Hatter v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER: Hatter's motion to reverse or remand is DENIED. Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 10/7/2013. (tc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION

BILL HATTER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:12-CV-851 JVB-CAN

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
On December 19, 2012, Plaintiff Bill Hatter filed his Complaint in this Court, challenging
the decision by Defendant Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin denying his applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Hatter requests this Court to
enter judgment in his favor or remand this matter to the Commissioner. For the reasons stated
below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

A. Procedural Background
Hatter applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on October 22, 2009, and Supplemental
Security Income on June 17, 2010. (R. at 20). In both instances, Hatter alleged a disability onset
date of November 16, 2008. (Id.). These claims were denied initially and again upon

1

On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin is automatically substituted
for Michael J. Astrue as the named Defendant.

reconsideration. (Id.). Hatter requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”),
which was held on October 4, 2011. (Id.). In an opinion dated October 17, 2011, the ALJ found
that Hatter met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,
2013, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 16, 2008. (R. at
22). Furthermore, the ALJ found that Hatter had the severe impairment of degenerative disk
disease of the spine. (Id.). The ALJ held, however, that Hatter did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Additionally, the ALJ found that Hatter retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).
Specifically, the ALJ found that Hatter can occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds, sit,
stand, or walk for one hour, and that he must adjust his position for five minutes after sitting for
one hour. (R. at 20). The ALJ determined that Hatter could not use his right leg to operate foot
controls, nor could he climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or drive, operate machinery, or be
exposed to unprotected heights, exposed flames, large bodies of water, or unguarded hazardous
machinery. (Id.). Hatter could, however, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id.). Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that Hatter
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 30).
Accordingly, the ALJ issued a decision denying Hatter’s application for benefits. (R. at
30). The Appeals Council denied Hatter’s request for review. (R. at 5). As a result, the ALJ’s
opinion became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; Fast v.
Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2005). Hatter then filed the present action.

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B. Factual Background
(1) Medical Evidence
Hatter was born in 1973, and was thirty-eight years old at the time the ALJ denied his
application for disability benefits. He has a high school education and past relevant work as a
welder. (R. at 40). Hatter suffers from lower-back pain that also travels into his legs. In 2004,
Hatter began treatment with his family physician, Dr. Rex Allman, complaining of chronic lower
back pain stemming from a previous accident at work. (R. at 332). Dr. Allman diagnosed
lumbosacral strain with chronic back pain and stabilized Hatter’s back pain with prescription
Adderall. (R. at 335, 342). Treatment notes indicate that Hatter’s back pain was well-controlled
with the use of Adderall. (R. at 332, 333–37, 338–40, 343). At a March 27, 2009, follow-up with
Dr. Allman, Hatter stated that he “fe[lt] well with no complaints.” (R. at 472).
Hatter saw Dr. Allman again on March 6, 2010. (R. at 470). He reported experiencing
intermittent back pain and pain down his legs that worsened with prolonged standing or sitting.
(Id.). Dr. Allman diagnosed Hatter with a lumbosacral sprain or strain. (R. at 471). In a
handwritten note from that date, Dr. Allman opined that Hatter was unable to work due to
chronic low back pain, which was made worse by sitting or standing for prolonged periods of
time. (R. at 400). Dr. Allman also wrote a follow-up note on March 19, 2010, in which he stated
that Hatter can only sit for sixty minutes, stand for ten to sixty minutes, walk two blocks, and
that prolonged sitting or standing worsened Hatter’s low back pain. (R. at 397). Dr. Allman also
indicated that Hatter had difficulty traveling due to low back pain that radiated to both legs. (Id.).
On June 11, 2010, Dr. Allman referred Hatter to neurologist Salman Wali, M.D., for a
neurological exam. (R. at 474). Dr. Wali noted Hatter’s complaint of back pain, and that physical
activity exacerbated the pain, and that the pain levels fluctuated throughout the day. (R. at 474,

