Taghon v. Euler et al
Filing
39
OPINION AND ORDER denying 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 7/30/12. (smp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEPHEN TAGHON,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN EULER, et al.,
Defendants.
NO. 3:11-CV-386
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed on February 22, 2012.
For the reasons set
forth below, this motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Stephen Taghon (“Taghon”), is an inmate in the
Indiana Department of Corrections and is currently housed at the
New Castle Correctional Facility.
Taghon filed this action,
alleging that while housed at Westville Correctional Facility, he
warned the Defendants that his life would be in danger if he was
placed in the IC Complex.
Taghon alleges he was nevertheless
placed in the IC Complex and was assaulted by fellow inmates.
Taghon argues that Defendants failed to protect him, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Defendants have
filed the instant motion, claiming this case must be dismissed due
-1-
to Taghon’s failure to exhaust the administrative process.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
The standards that generally govern summary judgment motions
are familiar. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
In other words, the record
must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th
Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court
must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Nucor Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas De
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of
"the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits," if any, that the
movant believes demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has met
this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but
-2-
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill
Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989).
"Whether
a
fact
is
material
depends
on
the
substantive
law
underlying a particular claim and 'only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'"
Walter v.
Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248).
"[A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate,
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of
material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley County REMC,
840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also
Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an
essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment will be appropriate.
Facts
Plaintiff, Stephen Taghon, was incarcerated at the Westville
Correctional Facility (“Westville”) from April 18, 2008 to February
18, 2011.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 6).
Timothy Bean is a Grievance
-3-
Specialist at Westville.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 3).
Bean is familiar with
the grievance procedure followed at Westville and the rules and
regulations of the Indiana Department of Corrections regarding
grievances.
(Dec.
Bean
¶
3).
Bean’s
familiarity
with
the
grievance process, computer programs, computer programs, and forms
at Westville allows him to determine what grievances an offender
has filed.
(Dec. Bean ¶¶ 4-5).
There is a grievance program in
place at Westville which was in place while Taghon was incarcerated
there and during the time that Taghon alleges that his rights were
violated.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 7).
Inmates can grieve matters that involve actions of individual
staff under the grievance program at Westville.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 8).
The grievance process at Westville includes an attempt to resolve
the complaint informally, as well as two formal steps: a formal
written grievance and then an appeal of the response to the level
one grievance.
(Dec. Bean ¶¶ 9-12).
A formal appeal is a second
level of review that affords greater authority to review facility
response and fashion a remedy.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 12).
Exhaustion of
the grievance procedure requires pursuing an appeal to the final
step of the grievance process.
If an inmate does not receive a
response from staff in accordance with the established time frames,
he is entitled to move to the next stage of the process.
(Dec.
Bean ¶¶ 13-14).
On
January
11,
2011,
Taghon
-4-
submitted
a
formal
written
grievance (“Grievance #1") stating that he was assaulted by fellow
inmates on January 7, 2011 and that he was warned staff that his
life was going to be in danger.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 16); (Ex. B).
On
January 14, 2011, Bean returned the grievance to Taghon requesting
more details regarding what staff Taghon warned and when he warned
those staff.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 17); (Ex. B).
Taghon then met with Bean and they discussed the attack.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 6).
On January 18, 2011, Taghon submitted a second
grievance (Grievance #2) stating that he was assaulted by fellow
inmates and that he warned Defendant Euler, Defendant Scott and
Internal Affairs.
(Ex. C).
On January 24, 2011, a response to
Grievance #2 was issued stating that Taghon’s grievance was denied
because there was no documentation of Taghon’s concerns regarding
his safety prior to January 7, 2011, and no evidence that Taghon
warned his Segregation Case Manager or the IC Unit Manager,
Defendant Watts.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 19); (Ex. D).
After receiving the response to Grievance #2, Taghon filled
out a “Request for Interview Form,” asking to be provided a form
with which to complete a grievance appeal.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 8).
On
January 27, 2011, Taghon received another offender grievance form
from either Bean or someone in Bean’s office in response to his
request.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 10). That same day, Taghon filed a third
written grievance (Grievance #3) stating that he did in fact warn
the Administration and the IC Complex Director.
-5-
(Ex. E).
Taghon
believed that submitting the third offender grievance form was his
written grievance appeal.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 10).
On January 31, 2011, a Return of Grievance was sent to Taghon
stating that the issue in Grievance #3 was already addressed in the
January 24th response.
(Ex. F).
Taghon took this to be a denial
of his grievance appeal, and believed that he had completed the
full grievance process at Westville.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 11).
Taghon did not file a formal appeal of Grievance #1, Grievance
#2, or Grievance #3 regarding the events alleged in his complaint.
(Dec. Bean ¶ 22).
Had Taghon appealed the response to his level
one grievance, some remedy could have been offered to him, such as
possible transfer to another facility, separation from the staff
member whose actions he complained of, and/or other relief.
(Dec.
Bean ¶ 23).
Taghon asserts that while he was at Westville, he was never
provided any written material regarding the facility’s policies or
grievance procedures.
postings
around
the
grievance process.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 13).
facility
regarding
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 13).
