Foster v. Potts et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting plaintiff leave to proceed against Sgt Potts, Officer Robinson, Officer Beach, and Officer Puetzer in their individual capoacities for monetary damages; dismisses any and all other claims contained in the complaint; directs US Marshals to effect service of process. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 11/30/2012. (kds)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
LAMAR FOSTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. POTTS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 3:12-CV-651 RM
OPINION AND ORDER
Lamar Foster, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts apply the same standard under Section
1915A as when deciding a motion under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6).
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint
must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-603 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. The court must bear in mind,
however, that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The complaint isn’t overly detailed, but giving it liberal construction, Mr. Foster
alleges that during an incident in July 2012, he was subjected to excessive force by four
correctional officers from the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”). According to the complaint and
attachments, Mr. Foster went to speak with a correctional officer after several inmates
attacked and beat him, which Mr. Foster attributed to the officer’s failure to lock his cell
even though he was supposed to be on “key lock” for his protection. This was the second
time such an incident had occurred. He claims that during this discussion he said he did
not want to go back to his cell, to which Sergeant Potts responded that he had to go back.
Mr. Foster said he was afraid to go, at which time Sergeant Potts, Officer Beach, and Officer
Puetzer slammed him to the ground while he was in handcuffs; in his words, they were
“being way [too] aggressive.” Sergeant Potts continued to push his head into the floor
while he was lying on the ground. Officer Robinson grabbed his left foot, which had been
placed in leg cuffs, and began “twisting it around.” Mr. Foster claims he told Officer
Robinson that was his “bad foot,” but he continued to twist it. He claims that this
altercation caused him significant pain in his back, hand, shoulder, head, and foot. These
allegations might or might be entirely correct, but they are all the court has to work with
at the screening stage.
Under the Eighth Amendment, the “core requirement” for an excessive force claim
is that the defendant “used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Several factors guide the inquiry of whether an
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officer’s use of force was legitimate or malicious, including the need for an application of
force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Id.
An inmate can’t refuse to comply with a direct order from a correctional officer; if he does,
the officer is justified in using some level of force to obtain his compliance. See Lewis v.
Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009); Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir.
1984).
It appears from the complaint that Mr. Foster might have refused an order to return
to his cell, and in such case the officers were justified in using some level of force to obtain
his compliance. Still, Mr. Foster alleges a plausible claim that the officers used more force
than was necessary under the circumstances. He alleges that three officers slammed him
to the ground when he was wearing handcuffs, were joined by a fourth officer, and
continued to beat him and twist his “bad” foot while he was lying on the ground in leg
restraints. The complaint can be read to allege that Mr. Foster was not offering resistance
during this incident, other than his initial statement that he did not want to return to his
cell. Further factual development might show that Mr. Foster was resisting the officers’
attempts to restrain him or that their actions were otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances, but at this stage the court must accept Mr. Foster’s allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Giving him the inferences to which he is
entitled, he has alleged enough to proceed past the pleading stage.
For these reasons, the court:
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(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Sergeant Potts, Officer
Robinson, Officer Beach, and Officer Puetzer in their individual capacities for
monetary damages for using excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth
Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the complaint;
(3) DIRECTS the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service of process on Sergeant
Potts, Officer Robinson, Officer Beach, and Officer Puetzer; and
(4) ORDERS that Sergeant Potts, Officer Robinson, Officer Beach, and Officer
Puetzer respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and
N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted
leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: November 30 , 2012
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court
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