Williams v. Superintendent
Filing
7
OPINION AND ORDER dismissing petition pursuant to 28:2254 and denying certificate of appealability. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 11/28/2012. (kds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ISAIAH THOMAS WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, MIAMI
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Respondent
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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NO. 3:12-CV-268
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.
Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State
Custody filed by Isaiah Williams on May 30, 2012. For the reasons
set forth below, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED, the Petitioner is
DENIED a certificate of appealability, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to
close this case.
BACKGROUND
Isaiah Williams is serving a twenty-five year sentence based
on his 2009 Marion County conviction for dealing in cocaine (DE 5-1
at 11). Williams pled guilty to this charge and was sentenced on
March 16, 2009 (DE 5-1 at 12). Williams did not appeal his
conviction (DE 1 at 1), but he filed a petition for post-conviction
relief (DE 5-1 at 14). The Trial Court denied post-conviction
relief on September 29, 2010 (DE 5-3), the Court of Appeals of
Indiana affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on July 11,
2011, (DE 5-2), and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer on
September 8, 2011 (DE 5-4 at 4).
Williams’s petition for writ of habeas corpus presents two
grounds, both of which arise from the discovery of cocaine during
a search of himself and his vehicle during a warrantless arrest. In
ground one, Williams asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to advise Williams “of a potential defense, to
wit, that Petitioner could have moved to suppress the cocaine found
on his person” and in his vehicle on Fourth Amendment grounds (DE
1 at 3), and in ground two he asserts that his guilty plea was not
knowing and intelligent because he “was not informed that he could
move to suppress [the] cocaine [found on him and in his car] as a
result of [an] illegal search and seizure” (Id.).
DISCUSSION
This
petition
is
governed
by
the
provisions
of
the
Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), See Lindh
v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), which allows a district court
to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A court can only grant an
application for habeas relief if it meets the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim–
2
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
In reviewing a petition for federal collateral relief from a
state court judgment of conviction, this Court must presume as
correct the facts as found by the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1);
Sumner
Petitioner
has
correctness
by
v.
the
Mata,
clear
burden
and
449
of
U.S.
539,
rebutting
convincing
547
the
evidence.
(1981).
The
presumption
28
U.S.C.
of
§
2254(e)(1). As stated by the Indiana Court of Appeals on appeal
from the denial of post-conviction relief, the relevant facts in
the Petitioner’s case are as follows:
In October 2007, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Detective Clifton Jones began working with a confidential
informant (“the CI”) to conduct controlled cocaine buys
from a man known as “Shorty.” The CI identified Williams
as “Shorty” via photo array. On October 30 and November
8, 2007, Detective Clifton conducted surveillance outside
Williams’s Jefferson Avenue residence while the CI
purchased cocaine from Williams, who delivered the
cocaine to the CI's vehicle. Police did not arrest
Williams at the time and did not issue an arrest warrant,
due to the ongoing nature of their investigation and
their goal of eventually using Williams as a confidential
informant to find the source of greater quantities of
cocaine.
Detective Jones could not locate Williams for a
while after the fall 2007 incidents, but he waited for
him to resurface. Meanwhile, police conducted a search of
the Jefferson Avenue residence and found it vacant.
Williams resurfaced at a local fast food restaurant on
March 13, 2008, at which time police arrested him without
a warrant and found 27.54 grams of cocaine on his person.
A subsequent search of his vehicle produced 1.64 grams of
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marijuana and 1.2777 grams of cocaine. Detective Jones
asked him to become a confidential informant, but he
refused.
On March 18, 2008, in cause number 49G20–0803–FA–
059107 (“cause 107”), the State charged Williams with
seven drug-related offenses. The following counts were
based on the March 13, 2008 incident at the restaurant:
Count I, class A felony cocaine dealing; Count II, class
C felony cocaine possession; and Count III, class A
misdemeanor
marijuana
possession.
In
the
same
information, the State charged Williams with Count IV,
class A felony cocaine dealing and Count V, class C
felony cocaine possession, both based on the November
2007 incident, and with Count VI, class B felony cocaine
dealing, and Count VII, class D felony cocaine
possession, both based on the October 2007 incident.
While cause 107 was pending, Williams entered into
a cooperation agreement with police and began working as
a confidential informant. In November 2008, a change of
defense counsel occurred, and Brian Lamar was assigned to
represent Williams. At that point, Williams was still
cooperating with police, and he had prospects for a
favorable plea agreement. In December 2008, he was found
with cocaine in his gas tank and arrested. At that point,
the State terminated the cooperation agreement and
charged him in cause number 49G20–0812–FA–294162 (“cause
162”) with one count of class A felony cocaine dealing,
one count of class C felony cocaine possession, one count
of class A misdemeanor possession marijuana, and one
count of class A misdemeanor driving while suspended.
Thereafter, defense counsel met with him and discussed
possible defenses as well as the prospect of a habitual
offender finding.
On March 2, 2009, Williams pled guilty via plea
agreement to one count of class A felony cocaine dealing
(Count I of cause 107) with a set twenty-five-year
sentence. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining
six counts in cause 107 as well as all counts in cause
162
and
the
only
count
in
cause
number
49G20–0704–CM–058319 (“cause 319”) (class C misdemeanor
driving while suspended). The State also agreed not to
file a habitual offender count. The trial court accepted
Williams’s guilty plea and sentenced him according to the
plea agreement on March 16, 2009.
On June 26, 2009, Williams filed a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief. He filed an amended petition
by counsel on January 19, 2010, asserting that his
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in
4
failing to advise him of a potential defense and in
failing to file a motion to suppress the cocaine found on
his person at the time of his warrantless arrest at the
fast food restaurant. He also asserts that due to the
aforementioned alleged failures, his guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered.
