Anderson v. Carefree of Colorado
Filing
30
OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING AS MOOT 22 Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTING Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/2/14. (jld)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
RANDALL ANDERSON,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAREFREE OF COLORADO,
Defendant.
NO. 3:12-CV-812
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed by Defendant on December 5, 2013; and (2) Amended
Motion for summary Judgment, filed by Defendant on December 6,
2013.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary
judgment (DE# 22) is DENIED as moot and the amended motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.1
Accordingly, this case is dismissed
with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On December 11, 2012, Plaintiff, Randall Anderson, filed an
“Employment Discrimination Complaint” against his former employer,
Defendant, Carefree of Colorado (Carefree).
Anderson alleged he
was terminated based on his race, in violation of Title VII of the
1
Carefree filed the amended motion for summary judgment to include a
request that the Section 1981 claim be dismissed.
-1-
Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.
Anderson also
alleges Carefree violated his privacy rights under the Healthcare
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
Carefree has filed the instant motion for summary judgment,
arguing that there are no genuine issues in dispute and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because Anderson is
proceeding pro se, Carefree provided Anderson with notice of its
summary judgment motion (DE# 25) and a short and plain statement of
the need to respond to it, giving both the text of Rule 56(c) and
an explanation of the rule in plain English.
Timms v. Frank, 953
F.2d 281, 283, 285 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Lewis v. Faulkner, 689
F.2d 100, 102-03 (7th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff has had ample time in
which to respond to the instant motion, but has failed to do so.2
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue
of
material
fact
exists
when
“the
evidence
is
such
that
a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not
2
Instead of filing a response brief, Anderson has instead filed letters
on various topics; none of which constitutes a response to the instant motion
for summary judgment. (See DE##’s 27-29).
-2-
every
dispute
between
the
parties
makes
summary
judgment
inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt,
606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). A party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations in
her own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court
with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v.
Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the
non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential
element on which he or she bears the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716
(7th Cir. 2006).
Facts
The following facts are undisputed and supported by the
record.
Carefree/Scott Fetzer Company d/b/a Carefree of Colorado
(“Carefree”) distributes awnings for the RV industry out of their
Elkhart, Indiana warehouse. (Anderson Dep. at 38-39). Anderson, who
is African-American, began work as a full-time material handler for
Carefree on or about April 26, 2012. (Dep. of Anderson at 7, 32-37
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& Exs. B-H; Declaration of Melanie Oliver ¶ 4 & Ex. B; but see
Anderson Dep. at 97 (April 24, 2012)). Anderson’s job included
unloading awnings from incoming trucks and pulling and racking new
orders to be placed on outgoing trucks. (Anderson Dep. at 37-38).
Anderson worked primarily with two other material handlers, Otto,
who is Hispanic, and Jemale, who is African American. (Anderson
Dep. at 38 & Eratta sheet). He reported to the Warehouse Lead,
Kelly Malicoat (“Malicoat”), a Caucasian female. (Anderson Dep. at
39-40). Malicoat reported to the facility manager, Mark Fortney
(“Fortney”), a Caucasian male, who started at the facility on May
1, 2012. (Anderson Dep. at 40). In addition to the three material
handlers, Anderson recalls several other employees who performed
inspection work that involved the unwrapping and wiping down of
incoming awnings; they also assisted in the unloading of trucks
when needed. (Anderson Dep. at 41-44). These inspectors included
Jonathan Vargas (“J. Vargas”) and Bryan Vargas (“B. Vargas”),
Hispanic males, who happened to be brothers. (Anderson Dep. at 4142, 53).
Early in his employment, Anderson had conversations with J.
Vargas during which J. Vargas questioned why Anderson would walk
through the office to use a particular men’s bathroom rather than
use one that was closer to where Anderson normally worked; Anderson
told him what bathroom he used was a personal matter. (Anderson
Dep. at 44). Also early on in Anderson’s employment, J. Vargas and
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other inspectors would sometimes assist the material handlers in
unloading trucks. (Anderson Dep. at 51). If Anderson indicated that
he intended to leave the truck to go to the bathroom, J. Vargas
would say to others on the truck, “[y]ou know, a nigger’s always
got to go to the bathroom.” (Anderson Dep. at 49-50). Anderson told
J. Vargas to refer to him by his name rather than calling him
“nigger.” (Anderson Dep. at 50). On other occasions, Anderson would
walk past J. Vargas’ work area on his way to the bathroom; J.
