McGhee v. Tyson Fresh Meats

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 1/30/2014. (lyb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
AZELL B. MCGHEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
TYSON FRESH MEATS (TYSON
FOOD INC.),
Defendant.

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No. 3:12 CV 158

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint. (DE # 14.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2012, pro se plaintiff Azell B. McGhee’s sued defendant, Tyson

Fresh Meats (Tyson Foods Inc.) for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621.
(DE # 1.) Plaintiff, who worked for defendant as a janitor, alleges that defendant
harassed him and discriminated against him because of his age (54) and because he is
black. (Id.)
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to RULE 12(b)(6)
of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to state a claim satisfying the
pleading requirements set forth in FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8. (DE # 14.)
Plaintiff did not respond, and the motion is now ripe for ruling.
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
RULE 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE sets forth the pleading

standard for complaints filed in federal court; specifically, that rule requires that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8. “The RULE reflects a liberal notice pleading regime,
which is intended to focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on
technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy RULE 8(a), “the statement
need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“While the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To meet this standard, a complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond providing “labels and
conclusions” and “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247,
251 (7th Cir. 1994) among other authorities). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained,
a complaint must give “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a

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story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); see
also Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251 (stating that the plaintiff does not need to plead facts that
establish each element of a cause of action and that “[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives
the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the
complaint”). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must construe it
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept well-pleaded facts as true,
and draw all inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,
595 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts regarding his

discrimination claim to satisfy RULE 8. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Swanson, 614
F.3d 400, already discussed briefly, provides ample guidance for deciding defendant’s
motion on this point.
In Swanson, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s discrimination complaint
satisfied RULE 8 because it identified the type of discrimination the plaintiff thought
occurred (racial), by whom (a bank), and when (in connection with her efforts to obtain
a home equity loan). Id. at 405. According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]his was all that was
needed to put in the complaint.” Id. Under Swanson, a plaintiff alleging discrimination
need only allege “how, in the plaintiff’s mind at least, the dots should be connected” to
comply with Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 405.
In this case, plaintiff’s allegations satisfy RULE 8. Plaintiff asserts that he was
discriminated against on the basis of his race and age by his employer, defendant,

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continuously during his employment, particularly by his supervisor Genie Powlen. (DE
# 1 at 2-3.) Thus, plaintiff has identified the basis of the alleged harassment (plaintiff’s
race and age), the alleged perpetrators of the harassment (defendant, and in particular
Genie Powlen), and when the alleged harassment occurred (continuously during
plaintiff’s employment with defendant). According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]his was
all that was needed to put in the complaint.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405.
Plaintiff’s allegations may present a very weak claim of discrimination, but
giving plaintiff the benefit of imagination while keeping consistent with the complaint,
Sanjuan 40 F.3d at 251, plaintiff has given enough details about the subject-matter of the
case to present a story that holds together, Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404, and to allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the alleged conduct.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Further, plaintiff’s allegations give the defendant fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93.
Accordingly, the complaint satisfies RULE 8 as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in
Swanson.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE # 14) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: January 30, 2014
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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