Pruitt v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 3 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Steve Pruitt, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 7/15/13. (smp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEVE PRUITT,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-603 WL
OPINION AND ORDER
Steve Pruitt, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended habeas petition challenging a prison
disciplinary proceeding. (DE 3.) On July 16, 2012, Mr. Pruitt was found guilty of disorderly conduct
under cause number RDC 12-07-0011. The charge was initiated on July 13, 2012, when Corrections
Officer A. Stobaugh prepared a conduct report stating as follows:
On 7/13/12 at approximately 8:00 p.m., I, Officer Stobaugh, called for Offender
Pruitt, Steven DOC #170795 to exit the 1st Range dayroom and return to his cell, due
to his unruly conduct. Offender Pruitt sarcastically responded, “Yes Sir, Yankee
Doodle!” I then advised the Offender that his actions and comments would result in
a conduct report. The Offender yelled, “I’m not going to listen to you, and you can’t
fucking make me.” Offender Pruitt came very close to my person and continued to
yell in a disorderly manner. Several offenders returning from med pass became
aware of the situation. At that time my line supervisor intervened and ordered
Offender Pruitt back to his cell twice, at which point he complied.
(DE 15-1.) On the same date, Sergeant Hanley (first name unknown) prepared the following witness
statement:
I Sgt. Hanley had just opened the Sergeants’ Office when I heard a disturbance
behind me. I turned around to see Offender Pruitt extremely close to Officer
Stobaugh. I Sgt. Hanley came out of the office and asked what was going on and told
Offender Pruitt to back up away from the officer. Offender Pruitt continued to yell
that he was not going to listen to what this “fucking officer had to say.” I Sgt. Hanley
calmly told him he needed to go back to his cell, Offender Pruitt then asked “for
what.” I Sgt. Hanley repeated myself saying “you need to go to your cell now.”
Offender Pruitt complied at this time.
(DE 15-4 at 2.) Officer Trueblood (first name unknown) also prepared the following witness
statement:
I Ofc. Trueblood while 1st range OIC observed Offender Pruitt #170797 D1-6B
during med movement in the lobby area walking controversially close to Officer
Stobaugh’s person. Offender Pruitt was verbally yelling instructions to Ofc.
Stobaugh, stating “I don’t fucking have to do what you say.” Officer Stobaugh
ordered the offender back to his cell several times. Sgt. Hanley ordered the offender
back to his cell, but Offender Pruitt verbally stayed argumentative while in route.
(DE 15-4 at 3.)
On July 16, 2012, Mr. Pruitt was notified of the charge and given a copy of the conduct
report. (DE 15-1, 15-2.) He waived the 24-hour notice requirement, pled not guilty, declined the
assistance of a lay advocate, and did not request any witnesses. (DE 15-2.) He requested only the
following physical evidence: “Medication - Depression.” (Id.) Later that same day, a disciplinary
hearing was held. (DE 15-4.) Mr. Pruitt made the following statement: “I was cooperating until the
Officer grabbed a hold of me. I was 4 hours late taking my medication.” (Id.) The hearing officer
also considered one of Mr. Pruitt’s medical records indicating that he had a history of mental health
problems and was currently on medication for depression. (DE 15-4 at 4-6.) The hearing officer
nevertheless found him guilty, and among other sanctions revoked 90 days of earned time credits.
(Id. at 1.) Mr. Pruitt appealed to the facility head and final reviewing authority, but his appeals were
denied. (DE 15-5, DE 15-6.) Thereafter, he filed the present petition.
When prisoners lose earned time credits in prison disciplinary hearings, the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written
notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence relied on and
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the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974). To satisfy
due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the hearing officer’s
determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Mr. Pruitt first claims that he was denied 24 hours advance written notice of the charge. (DE
3 at 4.) However, as the respondent points out, Mr. Pruitt signed a form clearly waiving his right to
24 hours notice at the time of screening. (See DE 15-2.) “It is without question that an individual
may waive his or her procedural due process rights.” Domka v. Portage County, 523 F.3d 776, 781
(7th Cir. 2008). Mr. Pruitt does not respond to the state’s waiver argument or otherwise mention this
claim in his traverse. (See DE 16.) Based on the record, he has not demonstrated an entitlement to
habeas relief on this claim.