Vargas would make comments to his co-workers such as “[h]ere comes
that nigger going to the bathroom again” in a voice loud enough for
Anderson to hear him. (Anderson Dep. at 51-52, 65-67). Sometimes
Anderson would confront J. Vargas about using the word “nigger,”
and they would exchange words; other times he just avoided walking
past him. (Anderson Dep. at 51, 53, 65-67, 310-11). Anderson also
observed J. Vargas swinging awnings around his head when unloading
trucks, which Anderson thought was unsafe behavior. (Anderson Dep.
at 60-62).
According to Anderson, he complained about J. Vargas to the
plant manager who preceded Fortney. (Anderson Dep. at 52-57). The
Operations Facility Manager who preceded Fortney, Brian Lewis, left
his
position
on
or
about
April
3,
2012,
before
Anderson’s
employment began. (Declaration of Venita Fortune ¶ 3). There was no
interim Operations Facility Manager, so Carefree is unsure to whom
Anderson made this complaint. (Id.). According to Anderson, the
-5-
person to whom Anderson complained told Anderson he would talk to
J. Vargas’ supervisor; however, the individual left the facility
shortly thereafter. (Anderson Dep. at 50, 52-57). Anderson does not
know what, if anything, this individual did with regard to J.
Vargas before he left. (Anderson Dep. at 56-57).
About a week after the individual to whom he first complained
left, Anderson complained to Malicoat about J. Vargas and other
inspection employees causing problems when working on the trucks.
(Anderson Dep. at 57-58). He did not mention J. Vargas’ use of the
word “nigger.” (Anderson Dep. at 57). Instead, he complained about
the unsafe behavior on the trucks. (Anderson Dep. at 57-59).
Malicoat responded by hiring a temporary employee, an AfricanAmerican male named Bramley, to help unload trucks, eliminating the
need
for
the
inspection
employees
to
step
in
and
help
out.
(Anderson Dep. at 58-59).
At some point after this, Anderson mentioned to Malicoat that
J. Vargas was using the “n” word to refer to him when he walked by
the inspectors’ work area to go to the bathroom. (Anderson Dep. at
65-67). Anderson believes Malicoat talked to J. Vargas and J.
Vargas’ supervisor about use of the word because Malicoat later
told Anderson that she did not know who to believe because J.
Vargas told her that Anderson had called him a “spic.” (Anderson
Dep. at 67-68). According to Anderson, this follow-up conversation
occurred on or about Wednesday, May 16, 2012, or Thursday, May 17,
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2012. (Anderson Dep. at 67-70, 72). Anderson stated that after
Malicoat raised the credibility issue, he denied calling J. Vargas
a spic and told Malicoat he was going to resign effective Friday,
May 25, 2012. (Anderson Dep. at 67-70, 73).
On Tuesday, May 22, 2012, Mark Fortney learned from Malicoat
that Anderson had complained to her about J. Vargas “messing with
him.” (Fortney Dec. ¶ 4). From his conversation with Malicoat,
Fortney understood that J. Vargas had used inappropriate terms
including the words “nigger” and “bitch” to describe Anderson, had
slandered Anderson’s wife, and had threatened to “get his Jersey
boys.” (Fortney Dec. ¶ 5). Fortney spoke with Anderson on the same
date, and Anderson confirmed that J. Vargas had used the word
“bitch” and “nigger” to describe him, made comments about his wife,
and made other threatening comments. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 6; Anderson
Dep. at 72-78).
After talking with Anderson, Fortney called Venita Fortune,
then
Carefree’s
Director
of
Administration,
who
is
based
in
Colorado and heads Carefree’s human resources function. (Fortney
Dec. ¶ 7; Fortune Dec. ¶¶ 2 & 4). Fortune and Fortney agreed that
they should give J. Vargas a written warning for violation of the
company’s anti-harassment policy and make it very clear to him that
he could not behave in the way that Anderson had described.
