Brown v. Superintendent et al

Filing 2

OPINION AND ORDER granting petitioner leave to proceed on ground one of his petition and on ground four. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the rules governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, denies leave to proceed on grounds two and three of his petition. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 5/13/2011. (cc: IAG)(kds)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CLAYTON BROWN,
Petitioner
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA
STATE PRISON,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 3:11-CV-148

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court sua sponte pursuant to Rule 4
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Rule 4 requires the
Court to review a habeas corpus petition and dismiss it if “it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief . . .” This rule provides
the Court with a gatekeeping responsibility to sift through habeas
corpus petitions and dismiss those petitions which obviously lack
merit. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
petitioner leave to proceed on ground one of his petition for writ
of habeas corpus, that the hearing officer denied him evidence, and
on ground four in which he asserts that there was no evidence in
the record to support a finding of guilt, and DENIES him leave to
proceed on claims two and three of his petition.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner Clayton Brown, a prisoner confined at the Indiana
State Prison, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254, challenging the results of a
prison disciplinary hearing.

A disciplinary hearing officer found

Brown guilty of possession of intoxicants and sanctioned him with
a loss of “fifteen (15) days earned credit time, two (2) weeks
commissary, and permanent loss of contact visitation” (DE 1 at 1).

DISCUSSION
Where prisoners lose good time credits at prison disciplinary
hearings, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees
them certain procedural protections, including (1) advance written
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an
impartial decision maker; (3) opportunity to call witnesses and
present

documentary

evidence

in

defense

when

consistent

with

institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written
statement by the fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), and “some evidence” to support the decision of the prison
disciplinary

board.”

Superintendent,

Mass.

Correctional

Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
In ground two of his petition, Brown asserts the Disciplinary
Hearing Board “denied [him] the opportunity to utilize the lay
advocate” [DE 1 at 3].

But the Constitution does not entitle a

prisoner to a lay advocate at a prison disciplinary hearing unless
he is illiterate or the charge against him is so complex that it is

2

unlikely that he will be able to collect and present the evidence
necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case.

Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570; Miller v. Duckworth. 963 F.2nd 1002,
1004 (7th Cir. 1992).

Nothing in this record suggests that Brown

is illiterate or was unable to gather evidence, and the charge
against him was simple.
In ground three of his petition, Brown asserts that the
hearing officer was not “impartial” because she “wrote down only
what she wanted in the official record” and “appears to have
intentionally suppressed” exculpatory evidence” (DE 1 at 4).
Due

process

requires

that

decision-makers

in

prison

disciplinary proceedings be impartial in that they have no direct
personal involvement in the incident that forms the subject of the
hearing.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 592; Redding v. Fairman,

717 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025
(1984). Wolff does not guarantee that a prisoner will have skilled
and knowledgeable hearing officers who will not make mistakes; what
Wolff does guarantee is that the author of the conduct report or
someone involved in investigating the incident does not serve as a
hearing officer.

Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d at 1113. Nothing in

Brown’s statement of facts supports an allegation that his hearing
officer was not impartial within the meaning of Wolff v. McDonnell.

3

In ground one of his petition, Brown alleges that the hearing
officer denied him evidence, and in ground four, he asserts that
there was no evidence in the record to support a finding of guilt.
Giving Brown the benefit of the inferences to which he is entitled
at this stage of the proceedings, these grounds may state claims
upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Petitioner leave to proceed on ground one
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, that the hearing
officer denied him evidence, and on ground four in which he
asserts that there was no evidence in the record to support a
finding of guilt;
(2) Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Court, DENIES the
Petitioner leave to proceed on grounds two and three of his
petition; and
(3) DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to ensure that a copy of
this order is served on the Respondent and the Indiana
Attorney General along with the order to show cause.

DATED: May 13, 2011

/S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

4