Skirnick v. Miller et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING leave to proceed against deft Miller in personal capacity on 14th Amendment claim; DISMISSING all other claims; DISMISSING defendants John Doe and John Does; ORDERING deft Miller to respond to complaint; DIRECTING USM to effect service of process. Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 5/30/12. (jld)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL SKIRNICK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. MILLER, M.D., et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:11-CV-279 PS

OPINION AND ORDER
In 2009, Plaintiff Michael Skirnick was severely injured when his clothing caught fire
from a cutting torch he was using. He alleges that on or about July 13, 2009, he was arrested by
Griffith police officers, but that Lake County Jail officials would not accept him because of his
injuries. He states that two Merrillville Police officers then took him to St. Mary’s hospital where

Dr. Miller signed paperwork stating that he had no serious medical needs that would prevent him
from being housed at the jail. Skirnick is suing Dr. Miller and the police officers who took him
to the hospital, asserting that their conduct was “contrary to Indiana Constitution Articles 1 § 12,
14 et seq. and the United States constitution 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments” [DE 1 at 2].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and
dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, or any portion of a complaint, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Courts apply the same standard under §
1915A as when addressing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d
621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006).

In the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that the “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead the
Court held that the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the Court
also took up the issue of pleading standards, but this time in the context of pro se litigation. In
Erickson, the Court stated that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” to meet the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Id. at 93. The Court further noted that a “document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 94 (internal
citations and quotations omitted). In an effort to reconcile Twombly and Erickson, the Seventh
Circuit has read those cases together to mean that “at some point the factual detail in a complaint
may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which
the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will,
as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

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Skirnick brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action to
redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law.
Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2004). To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must show that a person acting under color of state law committed the alleged deprivation.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Dr. Miller is a doctor employed at a private hospital and would generally not be a state
actor within the meaning of § 1983. But Skirnick alleges that St. Mary’s Hospital had a “contract
with [the] Merillville Police Department” or the Lake County Jail to examine and treat inmates
[DE 1 at 2]. If that is true, Dr. Miller may have acted under color of state law because doctors
who see and treat inmates on behalf of state or municipal entities are considered to be state actors.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 824-25 (7th Cir. 2009).
The first inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979). Skirnick’s allegation that the defendants’ actions violated provisions of Indiana’s

constitution states no claim upon which relief can be granted in a claim brought under § 1983.
Skirnick alleges that the defendants’ actions violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ due process clauses and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. In addressing a claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the defendants’ actions. Graham v.
Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause relates only to
the federal government and its agencies. See Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 831 F.2d 678,
681-83 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Craig v. Cohn, 80 F.Supp.2d 944, 947 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (Fifth
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Amendment’s due process clause applies only to acts of the federal government and does not
limit actions of state officials).
Claims against law enforcement officers in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause protects pretrial detainees and the Eighth Amendment’s cruel
and unusual punishments clause protects the rights of those convicted of crimes. Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979). Because Skirnick complains of events that occurred after he was
taken into custody pursuant to an arrest warrant but before his conviction, his claims arise under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. But “[a]lthough the Eighth Amendment only
applies to convicted prisoners . . . the same standard applies to pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.” Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th
Cir. 2007).
A violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause consists of
two elements: (1) objectively, whether the injury is sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of
the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) subjectively, whether the official’s
actual state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference” to the deprivation. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In medical cases, the Eighth
Amendment test is expressed in terms of whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to
the plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).
A medical need is “serious” for Eighth Amendment purposes if it is either one that a
physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention, and if untreated could result in further
significant injury or unnecessary pain, and that significantly affects the person’s daily activities
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or features chronic and substantial pain. Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2007);
Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373.
For a medical professional to be liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
medical needs, he must make a decision that represents such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
a judgment.
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Skirnick alleges that jail officials “would not accept him due to the Plaintiff having 3rd
degree burns which included, but were not limited to: exposed bone, exposed ligaments, exposed
tendons and massive tissue damage” [DE 1 at 3]. He further alleges that he was taken to St.
Mary’s hospital “for the purpose of having him declared ‘fit’ to be incarcerated instead of for
treatment” [DE 1 at 3] and that “[w]hen the defendant (Dr. Miller) signed paperwork for the
Merillville Police Department stating the Plaintiff had no serious medical issues and/or needs, he
did so for the sole purpose of depriving the Plaintiff of needed medical care and to expedite the
Plaintiff being incarcerated; this orchestrated a gratuitous cruelty upon the Plaintiff and was the
vehicle by which the Plaintiffs civil rights were impaired” [DE 1 at 3].
“Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 . . . establishes a system of notice pleading,” and a complaint may not
be dismissed at the pleading stage “unless no relief could be granted ‘under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.’” Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th
Cir. 1998), quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The Plaintiff alleges
that he had open, obvious, and serious injuries, but that Dr. Miller declined to treat these injuries
and instead certified that he had “no serious medical issues and/or needs” [DE 1 at 3]. Assuming
that Dr. Miller acted under color of state law when he examined Skirnick and that Skirnick had
the serious and obvious injuries he claims, then giving him the benefit of the inferences to which

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he is entitled at the pleadings stage, Skirnick states a plausible Fourteenth Amendment denial of
medical treatment claim against Dr. Miller.
Skirnick also names two John Doe police officers as defendants, but he may not pursue
claims against them until he has identified them by name. The United States Marshal’s office is
charged with effecting service of process for prison inmates. “When the district court instructs
the Marshal to serve papers on behalf of a prisoner, the prisoner need furnish no more than the
information necessary to identify the defendant.” Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602
(7th Cir. 1990). “The Marshal needs from the prisoner information sufficient to identify the
guard (‘John Doe No. 23’won't do).” Id. at 602. Because Skirnick has not provided the
information necessary to identify the Doe defendants in this case, the Marshal can not serve them
with process, and the Court cannot acquire personal jurisdiction over them. “[I]t is pointless to
include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the
door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v.
Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
The Court will dismiss the John Doe defendants without prejudice. If the Plaintiff can
identify those defendants later, he may move to add them as defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Plaintiff leave to proceed against Defendant Miller in his personal
capacity on the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim that Defendant Miller denied him
needed and obvious medical treatment;
(2) DISMISSES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, all other claims, and DISMISSES
Defendants John Doe and John Does without prejudice;

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(3) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), ORDERS that Defendant Miller respond to the
complaint as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(4) DIRECTS the Marshals Service to effect service of process on Defendant Miller, and
DIRECTS the clerk’s office to ensure that a copy of this order is served on him along with the
summons and complaint.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 30, 2012
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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