(Fortney Dec. ¶ 8; Fortune Dec. ¶ 5). Fortney called J. Vargas into
his office, and, with Fortune on the phone, administered the
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written warning. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 9; Fortune Dec. ¶ 6). J. Vargas
signed the warning; however, he also explained that Anderson had
made derogatory comments and used inappropriate language towards
him, including calling him a “spic.” (Id.).
The next day, Wednesday, May 23, 2012, Anderson was absent.
(Oliver Dec. ¶ 4 & Ex. C). J. Vargas came to Fortney and said he
wanted to make a complaint against Anderson. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 10).
Specifically, J. Vargas reported that while he was in the office
with Fortney getting his warning on the prior day, Anderson told
other
employees,
“[n]ow
that
spic
is
going
to
get
what
he
deserves.” (Id.). J. Vargas also called Fortune and gave her more
details of threatening comments from Anderson. (Fortune Dec. ¶ 8).
Fortney and Fortune discussed the situation and decided to issue a
written warning to Anderson like the one they had issued to J.
Vargas. (Fortune Dec. ¶ 9; Fortney Dec. ¶ 11).
Fortney met with Anderson on the morning of May 24, 2012, to
give him the written warning. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 12). Anderson has
only a limited recollection of this meeting: he recalls Fortney
telling him that J. Vargas had accused Anderson of calling him a
spic; he recalls denying the allegation; and he recalls being upset
about the allegation. (Anderson Dep. at 152-54, 298). He has no
recollection of Fortune being on the phone during this meeting, but
he admits that it was possible she was. (Anderson Dep. at 153-54).
Fortune and Fortney both recall Fortune being on the phone during
-8-
the meeting. (Fortune Dec. ¶ 10 ; Fortney Dec. ¶ 12). They both
also recall Anderson being very angry and vehemently denying that
he had referred to J. Vargas as a spic. (Id.) Anderson did not sign
a written warning at the meeting. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 12 ; Anderson
Dep. at 153-54, 298).
Later on the morning of May 24, 2012, Anderson was walking out
of the men’s room, and B. Vargas, J. Vargas’ brother, called him a
snitch. (Anderson Dep. at 129-130 & Ex. K). Anderson asked what B.
Vargas had said. (Id.) B. Vargas became defensive and threatened to
beat Anderson. (Id.) J. Vargas told his brother not to say what he
was saying. (Id.) Anderson asked B. Vargas why he had not made the
threat when the men were in the bathroom. (Id.) B. Vargas said he
would say it to Anderson’s face. (Id.) J. Vargas then grabbed B.
Vargas and said “let’s go bro, this bitch ain’t worth it.” (Id.)
Anderson said he was not a bitch. (Id.) J. Vargas then called
Anderson a “bitch as[s] nigger.” (Id.) According to Anderson, he
immediately orally reported this incident to Fortney, and Fortney
told him to write it down. (Anderson Dep. at 129-131). Fortney
recalls Anderson giving him the written document late in the
afternoon of May 24, 2012, after the meeting described in the next
paragraph. (Fortney Dec. ¶ 15 & Ex. B).
By May 24, 2012, it appeared to Fortney and Fortune that
Anderson and J. Vargas had engaged in inappropriate conduct,
including racial slurs, toward each other, so they decided to bring
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the two men together and attempt to try to work through the
situation with both of them at once. (Fortune Dec. ¶ 11; Fortney
Dec. ¶ 13). Around noon or 1:00 p.m. on May 24, 2012, Fortney
called both of the men into an office at the facility. (Anderson
Dep. at 80; Fortney Dec. ¶ 13). Fortune; Melanie Oliver (“Oliver”),
Carefree’s Human Resources Manager; and Bob Emler, Carefree’s
Director of Materials, called in on the phone. (Anderson Dep. at
81-84, 100-01; Fortune Dec. ¶ 11). Fortune talked to the two men,
telling them that the situation between them had gotten out of
hand. (Anderson Dep. at 84). Anderson recalls that J. Vargas became
very angry during the meeting and blamed everything on Anderson.