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476). Dr. Wali ordered an x-ray of Hatter’s lower back, as well as an EMG and nerve conduction
studies of his legs. (R. at 476). Dr. Wali saw Hatter again on June 25, 2010, and reported that the
x-ray exam, EMG and nerve conduction studies were all normal. (R. at 472). Dr. Wali
recommended that Hatter receive trigger point injections into his lower back. (R. at 473).
On October 26, 2010, Hatter established care with neurosurgeon Roman Filipowicz,
M.D. (R. at 625). Dr. Filipowicz noted Hatter’s history of back pain and ordered an MRI of his
lower back. (Id.). The MRI showed a disc protrusion at the L4–L5 level of the spine, causing
severe left neuroforamina stenosis and mild to moderate stenosis of the left aspect of the central
canal, with likely nerve root compression at the L4–L5 level. (R. at 404). In a letter dated March
4, 2011, Dr. Filipowicz stated that the MRI revealed a “good-sized disc herniation” at the L4–L5
level, causing nerve root compression. (R. at 627). On March 15, 2011, Hatter elected to undergo
an operation on his lower back. (R. at 418). Dr. Filipowicz performed a hemilaminotomy, a
microdiskectomy at the L4–L5 level, and a nerve root decompression. (R. at 418–19).
Hatter followed-up with Dr. Filipowicz on April 1, 2011. (R. at 434). Dr. Filipowicz
stated that Hatter still had back and leg pain, but it was better, and that he moved his legs “quite
well.” (Id.). At another appointment on May 6, 2011, Dr. Filipowicz noted that Hatter’s strength
and function improved after the operation, he was trying to not take pain medicine, was
rehabilitating himself on his own, and was able to walk and complete small jobs around the
house. (R. at 433). Dr. Filipowicz stated that Hatter still had bad days, and that his back problems
made it difficult for him to return to work as a welder. (Id.). Dr. Filipowicz recommended that
Hatter see either a physiatrist or physical therapist to receive a functional capacity evaluation.
(Id.).

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Hatter saw Dr. Filipowicz again on August 8, 2011. (R. at 533). Dr. Filipowicz noted that
Hatter’s back and legs hurt, and expressed concern that Hatter may have a problem with his disk
if he did not improve. (Id.). Hatter underwent another MRI of his lumbar spine on August 16,
2011. (R. at 530). The MRI results showed a possible residual disk fragment in the same area as
Hatter’s first operation. (Id.).

(a) Dr. Allman’s Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire
On March 31, 2010, Dr. Allman completed a Lumbar Spine Residual Functional
Capacity Questionnaire. (R. at 485). Dr. Allman diagnosed Hatter with a lumbosacral strain
resulting in clinical findings of back stiffness, muscle spasm, and moderately decreased range of
motion in the lower back. (R. at 485–86). He noted that Hatter would often experience pain that
was severe enough to interfere with his attention and concentration. (R. at 486). Dr. Allman also
stated that Hatter could walk for five blocks, sit and stand continuously for two hours at a time,
and sit and stand for about two hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 487). He also opined that
Hatter must walk every fifty minutes for ten minutes, and that he would need to take an
unscheduled break every hour for ten minutes. (Id.). Additionally, Hatter could frequently lift
and carry ten pounds or less. (R. at 488).

(b) Dr. Filipowicz’s Medical Source Statement
In September 2011, Dr. Filipowicz completed a medical source statement assessing
Hatter’s ability to perform work-related activities. (R. at 537–41). He stated that Hatter could

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only occasionally lift or carry up to ten pounds. (R. at 537). Sitting, standing, and walking were
limited to one hour each during an eight-hour day. (R. at 538). Hatter could not use either foot to
operate foot controls. (R. at 539). He was limited to occasional climbing, balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling (R. at 541). Hatter was also limited to occasional exposure to
unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and operation of a motor vehicle. (R. at 541).

(2) Claimant’s Testimony
At his hearing before the ALJ on October 4, 2011, Hatter stated that he is disabled
because he experiences constant lower back pain that travels into his legs.2 (R. at 46). He said
that physical activity makes the pain worse and that he took muscle relaxants and pain medicine
to lessen his symptoms. (Id.). Furthermore, Hatter said that his pain level was generally constant
from 2008 through 2011. (Id.). Hatter testified that he can only sit for fifteen to twenty minutes
before needing to get up and change position. (R. at 49). He also said that he can only stand for
fifteen to twenty minutes at one time, and that he needs to lie down and rest two to three times
per day for fifteen minutes to one-half hour. (R. at 49–51). Hatter said that during the day he
checks e-mail, helps with household chores, assists his children with their school work, and is
able to drive himself to appointments. (R. at 50–52).

