Neal v. Superintendent
Filing
46
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 24 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/29/14. cc:petnr(kjp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DAVID R. NEAL,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-301
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by David R. Neal, a pro se prisoner
challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding, on November 28, 2012
(DE #24).
For the reasons set forth below, the petition (DE #24)
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
In
conduct.
MCF
#12-04-065,
Neal
(DE #41-3 at 1.)
was
found
guilty
of
disorderly
The charge was initiated on April 9,
2012, when Sergeant C. Shaffer wrote a conduct report stating as
follows:
On the above date and time I Sgt. C. Shaffer was posted
on phase 2 yard when I was called via radio to signal 8
KHU ½ side. When I arrived I found Offender Neal, David
110281 sitting in the dayroom at a table refusing to go
into his cell KHU 122. I tried to explain to Mr. Neal
that he needed to go into his cell during count so Sgt.
Evans could look into his bottom bunk pass.
After
explaining several times Neal still refused. After
several verbal attempts to order Neal into his cell he
still would not cooperate so Sgt. Evans and myself
attempted to escort Offender Neal[.] [H]e then sat on
the floor and refused to move. At this point I put him in
a wheel chair and took him to SCU.
(DE #41-1.) Sergeant J. Evans also submitted the following witness
statement:
On 4-9-12 at approximately 15:02 p.m. I Sgt. J. Evans
called yard Sgt. C. Shaffer to K ½ side to assist in
locking down offender Neal, David 110281 of K-122. I
instructed Offender Neal to lockdown and he refused
saying, “I’m not going in that cell. I have a bottom
bunk, bottom range pass.”
I checked and found that
Offender Neal did not have a bottom bunk or bottom range
pass. When we attempted to secure offender Neal in the
cell he put himself on the floor and refused to get up.
(DE #41-3 at 2.)
On April 11, 2012, Neal was formally notified of the charge
and given a copy of the conduct report.
(DE #41-1, DE #41-2.)
He
pled not guilty and requested a lay advocate. (DE 41-2.) He
requested a review of the surveillance video as physical evidence,
and requested a witness statement from a prison physician, Dr.
Marandet (first name unknown), to attest that he had a bottom bunk
pass.
(Id.)
Thereafter, a statement was obtained from a prison nurse, who
looked through Neal’s medical chart and stated that he did not have
a current bottom bunk pass recommendation.
(DE #41-3 at 3.)
The
hearing officer also reviewed the surveillance video per Neal’s
request, and summarized it as follows:
On the date of 4/9/2012 offender Neal comes into the unit
with his property on a red cart.
The property is
unloaded at the dayroom table near cell 117/118 and
2
offender Neal sits down at the table. At 15:02 Yard Sgt.
Shaffer comes onto the range and begins to talk with this
offender. 15:07 Sgt. Evans begins placing the offenders
property into his cell.
At this time, Sgt. Shaffer
begins to assist offender Neal up from the stool and
offender Neal kicks his right leg out and slides down
onto the floor. Sgt. Shaffer tried to get the offender
off the floor but the offender would not bring his legs
up making all of his weight dead weight and not easily
picked up.
At 15:14 the offender is placed in a
wheelchair by Sgt. Shaffer and C/O Huffman. Everyone is
off unit at 15:15.
(DE #41-3 at 5.)
On April 17, 2012, a hearing was held on the charge.
3 at 1.)
(DE #41-
Neal made the following statement, “I didn’t do that. I
slipped and fell. I couldn’t get up.”
(Id.)
Based on the
evidence, the hearing officer found him guilty, resulting in the
loss of earned-time credits and other sanctions.
(Id.)
Neal’s
administrative appeals were denied. (DE #41-3 at 5.)
DISCUSSION
When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary
proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees
them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of
the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
3
To satisfy due process,
there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the
hearing officer’s determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Neal’s petition is not a model of clarity, but it can be
discerned that his first claim challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence.
(DE
#24
at
1.)
In
reviewing
a
disciplinary
determination for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not
required
to
conduct
an
examination
of
the
entire
record,
independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,
but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision
to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v.
McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
“[T]he relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
Hill,
The court will overturn a
guilty finding only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have found
[the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence
presented.”
Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d
1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
Here, Neal was found guilty of disorderly conduct, which is
defined by the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) Adult
Disciplinary Procedures (“ADP”), as “exhibiting disruptive and/or
violent conduct which disrupts the security of the facility or
other area in which the offender is located.”
4
(DE #44 at 6.) There
is sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing
officer’s determination that Neal was guilty of this offense.
