Heyne v. American Pancake House et al

Filing 45

OPINION AND ORDER denying 32 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 3/30/12. (smp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ANGELA HEYNE, ANGELA KING, AND
STACEY DEVREESE,
Plaintiffs
vs.
NICK KLADIS AND NICK’S AMERICAN
PANCAKE HOUSE & CAFÉ INC.,
Defendants

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Cause No. 3:11-CV-305-RLM-CAN

OPINION and ORDER
The second amended complaint filed in this case by plaintiffs Angela
Heyne, Angela King, and Stacey DeVreese alleges sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII and also charges that defendant Nick Kladis violated
certain health codes in how he handled food. This matter is before the court on
a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 32) pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c) filed by defendants Nick Kladis and Nick’s American
Pancake and Café Inc. The motion focuses only on the health code violation
allegations and asks the court to award Mr. Kladis judgment as to that issue
only. The plaintiffs oppose the motion.
In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court takes all
facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiffs. Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.
2007) citing Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2004). A
Rule 12(c) motion is analyzed using the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 633. To present a cognizable claim, a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). While detailed factual
allegations aren’t required, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
Mr. Kladis doesn’t raise objections to most of the plaintiffs’ complaint;
rather, he focuses his motion on several specific paragraphs. In the general
allegations section of their complaint, the plaintiffs made an allegation that Mr.
Kladis’ actions were “outside the bounds of human decency, as evidenced by,”
among other things, his “[s]erving meat that he has hunted in the wild to his
customers by putting it in the chili without their knowledge and in violation of
health rules and regulations, and would ‘dare’ any of the females to question
it.” Compl. at ¶ 14. In Count XI of their complaint, entitled “Violation of Indiana
Food Safety Standards,” the plaintiffs make several assertions: Mr. Kladis
“would kill deer in the wild and bring it to the restaurant to grind it up to put
in his chili,” compl. at ¶ 54; “He would kill quail and rabbits in the wild and
bring such animals to the restaurant and ‘dress’ them in the kitchen,” compl.
at ¶ 55; and “That Nick Kladis would penalize any waitress who complained,”
compl. at ¶ 56. Elsewhere, each of the three plaintiffs claims that she was
discharged from employment (either by constructive discharge or express
termination of employment) but those claims don’t refer directly to the food
safety issues.
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In his motion, Mr. Kladis contends that, because enforcement of food
health codes is entrusted to a department of the state of Indiana, the three
plaintiffs don’t have standing to bring a claim for violations of those codes. In
counter to that, the plaintiffs point out that their claim isn’t a private claim
under health codes, but a claim for retaliatory conduct in an employment
setting.
Assuming, as the court must, Thomas v. Guardsmark, 381 F.3d at 704,
that Mr. Kladis blatantly violated the health code, that he threatened
employment-related repercussions against anyone who complained about his
violations, and that he took negative employment-related action against the
plaintiffs including harassment and wrongfully terminated them, the plaintiffs
appear to contemplate a claim that turns not on the health code, but on
retaliatory termination. This is further supported by the plaintiff’s response to
this motion in which they state that the allegations relate not to violations of
the food code itself, but to retaliatory action taken by Mr. Kladis that is
tangentially related to the violations.
A complaint doesn’t need to set forth the exact legal theory, “so long as
some legal theory can be sustained on the facts pleaded in the complaint.”
O’Grady v. Village of Libertyville, 304 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2002). “It is not
necessary to specify particular legal theories in a complaint, so long as the
facts alleged give adequate notice to the defendant of the basis of the suit.”
Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 1997). While Mr. Kladis might
be correct that the plaintiffs wouldn’t have standing to bring a private action
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for witnessing violations of food safety, the court needn’t reach a conclusion on
that question because some legal theory can be sustained based on the facts in
the complaint. See O’Grady v. Libertyville, 304 F.3d at 723. By their complaint,
the plaintiffs have put Mr. Kladis on notice of their claim of employment
discrimination and harassment (see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) which requires that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level” Id.), and these facts, including those
related to the food safety violations, the threats of retaliation, and the adverse
employment-related actions, when taken in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, put Mr. Kladis on notice of a potentially viable claim, which meets
the standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Because of this,
the court DENIES Mr. Kladis’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 30, 2012

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

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