Hogan v. Superintendent

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING petition for writ of habeas corpus, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 5/16/12. (jld)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ANTHONY HOGAN,

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Petitioner,
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vs.
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SUPERINTENDENT, Indiana State Prison, )
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Respondent.
)

CAUSE NO. 3:11-CV-0098 PS

OPINION AND ORDER
On November 7, 2011, Lieutenant James Meehan, a correctional officer at the Indiana
State Prison, wrote a conduct report charging inmate Anthony Hogan with possession of a
deadly weapon – an 8 ½ inch shank or knife. [DE 15-1.] The weapon was found inside the
locking device of the cell door and, according to the conduct report, it was accessible to the
occupant of the cell. [Id.] On November 19, 2011, the disciplinary hearing officer found Hogan
guilty and docked him thirty days of earned credit time. Hogan unsuccessfully appealed to the
Indiana State Prison Superintendent [DE 15-6], and then to the Indiana Department of Correction
Final Reviewing Authority [DE 15-7].
Hogan filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging his loss of earned credit time. I reviewed Hogan’s petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and granted him leave to proceed on his claim in ground
two of his petition that the hearing officer found him guilty without sufficient evidence. I
dismissed ground one of the petition in which Hogan asserted that he was denied an impartial
hearing officer.
Where prisoners lose good time credits at prison disciplinary hearings, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees them certain procedural protections, including (1)
advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision

maker; (3) opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact
finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974).

Only “some evidence” is needed to support the decision of the prison

disciplinary board. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985).
Hogan alleges that there was no evidence to support a finding of guilt. The problem with
this argument is that the amount of evidence needed to support a finding of guilt in the context of
prison disciplinary hearings is very modest. A reviewing court must uphold a finding of guilt if
“there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached” by the
disciplinary hearing board. Id. at 455-56. The Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to call the
“some evidence” standard a “meager threshold.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir.
2011). In fact, in the appropriate circumstances, the conduct report alone may be sufficient
evidence to support a finding of guilt. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.
1999). The evidence that Hogan possessed a weapon is more than meager.
In his conduct report, Lieutenant Meehan states that he and other correctional officers
found an 8½ inch knife in the locking device of Hogan’s cell. He further states that, in his
opinion, the knife could only have been placed in the locking device by the cell occupant,
Hogan. In addition to the conduct report, the hearing officer also considered the Evidence
Record and photographs of the knife that was removed from the locking device of Hogan’s cell
[DE 15-2].
Hogan argues that the evidence in this case is insufficient because Lieutenant Meehan
had “no personal knowledge of how the weapon came to be in the [cell] door, or how long it had
been there” [DE 17-1 at 2]. He also asserts that when the cell door was open someone other than
the occupant could have placed something in the locking devise, that the evidence does not show
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that he placed the weapon in the locking device of his cell door, and that, in his opinion, he could
not have retrieved the weapon. Hogan argues that the evidence “merely proves that a knife was
found in the door, not that the petitioner ever possessed it” [DE 17-1 at 3].
Hogan’s attempt to posit other possibilities as to how the knife got into his cell or to
otherwise poke holes in the evidence does not mean that there isn’t some evidence that he is the
one actually responsible for the weapon. Recall that the standard of review is a very lenient one.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). The undisputed fact that correctional
officers recovered a knife from the locking device of Hogan’s cell provides sufficient evidence
under the applicable standard to support a finding that Hogan was guilty of possession of a
dangerous weapon. Where a weapon is found in an inmate’s cell, he may be found guilty of
possession of the weapon by joint or constructive possession. Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d
341, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1999) (due process is not violated when a prisoner is disciplined for
possession of a weapon found in a cell occupied by the prisoner and three other inmates because
there was “some evidence” that the prisoner possessed the weapon). Under the reasoning of
Hamilton, there is plainly some evidence that Hogan possessed the knife found in the locking
device of a cell that he occupied.
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED [DE 1].
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 16, 2012
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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