Norington v. Superintendent

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER; the petition is DENIED. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 4/9/13. (jld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
LAKESHA NORINGTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-521

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C.
Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State
Custody

filed

by

Lakesha

Norington,1

a

pro

se

prisoner,

September 14, 2012, challenging a disciplinary proceeding.
#1).

on
(DE

For the reasons set forth below, the petition (DE #1) is

DENIED.

BACKGROUND
In WCU # 12-02-0181, Norington was found guilty of attempting
to

engage

in,

or

encouraging

others

to

engage

in,

a

group

demonstration, work stoppage, or refusal to work in violation of
Indiana
223/240.
1

Department

of

Correction

(“IDOC”)

disciplinary

rules

The charge was initiated on February 6, 2012, when

The petitioner, whose legal name is Shawntrell Marcel
Norington, was born a male but identifies himself as a female and
refers to himself with female pronouns. The Court does so here out
of courtesy.

Corrections

Officer

Critchfield

(first

name

unknown)

wrote

a

conduct report stating as follows:
On the above date and time [February 6, 2012, at
approximately 12:10 p.m.] I Ofc. Critchfield along with
Ofc. Gulleson was picking up trays on B5 range when
Offender Norington, Shawntrell #138726 yelled and stated
that “Everyone is to not give up their tray until Mr.
Lowry come on the pod and speaks with him.”
(DE #10-1.)

On that same date, Corrections Officer D. Gulleson

prepared a witness statement stating as follows:
On the above date and time [February 6, 2012, at
approximately 12:10 p.m.] I Ofc. Gulleson with Officer
Critchfield was picking up trays on B5-Range when
Offender Norington, Shawntrell #138726 yelled and stated
that “Everyone is to not give up their tray until Mr.
Lowry comes on the pod and speaks to me.”
(DE #10-2.)
On February 8, 2012, Norington was notified of the charge and
given a copy of the conduct report.

(DE #10-3.)

She pled not

guilty, declined the assistance of a lay advocate, requested no
physical

evidence,

and

requested

witness

statements

from

Dr.

Williams (first name unknown), staff member E. Lowry, and fellow
inmate Engai Maul.

(Id.)

Witness statements were obtained from

all three individuals, but Dr. Williams and Lowry both stated that
they were not present during the incident.

(DE #10-4, 10-6.)

In

his statement, Maul claimed that Norington did not tell the other
inmates to hold their trays, and instead had said something like,
“Don’t hold ya’ll trays, he wouldn’t like that.” (DE #10-5.)
On February 16, 2012, a hearing was held on the charge.

2

(DE

#10-8.)

Norington stated that the charge was false and that

“[w]hat was perceived to be said is not what was said.”

(Id.) The

hearing officer found Norington guilty and revoked 30 days of
earned time credits.
were denied.

(Id.)

Norington appealed, but her appeals

(DE #10-9 to #10-12.)

Thereafter, she filed this

petition.

DISCUSSION
When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary
proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees
them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of
the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

To satisfy due process,

there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the
hearing officer’s determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Norington

first

claims

impartial decision-maker.
adjudicators

are

“entitled

she

was

denied

the

right

to

an

In the prison disciplinary context,
to

a

presumption

of

honesty

and

integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is

3

high.”
process

Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
prohibits

a

prison

official

who

was

personally

Due
and

substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting as a
decision-maker in the case.

Id.

However, due process is not

violated simply because the hearing officer knew the inmate,
presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited
involvement in the event underlying the charge.

Id.

Here, Norington argues that the hearing officer was biased
because he was in the room when she was screened on the charge.
Even if this is true, it would not establish the type of bias that
violates federal due process.

Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Norington

believes that the hearing officer violated prison policies by being
present during screening, but a violation of prison policy does not
provide grounds for granting federal habeas relief.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

Estelle v.

(1991) (federal habeas relief cannot

be granted for violations of state law); Hester v. McBride, 966 F.
Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (claim premised on violation of
prison policy was not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding).
Norington next claims that her rights were violated because
the charge was false.

“[P]risoners are entitled to be free from

arbitrary actions of prison officials.”
F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999).

McPherson v. McBride, 188

However, “even assuming fraudulent

conduct on the part of prison officials, the protection from such
arbitrary action is found in the procedures mandated by due

4

process.”

Id.

In other words, the protections to which Norington

was entitled are the protections afforded by Wolff, and her claim
that the charge was false does not itself entitle her to federal
habeas relief.
Liberally construed, her claim may be that the evidence was
insufficient to support the guilty finding.

In reviewing a

disciplinary determination for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts
are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record,
independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,
but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision
to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.”
188 F.3d at 786.

McPherson,

“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.”
added).

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis

The Court will overturn a guilty finding only if “no

reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of
the offense on the basis of the evidence presented.”

Henderson v.

United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
Here, Norington was found guilty of attempting to engage in,
or encouraging others to engage in, a group demonstration. (See DE
#10-14.)
collecting

The evidence shows that two correctional officers were
lunch

trays

in

Norington’s

unit,

when

they

heard

Norington yell to the other inmates not to return their trays until
another staff member came up to speak with her.

5

(DE #10-1, 10-2.)

This evidence provides some evidence that she was guilty of the
charge.

See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457; see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288

F.3d 978, 988 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some
evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some
evidence

to

support

disciplinary

determination).

Although

Norington denied making the statement, and obtained a corroborating
statement from another inmate, the hearing officer was not required
to credit Norington’s exculpatory evidence, nor was he required to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
981.

Moffat, 288 F.3d at

The question for this Court is solely whether there is some

evidence

in

the

record

to

support

the

hearing

officer’s

determination, and that standard is satisfied.
Norington’s

remaining

claims

pertain

to

the

number

of

decision-makers in her case and the sanctions that were imposed,
and are premised on violations of internal prison policies.

As

stated above, a violation of prison policy does not provide grounds
for granting federal habeas relief.
Hester, 966 F. Supp. at 774-75.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68;

Norington has not established a

violation of her federal due process rights and, accordingly, her
petition will be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE #1) is
DENIED.

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DATED: April 9, 2013

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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