Chapman v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby DENIED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/22/13. (jld)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
SEBASTIAN CHAPMAN,
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)
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioner
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, MIAMI
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Respondent.
No. 3:11-CV-388
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Sebastian Chapman, a prisoner confined at the Miami
Correctional Facility, submitted a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 dealing with loss of earned
credit time in a prison disciplinary hearing. The Respondent has
filed his response to the petition and the administrative record.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Petitioner’s
habeas corpus petition.
BACKGROUND
Chapman was originally charged with the offense of assault on
staff, but the hearing officer changed the charge to assault with
serious injury.
According to the record, Chapman pled guilty to
the charge of assault with serious injury, and was sanctioned with
one year in disciplinary segregation, a loss of thirty days of
earned credit time, and a demotion of one level in credit earning
time
classification (DE 7-5).
DISCUSSION
Where prisoners lose good time credits at prison disciplinary
hearings, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees
them certain procedural protections, including (1) advance written
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an
impartial decision maker; (3) opportunity to call witnesses and
present
documentary
evidence
in
defense
when
consistent
with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written
statement by the fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974). There must also be “some evidence” to support the decision
of
the
prison
disciplinary
board.”
Superintendent,
Mass.
Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
In ground one of his petition for writ of habeas corpus,
Chapman asserts that “the hearing officer changed the information
from an A117, assault on staff, to an A/102, assault/battery with
weapon or serious injury” (DE 1 at 4). The Petitioner alleges that
he
was
not
infraction”
aware
that
“the
hearing
officer
had
changed
the
and that therefore his guilty plea was not knowing.
(Id.) In ground two of his petition Chapman asserts that “[t]he
Report of Conduct and Staff Reports do not read that a weapon was
used nor that serious bodily injury resulted” (DE 1 at 4) and that
“therefore there is no evidence of an A102” (Id.).
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Claim that the Hearing Officer Changed the Charge Against the
Petitioner
Chapman was initially charged with committing an assault on
staff, code number A117 (DE 7-1). At the hearing, the hearing
officer changed the charge to A102, assault with serious injury (DE
7-5), and the Petitioner pled guilty (Id.). Chapman admits that he
pled guilty, but claims that he was not aware that the hearing
officer had changed the charge, and that he thought he was pleading
guilty to A117.
In addition to the administrative record, the Respondent has
submitted the declaration of the hearing officer, Joshua Webb (DE
8).
Prison
officials
may
supplement
the
record
in
a
habeas
proceeding with prison disciplinary proceedings by submitting
affidavits or declarations. Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 313 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Correctional Sergeant submitted affidavit stating “that
he personally informed Forbes of the [drug testing] requirement
before Forbes began working.”); Scruggs v. Jordan, 435 F.Supp.2nd
869, 874 (N.D.Ind. 2006) (Respondent submitted affidavit of the
disciplinary hearing board chairman to supplement the record of a
prison disciplinary hearing). A petitioner may also submit an
affidavit
dealing
with
his
version
of
a
prison
disciplinary
hearing. Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2006).
In his declaration, Joshua Webb, states that:
5. In this case, after reviewing the record I informed
Offender Chapman that I was changing the offense
originally charged from A-117, assault on staff, to A-102
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assault with serious injury. Offender Chapman asked me if
I would allow the charge to remain an A-117. I explained
to him that I was making the change because the officer
he assaulted required outside medical treatment.
6. After changing the offense in the Hearing Report and
explaining that change to Offender Chapman, I asked him
how he wanted to plead. He responded that he wanted to
plead guilty. I recorded his response and my acceptance
of his guilty plea on the Hearing Report.
DE 8 at 2.
The hearing officer’s declaration establishes that he fully
explained to Chapman that he was changing the charge against
Chapman, and that Chapman knew he was pleading guilty to A117, not
A102. Chapman did not submit his own affidavit contesting the facts
asserted by the hearing officer.
In his traverse, Chapman asserts that “[i]t’s uncontested that
the hearing officer scratched out the A117 code number replacing it
with an A102 without initialing the change in code number . . . in
compliance with IDOC policy.” (DE 9 at 2).
But violations of
prison policies do not state a claim for federal habeas relief, and
that the hearing officer did not initial the change in the code
number does not suggest that Chapman was not aware of the change or
that Chapman was not aware that he was pleading guilty to A102 not
A117. Hester v. McBride, 966 F.Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D.Ind. 1997),
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Chapman argues that the conduct report does not state that the
officer he attacked required medical attention, and therefore there
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is insufficient evidence on the record to support a finding that he
inflicted serious injury on his victim. It is true that the conduct
report and other documents in the record are silent on the extent
of the injuries Chapman caused to his victim. But the Court has
already determined that the Hearing Officer informed Chapman that
“the officer he assaulted required outside medical treatment” (DE
8 at 2), and that Chapman pled guilty to the charge of assault with
serious injury.
“A guilty plea admits in legal effect the facts as charged”
United States v. Loutos, 383 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2004). By
pleading guilty to A117, assault with serious injury, Chapman
admitted the elements of the offense, including that the officer he
assaulted
was
seriously
injured
and
required
outside
medical
attention.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES this petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and
DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case.
DATED: January 22, 2013
/S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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