(Anderson Dep. at 87-89). Anderson recalls making comments himself,
but he does not recall becoming angry like J. Vargas did. (Anderson
Dep.
at
93-94).
Fortune
listened
to
what
they
were
saying.
(Anderson Dep. at 97-98). Eventually, Fortune said they had a “he
say/he say” situation, directed Fortney to tear up any previous
write ups, and said that they were going to “start fresh.” (Id.).
She instructed both men, in no uncertain terms, that if
management caught either of them calling the other names, there
would be no more questions asked, and the person doing the name
calling would be terminated. (Id.)
Anderson also recalls Fortune
telling both of them that what had transpired in the office should
stay in the office; they should not go out and talk about it.
(Anderson Dep. at 100). Anderson does not recall what Melanie
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Oliver said during the call. (Anderson Dep. at 100-01). Immediately
after the call, Oliver typed up her impressions of what occurred
during the call. (Oliver Dec. ¶ 3 & Ex A ).
After the meeting, Fortney gave each man a written Agreement
and Warning to sign; J. Vargas signed his immediately. (Fortney
Dec. ¶¶ 14 & 16 & Exs. A & C). Anderson recalls receiving the
Agreement and Warning sometime later on the 24th and taking it home
to think about it. (Anderson Dep. at 144-45).
On the morning of May 25, 2012, Anderson advised Fortney that
he was not going to sign the Agreement and Warning. (Fortney Dec.
¶ 16 & Ex. C; Anderson Dep. at 141-42, 145).
He had two reasons
for not signing. (Anderson Dep. at 146, 149-150). Sometime during
the afternoon of May 24, after the meeting with Fortune on his
phone, Anderson had walked by and heard J. Vargas telling his
brother that Anderson had gone in the office and “lied on him,”
causing management to tell him that if he said anything else to
Anderson he would be fired - behavior which contradicted the
directive of the meeting that neither of them talk about what
happened in the meeting.
(Anderson Dep. at 145-148).
Second,
Anderson did not sign because he did not “feel that [he] should
have been in the office getting wrote up when [he] wasn’t the one
initiating none of the contact. [H]e was the one being abused and
threatened.” (Anderson Dep. at 142, 149-50).
After
their
short
conversation,
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Fortney
left
to
do
the
forklift training, and Anderson walked away to use the men’s room
closest to the facility’s office. (Anderson Dep. at 161-62). When
he got there, the restroom was in use.
(Adnerson Dep. at 167).
So
he walked to Malicoat’s office, dropped off some paperwork, and
then walked to the warehouse bathroom that is connected to the
employee break room. (Anderson Dep. at 168-176, 184-85 & Ex. M).
While Anderson was washing his face, he heard someone enter the
bathroom and close the door. (Anderson Dep. at 176-77). When he
looked up, B. Vargas was standing over him. (Anderson Dep. at 177).
According to Anderson, B. Vargas challenged him to fight; Anderson
refused; a scuffle ensued; B. Vargas pulled out a knife; Anderson
pulled a box cutter out of his pocket; B. Vargas tried to stab
Anderson and missed; Anderson struck B. Vargas’ arm with the box
cutter; B. Vargas started bleeding and ran out of the bathroom,
yelling for his brother. (Anderson Dep. at 177-192). Fortney ran
into the bathroom with J. Vargas right behind him. (Anderson Dep.
at 192). Fortney told J. Vargas to get away and closed the bathroom
door with Anderson inside. (Anderson Dep. at 192-93). Anderson
opened the door, and Fortney told him to wait in the office;
Fortney directed a truck driver named Dave to watch Anderson.
(Anderson Dep. at 193-94). A female police officer arrived, talked
to Anderson, took the box cutter from Anderson, and arrested
Anderson. (Anderson Dep. at 195-96, 209). Anderson served thirtythree (33) days in jail. (Anderson Dep. 210). The prosecutor
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charged Anderson with a class D felony battery; he eventually pled
guilty to a class A misdemeanor battery. (Anderson Dep. at 230-33).
