumstances, the grievance process was not
“available” to Campbell. See Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684-85 (summary judgment not
appropriate where the plaintiff submitted evidence that he was denied forms and
intimidated into not pursuing a formal grievance); Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th
Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiff submitted evidence that he
was not given the proper forms needed to exhaust). Schumacher has not met her
burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to judgment on exhaustion grounds, and
accordingly, the motion will be denied.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (DE # 48) and the motion
for summary judgment (DE # 60) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May 9, 2012
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?