On April 16 and April 20, 2010, the post-conviction
court held hearings on Williams’s post-conviction
petition. On September 27, 2010, the court issued
extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law,
denying his petition for post-conviction relief.
DE 5-2 at 3-6.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The Petitioner asserts that his conviction violated provisions
of the United States Constitution and also violated provisions of
Article 1 §§ 12 and 13 of the Indiana Constitution (DE 1 at 3). But
violations of state law do not entitle prisoners to habeas corpus
relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). Federal courts may
grant
habeas
relief
under
§
2254
“only
on
the
ground
that
[petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or
treaties
Accordingly,
of
the
United
Williams’s
States.”
claim
that
28
his
U.S.C.
§
2254(a).
conviction
violated
provisions of Indiana’s Constitution states no claim upon which
habeas relief can be granted.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In ground one of his petition, Williams asserts that his
“trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise
Petitioner of a potential defense, to wit, that Petitioner could
have moved to suppress the cocaine found on his person based on an
5
illegal search and seizure incident to an illegal warrantless
arrest . . .” (DE 1 at 3). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
require the Petitioner to establish that his counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that this
deficiency actually caused prejudice. Martin v. Evans, 384 F.3d
848, 851 (7th Cir. 2004), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-88 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel,
the
Petitioner
must
demonstrate:
(1)
that
counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) that absent said deficient
performance, there exists a reasonable probability of a different
outcome.
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, a habeas
applicant must show that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). In
considering counsel’s performance, a reviewing court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide
range
of
reasonable
professional
assistance.
Strickland
v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 689.
To satisfy the Strickland test’s second prong, a habeas
petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that
but
for
counsel’s
unprofessional
errors
the
result
of
the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
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After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court entered
extensive findings of fact. Williams’s counsel testified the he
“recalled the warrantless arrest as an issue he discussed with
Petitioner prior to the guilty plea hearing” (DE 5-3 at 9). The
trial
court
credited
that
testimony,
concluding
that
“having
considered [his counsel’s] testimony . . . the Court finds that
Petitioner has not proven that [counsel] failed to advise him about
a defense based upon the warantless arrest” (DE 5-3 at 10).
In regard to Strickland’s prejudice prong, the post-conviction
court concluded that Williams suffered no prejudice because the
five month delay in his arrest did not eliminate the preexisting
probable cause for his arrest, that his arrest was lawful, and that
“[t]he items seized as a result of the search would have been
properly introduced into evidence, and any objection to this
evidence would have been properly overruled by the trial court” (DE
5-3 at 13).
In its review of Williams’s appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Indiana properly identified the Strickland standard as governing
the resolution of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims (DE 5-2 at 7). To support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel on habeas review, a petitioner must show that the state
court’s application of Strickland’s attorney-performance standard
was objectively unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702
(2002).
The Court of Appeals of Indiana accepted the post-conviction
court’s findings of fact that Williams’s counsel had discussed with
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him the possibility of attempting to suppress the drugs found
during his warrantless arrest, and agreed with the trial court’s
analysis of the prejudice prong, stating that “(b)ecause no basis
existed to suppress the evidence, Williams would not have been
successful had he chosen to proceed to trial . . . Consequently,
Williams has failed to establish that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel” (DE 5-2 at 10-11). The Indiana courts
reasonably applied Strickland’s attorney-performance standard, and
Williams is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
PETITIONER’S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
In ground two of his petition, Williams asserts that his
guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was not
informed that he could move to suppress the drugs found on him and
in his vehicle during the search incident to his arrest. (Id.).
This claim is based on the same operative facts as his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
A guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent. To enter
a voluntary and intelligent plea, a defendant must have
full awareness of the plea’s direct consequences, real
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, and
understand the law in relation to the facts. Whether a
plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily is determined
from all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.
Guilty pleas are accorded a great measure of finality
because they are important components of this country’s
criminal justice system. As a result, the defendant bears
the burden of proving that the plea he entered was
involuntary and unintelligent.
8
Virsnieks
v.
Smith,
521
F.3d
707,
714-15
(7th
Cir.
2008)
(citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
Under the AEDPA, federal courts generally must accept a state
court’s factual findings. Id. at 715. A1raujo v. Chandler, 435 F.3d
678,
682
(7th
Cir.
2005),
citing
28
U.S.C.
§§
2254(d)(2);
2254(e)(1). Therefore, to prevail on this claim, Williams must
overcome the state court’s factual determination that his counsel
had informed him that he could move to suppress the drugs found in
his possession when he was arrested.
This Court has already concluded, based on the findings of the
post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals of Indiana, that
Williams’s counsel did, in fact, inform him that he could move to
suppress the drugs found in his possession when he was arrested.
Williams has failed to show that the state court’s decision “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court concludes that Williams’s
guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
the
Court
certificate
must
of
consider
whether
appealability.
To
to
grant
obtain
the
a
Petitioner
certificate
a
of
appealability, a petitioner must make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right by establishing “that reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
9
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
For the reasons stated in this memorandum, the Court concludes
that Williams’s petition must be dismissed because his counsel was
not ineffective and because his guilty plea was knowing and
intelligent. Williams has not established that jurists of reason
could debate the correctness of these rulings or find a reason to
encourage him to proceed further. Accordingly, the Court declines
to issue Williams a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES the
petition (DE 1), DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case, and DENIES
a certificate of appealability.
DATED: November 28, 2012
/S/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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