Nor did he see any
how
to
complete
the
Taghon claims his only
knowledge of the steps in the grievance process was based on what
other prisoners told him.
(Taghon Aff. ¶ 13).
Nevertheless, on
April 21, 2008, Taghon acknowledged receiving orientation as a new
arrival at Westville in both grievances and appeals.
A).
-6-
(Supp. Ex.
Administrative Remedies
Defendants
argue
that
Taghon
failed
to
exhaust
his
administrative remedies; therefore, judgment in their favor is due
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e.
The PLRA provides that prisoners are prohibited from
bringing claims about prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
until
“such
exhausted.”
administrative
remedies
as
are
available
are
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An administrative remedy is
“available” if the administrative procedure has “authority to take
some action in response to a complaint.”
Larkin v. Galloway, 266
F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is designed to provide state
corrections officials “time and opportunity to address complaints
internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002).
In other words, the
PLRA was enacted to allow prison officials an opportunity to
informally resolve disputes that inmates may have before they are
brought into court, which also helps “reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 203-04 (2007) (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 524).
Prisoners are required to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit relating to prison conditions.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006).
The failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense on which the defendants bear the burden of
-7-
proof.
See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006);
see also Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding that “[f]ailure to do what the state requires bars, and
does
not
just
postpone,
suit
under
§
1983.”).
“To
exhaust
remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place,
and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo,
286 F.3d at 1025.
His filings also must contain the “factual
particularity” required by prison rules. Strong v. David, 297 F.3d
646, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2002).
This Circuit has taken a strict
compliance approach with respect to exhaustion, and a prisoner must
properly follow the prescribed administrative procedures in order
to exhaust his remedies.
Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
Additionally, an
inmate is required to pursue his claim through the final step of
the grievance process. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
When an available administrative remedy has not been exhausted, the
claim should be dismissed without prejudice.
See Massey v.
Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).
It is undisputed that Westville had a grievance procedure in
place at the time of the alleged attack, and it is undisputed that
Taghon did not exhaust that grievance procedure.
Thus, at first
blush, it seems that Defendants have indeed proven that Taghon
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
However, the
inquiry in this case centers around whether the grievance process
was “available” to Taghon.
Taghon contends that summary judgment
-8-
is inappropriate on grounds of failure to exhaust.
This Court
notes that “[t]he ability to take advantage of administrative
grievances is not always an ‘either-or’ proposition.
Sometimes
grievances are clearly available; sometimes they are not; and
sometimes there is a middle ground. . . .”
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d
678, 685 (7th Cir. 2006). Cases falling within that middle ground,
like this one, require a “more discriminating analysis.”
Id.
There is a question of material fact as to whether
the administrative remedies can deemed as “unavailable.”
Taghon urges an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
He
asserts that the administrative remedies were unavailable due to
prison staff’s providing him the wrong form on which to file an
appeal.
Taghon argues that, but for the Westville staff providing
him the wrong form to fill out for his grievance appeal, he would
have correctly completed the grievance process.
Taghon asserts
that his third written grievance form contained “what normally
would have been encompassed in a statement for a grievance appeal.”
The reasonable inference, Taghon claims, “is that if prison staff
had just given him the proper form to do a grievance appeal with,
[he]
would
have
completed
administrative remedy process.”
the
grievance
appeal,
and
the
(Response, pp. 7-8).
Defendants concede that this Circuit deems administrative
remedies to be unavailable- and thus excused- if a prison official
prevents an offender from exhausting.
-9-
See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d
678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th
Cir. 2006).
However, the exhaustion requirement is not excused
when it is the prisoner’s mistake that caused the failure to
exhaust.
Dole, 438 F.3d at 811.
Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Taghon, as the
Court must do at this juncture, there is a question of material
fact as to whether Taghon’s failure to exhaust was due to prison
officials preventing him from completing the grievance appeal
process. Indeed, finding that Taghon did request a form with which
to complete a grievance appeal, and in response prison officials
provided him the wrong form, and the use of that form led to his
not being deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies,
Taghon’s failure to exhaust may be excused.
Defendants argue many reasons why they believe there “is a
reasonable inference that Plaintiff knew he was not appealing” when
he submitted Grievance #3.
However, all of those reasons are
merely issues of fact.
What cannot go unnoticed is that there is no evidence in the
record explaining what Taghon knew about filing a grievance appeal
or Westville’s procedures on how to perfect a grievance appeal.
While
there
is
evidence
that
Taghon
acknowledged
receiving
orientation on grievances and appeals when he arrived at Westville,
the record is silent on what exactly that orientation included.
Moreover, while Bean provided a declaration explaining that a
-10-
grievance appeal must be filed to exhaust administrative remedies
at Westville, he does not explain how that grievance appeal process
works. In their brief, Defendants state that if Plaintiff returned
the Grievance Response Report and indicated that he disagreed with
the Response, then it would clearly indicated that Plaintiff wanted
to appeal his denied grievance.
However, there is no evidence in
the record that that is the proper procedure to pursue a grievance
appeal and, similarly, there is no evidence in the record that
Taghon knew of that procedure.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is DENIED.
DATED:
July 30, 2012
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
-11-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?