His sentence was a year of probation with credit for time served.
(Anderson Dep. at 233-36).
Carefree terminated Anderson because of the altercation with
B. Vargas. (Anderson Dep. at 297). Carefree sent Anderson his final
paycheck with a letter terminating his employment. (Anderson Dep.
at 262-63). Carefree also notified People Link, the agency through
which B. Vargas worked, that B. Vargas was not to return to work at
Carefree. (Fortune Dec. ¶ 12). He has not done so. (Fortney Dec. ¶
17). Anderson admits that B. Vargas’ assignment was terminated
because of the altercation. (Anderson Dep. at 298).
According to Anderson, his claim for violation of HIPAA is
based on two disclosures by Malicoat. (Anderson Dep. at 306).
First, he personally heard Malicoat telling J. Vargas, at some
point during the week of May 21, 2012, that Anderson was quitting
on May 25, 2012. (Anderson Dep. at 303-04). Second, at an unknown
time Dave the truck driver asked Anderson what medicine he was
taking. (Anderson Dep. at 305-06). Anderson refused to provide the
information and demanded to know who told Dave that he was taking
medicine. (Anderson Dep. at 305-06.) Dave used the term “she” to
describe
the
person
who
told
him
something
about
Anderson’s
medication, but refused to tell Anderson anything else. (Anderson
Dep. at 306). Anderson had previously told Malicoat that he was
-13-
taking some medication, so he assumed that Malicoat told Dave.
(Anderson Dep. at 305, 307). He admits, however, that he does not
know what, if anything, Malicoat (or anyone else) told Dave about
Anderson taking medication. (Anderson Dep. at 307).
Scott
Fetzer’s
self-insured
benefit
plans
are
“covered
entities” for HIPAA purposes, but no one based in Indiana engages
in plan administration. (Oliver Dec. ¶ 5). Malicoat was a Warehouse
Lead in April and May 2102; she is not a health care provider.
(Oliver Dec. ¶ 6). She does not, and did not in April or May 2012,
have access to employees’ health insurance claims information, and
she does not, and did not in April or May 2012, transmit healthrelated information to, or receive such information from, insurance
companies on behalf of Carefree. (Id.)
Anderson recalls Fortney starting somewhere between two days
and a week after Anderson arrived. (Anderson Dep. at 40; 57-58).
Fortney started on Tuesday, May 1, but he was out of the facility
for
training
from
Tuesday,
May
8
through
Friday,
May
11.
(Declaration of Mark Fortney ¶ 3).
The Title VII and Section 1981 claims must be dismissed because
there is no evidence that Carefree engaged in race discrimination
Anderson alleges that he was discriminated against on the
basis of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5, and in violation of
his equal rights under the law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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Because Title
VII and 1981 claims are analyzed in the same manner, these claims
will be addressed simultaneously. Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch.
Bd., 276 F.3d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 2002). There are two ways a
race discrimination claim can be proven.
There is a direct and an
indirect method. Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 938
(7th Cir. 2003).
Even though Anderson has failed to respond to the
instant motion or asserted which method he wishes to proceed on,
this Court will examine whether there is a triable issue of fact
under either method.
The direct method
Under the direct method a plaintiff must “show either through
direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer's decision to
take the adverse job action was motivated by an impermissible
purpose.” Id. at 938-939. Direct evidence consists of either an
outright admission by the decision maker that the challenged action
was undertaken because of the [plaintiff’s race] or a convincing
mosaic of circumstantial evidence . . . that point[s] directly to
a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action. Dass v. Chicago
Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012)(citations and
quotations
omitted).
There
record
does
not
demonstrate
any
admissions of discrimination.
Direct evidence can also be circumstantial evidence from which
a trier of fact could reasonably infer that Carefree discriminated
-15-
against him because of his race.
To create a convincing mosaic,
a plaintiff can rely on “three different types of circumstantial
evidence of intentional discrimination: (1) suspicious timing,
ambiguous oral or written statements, behavior toward or comments
directed at other employees in the protected group, and other bits
and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might
be drawn; (2) evidence that similarly situated employees outside
the protected class received systematically better treatment; and
(3) evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the job in
question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the
protected class and that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext
for
discrimination.”