Sergeant
Shaffer
and
Sergeant
Evans
both
offered
eyewitness
accounts that Neal refused to go to his cell during count time and
disobeyed multiple direct orders.
(DE #41-1 at 1; DE #41-3 at 2.)
The summary of the video also indicates that Neal was uncooperative
during this incident.
hearing
officer’s
support.
(DE #41-3 at 5.)
finding
of
guilt
Based on the record, the
has
adequate
evidentiary
See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (“Although the evidence in this
case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct
evidence identifying any one of three inmates as the assailant, the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.”);
see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002)
(witness statements constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d
at 786 (conduct report alone provided some evidence to support
disciplinary determination).
Neal appears to argue that he fell and did not intentionally
refuse to get off the floor during this incident.
(DE #44.)
He
asks this Court to review the video evidence for itself, and to
subpoena witnesses and hear testimony from all the individuals
involved,
including
Sergeant
Evans,
Sergeant
disciplinary hearing officer, and Dr. Marandet.
misunderstands
the
nature
of
this
5
Shaffer,
the
(DE ##44, 45.) He
proceeding.
Weighing
the
evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses was the job of
the hearing officer, not this Court.
McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786.
As stated above, the question for this court is solely whether
there is “some evidence” in the existing record to support the
finding of guilt.
See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
Furthermore, even if Neal did not intentionally refuse to get
off the floor as he claims, there is sufficient evidence in the
record that he was disorderly and caused a disturbance in the
facility.1
Neal readily admits that he refused the officers’
orders to go to his cell; in his view, “I do not have to go in to
a cell I do not want to. . . .”
(DE #44 at 3.)
This is incorrect.
“[I]nmates cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will
obey, and when they will obey them[.]”
467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).
Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d
“When an inmate refuses to obey a proper
order, he is attempting to assert his authority over a portion of
the institution and its officials [which] . . . places the staff
and other inmates in danger.”
Id. In other words, Neal was not
entitled to disobey multiple direct orders simply because he felt
he
should
receive
a
different
bed
assignment.
His
actions
necessitated the intervention of two correctional sergeants, who
were pulled from their posts to assist in removing him from the
1
Neal also appears to believe it would have been more appropriate to
charge him with “refusing a bed move.” (DE #44 at 3.) Whether prison
officials might have charged him with some other offense is not the issue; the
question for this court is solely whether there is “some evidence” to support
the charge on which he was found guilty. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
6
dayroom, so that they could conduct a count of the inmates.
There
is sufficient evidence that Neal acted disorderly, and accordingly,
this claim is denied.
Neal’s remaining claim is that he was denied exculpatory
evidence.
(DE #24 at 2.)
A prisoner has a limited right to
present witnesses and evidence in his defense consistent with
correctional goals and safety.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.
A hearing
officer has considerable discretion with respect to witness and
evidence
requests,
and
may
deny
requests
that
threaten
institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.
Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,
due process only requires access to witnesses and evidence that are
exculpatory.
Cir. 1992).
See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th
“Exculpatory” evidence in this context means evidence
that “directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the
record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.”
F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996).
evidence
will
be
Meeks v. McBride, 81
The denial of the right to present
considered
harmless
unless
the
prisoner
establishes prejudice by showing that the evidence could have aided
his defense.
See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir.
2011).
Here, the record shows that Neal requested a statement from a
prison physician that he had a bottom bunk pass.
(DE #41-2.)
A
statement was obtained from another member of the medical staff,
7
who looked through Neal’s chart and determined that he did not have
a current bottom bunk pass issued by Dr. Marandet or any other
physician.2
(DE
#41-3
at
3.)
It
appears
that
Neal
was
dissatisfied with this statement and wanted one from Dr. Marandet
instead.
(DE #24 at 2.)
However, to the extent there was any
error, Neal has not demonstrated prejudice.
There is nothing to
suggest Dr. Marandet would have provided any different information
than the nurse, but more importantly, whether Neal had a bottom
bunk was wholly irrelevant to the charge.
As stated above, Neal
was not entitled to disobey the orders of correctional officers and
cause a disturbance even if he believed he should have been
assigned to a different bunk. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated
an entitlement to habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #24) is
DENIED.
DATED: January 29, 2014
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
2
There was a document in Neal’s chart, which the nurse provided to the
hearing officer, indicating that Dr. Marandet had recommended Neal for
“medical idle” status in 2004. (DE #41-3 at 4.) This means, in essence, that
Neal was excused from working a prison job. See Williams v. Faulkner, 837
F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1988). This is not the same as having a bottom bunk pass,
nor does this evidence somehow exculpate Neal from the charge of disorderly
conduct on the date in question.
8
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