Taghon v. Euler et al
Filing
5
OPINION AND ORDER granting Stephen Taghon leave to proceed against Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott, Mr Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and Stentson, in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to protect him from attach by other inmates; dismisses all other claims; USM to effect service. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 10/25/11. (smp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEPHEN TAGHON,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN EULER, et al.,
Defendants.
NO. 3:11-CV-386
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a complaint filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 by Stephen Taghon, a pro se prisoner. For the
reasons set forth below, the court: (1) GRANTS Stephen Taghon leave
to proceed against Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott, Mr.
Whelan,
Rhonda
Vega,
and
Mr.
Stentson,
in
their
individual
capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to
protect him from attack by other inmates on January 7, 2011, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285 for
Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott, Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and
Mr. Stentson to the United States Marshals Service along with a
copy of this order and a copy of the complaint; (4) DIRECTS the
United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to
effect service of process on Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott,
Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and Mr. Stentson; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike
Scott, Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and Mr. Stentson respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND.
L.R. 10.1, only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been
granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
BACKGROUND
Stephen Taghon, a pro se prisoner, alleges that he fought with
a member of the Saxon Knights, a white supremacist gang, on July
14, 2010. As a result, he was placed in disciplinary segregation.
On January 5, 2011, he was released and placed in an open dorm with
members of the Saxon Knights. He alleges that both before and after
his release, he communicated with the defendants about his fear of,
and his need for protection from, the Saxon Knights. In the early
morning hours of January 7, 2011, he was beaten and stabbed by
several members of the Saxon Knights.
DISCUSSION
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it
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if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, or
any portion of a complaint, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A
as when addressing a motion under RULE 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.
Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). “In order to state a
claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants
deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the
defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469
F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations and internal
punctuation omitted). However, “[p]risons are dangerous places.
Housing the most aggressive among us, they place violent people in
close quarters.” McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 345 (7th Cir.
1991).
Some level of brutality and sexual aggression among
[prisoners] is inevitable no matter what the guards do.
Worse: because violence is inevitable unless all
prisoners are locked in their cells 24 hours a day and
sedated (a “solution” posing constitutional problems of
its own) it will always be possible to say that the
guards “should have known” of the risk. Indeed they
should, and do. Applied to a prison, the objective
“should have known” formula of tort law approaches
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absolute liability, rather a long distance from the
Supreme Court’s standards in Estelle and its offspring.
McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991).
Therefore, when an inmate is attacked by another inmate, the
Eighth Amendment is violated only if “deliberate indifference by
prison officials effectively condones the attack by allowing it to
happen . . ..” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir. 1996).
The defendant “must be both aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Merely
expressing a generalized fear of future harm based on past attacks
is not sufficient to establish liability. Klebanowski v. Sheahan,
540 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2008). Negligence does not satisfy
the “deliberate indifference” standard, Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d
1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994), and it is not enough to show that a
prison guard merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49
F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995).
Here, giving Taghon the benefit of the inference to which he
is entitled at the pleading stage of this proceeding, he has stated
a claim against Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott, Mr. Whelan,
Rhonda Vega, and Mr. Stentson, in their individual capacities for
compensatory and punitive damages for failing to protect him from
attack by other inmates on January 7, 2011, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
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However, Taghon has not stated a claim against any of the
defendants in their official capacities. First, “[t]o establish a
claim in an official capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that the
actions on which liability is predicated took place pursuant to a
government policy or custom.” Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 782 (7th
Cir. 1987). Here, Taghon has not alleged that the failure to
protect him was premised on either a policy or custom. Moreover,
even if he had made such an allegation, “a suit against a[n] . . .
official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will
v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Because
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits monetary damage suits against
States and their agencies, Kashani v. Purdue University, 813 F.2d.
843, 845 (7th Cir. 1987), Taghon may not proceed against the
defendants in their official capacities.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court: (1) GRANTS Stephen
Taghon leave to proceed against Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike
Scott,
Mr.
Whelan,
Rhonda
Vega,
and
Mr.
Stentson,
in
their
individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for
failing to protect him from attack by other inmates on January 7,
2011, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) DISMISSES all other
claims; (3) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM-285
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for Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott, Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega,
and Mr. Stentson to the United States Marshals Service along with
a copy of this order and a copy of the complaint; (4) DIRECTS the
United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to
effect service of process on Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike Scott,
Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and Mr. Stentson; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Steven Euler, Tina Watts, Mike
Scott, Mr. Whelan, Rhonda Vega, and Mr. Stentson respond, as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND.
L.R. 10.1, only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been
granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
DATED:
October 25, 2011
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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