Id.
(citations
and
footnotes
omitted).
Ultimately, the circumstantial evidence a plaintiff presents “must
point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s
action” and be “directly related to the employment decision.”
Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003);
Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Services, Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 602 (7th Cir.
2003).
In reviewing the record, none of these three types of
circumstantial evidence are present. There is nothing that directly
points
to
Anderson.
a
discriminatory
reason
for
Carefree
terminating
Quite the contrary, the evidence shows that Carefree
terminated Anderson due to the altercation that led to his arrest.
Thus, there is no direct evidence that Anderson was discharged
based on his race.
-16-
Indirect Method
When using the indirect method a plaintiff must first make a
prima facie case of discrimination.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
To do this, the plaintiff must
show that 1) he belongs to a protected class 2) he was meeting his
employer's legitimate performance expectations 3) he suffered an
adverse employment action and 4) other similarly situated employees
who were not members of the protected class were treated more
favorably.
Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 538 (7th
Cir. 2007).
If the plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case the
burden
then
shifts
nondiscriminatory
to
reason
the
defendant
for
Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 at 802.
then
the
plaintiff
defendant’s
is
the
adverse
make
a
legitimate,
action.
McDonnell
If the defendant meets this burden
afforded
nondiscriminatory
to
a
chance
reason
is
to
show
mere
that
pretext
the
for
discrimination. Id. at 804. To show pretext the plaintiff must
“identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or
contradictions in the purported reasons that a jury could find them
unworthy of credence.” Fane, 480 F.3d 534 at 541.
While the
burden does shift between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is always with the plaintiff. Id. at
538.
There is no question that Anderson, an African-American, is a
-17-
member of a protected class.
However, whether he was meeting his
employer’s legitimate performance expectations is another story.
Anderson got into an altercation with B. Vargas in the men’s room
at Carefree, which resulted in Vargas being cut by a box cutter and
Anderson’s arrest.
Anderson was fired for this incident and has
pointed to no other similarly situated employee who was not a
member of the protected class who was treated more favorably.
Thus, Anderson is unable to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Even if Anderson could make out a prima facie case, Carefree
has
proffered
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
terminating Anderson - the altercation in the men’s room.
for
There
has been no evidence that Carefree’s stated reason is pretextual.
In fact, Anderson admits that the altercation was the reason he was
fired from Carefree.
(Anderson Dep. pp. 297-300).
As such,
Anderson cannot successfully proceed under the indirect method
either.
As a result, Anderson’s Title VII and section 1981 claims
fails.
The HIPAA claim must be dismissed
Anderson claims that Malicoat violated his HIPAA privacy
rights by telling J. Vargas that Anderson was quitting and telling
Dave,
a
truck
driver,
that
Anderson
-18-
was
taking
medication.
(Anderson Dep. pp. 302-04, 306). Unfortunately for Anderson, HIPAA
does not provide him a cause of action against Carefree.
HIPAA empowered the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to promulgate regulations relating to privacy
standards for medical information.
These standards
authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
take enforcement action against health care providers and
insurers for noncompliance with the privacy standards.
HIPAA, however, does not provide a private cause of
action for enforcing privacy standards.
Hamilton-Hayyim v. Jackson, No. 12-cv-06392, 2013 WL 3944288 *9
(N.D. Ill. July 31, 2013) (citations omitted); see also Dodd v.
Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010).
Because HIPAA is a
regulatory statute that does not create a private cause of action
for Anderson to bring an action against Carefree, this claim must
be dismissed.3
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary
judgment (DE# 22) is DENIED as moot and the amended motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
Accordingly, this case is dismissed
with prejudice.
DATED:
June 2, 2014
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
3
Even if HIPAA did create a private cause of action, Anderson’s claim
would still fail because it is based on nothing more than Anderson’s
speculation and hearsay - neither of which can support a claim. There is no
evidence that Carefree violated any HIPAA regulation.
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