Next, Mr. Pruitt claims that he was denied his right to present documentary evidence in his
defense. (DE 3 at 5.) A prisoner has a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense, consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. A
hearing officer may deny a witness or evidence request that threatens institutional goals or is
irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, the denial of evidence will be considered harmless unless the prisoner shows that the
evidence could have aided his defense. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011); Piggie,
342 F.3d at 666.
Here, Mr. Pruitt asserts that the hearing officer should have obtained all of his medical
records for consideration at the hearing. (DE 3 at 5.) However, he did not make this specific request
at the time of screening, and instead simply referenced “medication” for “depression.” (DE 15-2.)
Mr. Pruitt cannot fault the hearing officer for failing to consider evidence he did not properly
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request. Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002) (if an inmate fails to request
exculpatory evidence “either before or at the hearing, then the CAB could not have denied him due
process by not considering the request”); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999)
(observing that due process does not require “the consideration of evidence that could have been but
was not presented at the hearing”). Furthermore, the record reflects that the hearing officer did
consider Mr. Pruitt’s mental health issues, as well as the fact that he was on medication at the time
of this incident. (See DE 15-4 at 1, 4-6.) Mr. Pruitt has not explained how additional mental health
records would have been exculpatory to the charge. Accordingly, he has not established a federal
due process violation.
Finally, Mr. Pruitt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE 3 at 5.) In reviewing a
disciplinary determination for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not required to conduct an
examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,
but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits has
some factual basis.” McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The court will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if
“no reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the
evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.
1994).
Here, Mr. Pruitt appears to concede that he acted in a disorderly manner, but asserts that
there was insufficient evidence he was disruptive or violent.1 (DE 3 at 5, DE 16.) However, the
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The Adult Disciplinary Procedures define disorderly conduct as “exhibiting disruptive and violent conduct
which disrupts the security of the facility or other are in which the offender is located.” (DE 15-7 at 7.)
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evidence reflects that Mr. Pruitt approached one of the officers in a confrontational manner, yelled
and swore at the officer, and disobeyed several orders to return to his cell. His actions necessitated
the intervention of additional staff to diffuse the situation, since other inmates were passing through
the area at the time. This constitutes some evidence that Mr. Pruitt was guilty of disorderly conduct.
See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457; see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 988 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness
statements constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some
evidence to support disciplinary determination).
Mr. Pruitt suggests that he should not be held responsible for his conduct because he suffers
from “mood swings, depression, bipolar [disorder], and brain damage,” and in his words, “wasn’t
in the mood for C.O. Stobaugh harassing me.” (DE 16 at 2.) Regardless of whether Mr. Pruitt was
in a bad mood, “inmates cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will obey, and when they
will obey them[.]” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, “When an inmate refuses to obey a proper order, he is attempting to assert his authority
over a portion of the institution and its officials [which] . . . places the staff and other inmates in
danger.” Id. Thus, his argument is unavailing. Furthermore, the hearing officer considered Mr.
Pruitt’s statement that Officer Stobaugh provoked the incident and that he was late taking his
medication on that date.2 He nevertheless concluded that Mr. Pruitt was guilty of the offense, and
it is not the province of this Court to reweigh the evidence or determine the relative credibility of
the witnesses. Based on the record, Mr. Pruitt has not established a violation of his federal due
process rights.
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 3) is DENIED.
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Mr. Pruitt indicates in his traverse that he was on his way back from taking his medication at the time of this
incident. (DE 16 at 2.)
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SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 15, 2013
s/William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court
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