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While Hatter also alleged disability due to a depressive condition, the ALJ found that this was a non-severe
impairment. (R. at 23–24). Furthermore, when the ALJ asked why Hatter is disabled, Hatter only mentioned his
back pain, and does not raise the depressive condition as an issue on appeal. Therefore, the Court confines its
analysis to Hatter’s allegations regarding his lower back problems.

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C. Disability Standard
In reviewing disability decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security, the district
court must affirm the ALJ’s decision so long as it is both supported by substantial evidence and
free of legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345,
351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of such “relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This Court will not substitute its own opinion for that of the ALJ’s or
re-weigh the evidence; however, it will conduct a critical review of the evidence, considering
both the evidence that supports and detracts from the decision. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart,
336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary
support or an adequate discussion of the issues. Id. The ALJ must explain his analysis of the
evidence with specific detail and clarity so as to build a logical bridge from the evidence to the
conclusion, but does not need to provide a “complete written evaluation of every piece of
testimony and evidence.” Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Diaz v.
Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 1995)). This includes addressing uncontradicted evidence that
supports a claimant’s disability. Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985). The
ALJ’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626.
Claimants will only qualify for benefits if they are found “disabled” under the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the
“inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-part test to determine

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whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920. This test requires the ALJ
to consider whether: (1) the claimant is involved in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant
has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe; (3) the individual’s impairment
meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations; (4) the
impairment precludes the claimant from performing past relevant work; (5) the national economy
lacks a significant number of jobs that the claimant has the capacity to perform. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, after which
the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration at step five. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five.
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2005). At step three, if the
impairment meets or medically equals any of the severe impairments listed in the Social Security
Regulations, the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner and the claimant is found to
be disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If, however, the claimant’s
impairment does not meet a listing, the ALJ will then assess the claimant’s RFC to determine if
the claimant can perform past relevant work, or other work available in the national economy. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)–(v).

D. Analysis
The primary issue this Court must resolve is whether the ALJ made a proper RFC
determination. Hatter argues that the ALJ’s opinion does not support his RFC determination
because (1) the ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinion of Hatter’s treating physicians,

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Drs. Allman and Filipowicz, and (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated Hatter’s credibility regarding
his testimony about his pain symptoms.
The RFC is a judgment of an individual’s ability to perform physical and mental work
activities on a sustained basis, despite having limiting impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
416.920(e); SSR 96-8p. In making a proper RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all of the
relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The record includes
medical signs, diagnostic findings, the claimant’s statements about the severity and limitations of
medical impairments, statements and other information provided by treating or examining
physicians and psychologists, third party witness reports, and any other relevant evidence in the
record. See Martinez v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-62-PRC, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 4611415, at *9 (N.D.
Ind. Nov. 30, 2009); SSR 96-7p.

1. The ALJ properly explained his reasons for discounting Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s
medical opinions.
Hatter seeks a remand for further consideration of the medical opinions of Drs. Allman
and Filipowicz. He contends that the ALJ erred by not assigning controlling weight to these
opinions because they were his treating physicians. In determining the proper weight to accord
medical opinions, the ALJ must consider factors including the claimant’s examining and
treatment relationship with the source of the opinion, the physician’s specialty, the support
provided for the medical opinion, and its consistency with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c), 416.927(c). A “treating source” is a medical professional who provides medical
treatment or evaluation to the claimant and has or had an ongoing relationship with the claimant.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). An ongoing relationship exists when the medical record
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shows that the claimant saw the source frequently enough to be consistent with accepted medical
practices for the treatment of the medical condition. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).
An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is well-supported
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and if it is consistent with
other substantial evidence in the record. Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 2006);
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); SSR 96-8p; SSR 96-2p. Generally, ALJs weigh the
opinions of treating sources more heavily because they are more familiar with the claimant’s
conditions and circumstances. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. A claimant is not entitled to benefits,
however, merely because a treating physician labels him as disabled. Dixon v. Massanari, 270
F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). A medical opinion may be discounted if it is internally
inconsistent or inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Clifford, 227 F.3d at
870. While ALJs are not required to award a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight,
they must articulate their reasoning for not doing so. Hofslien, 439 F.3d at 376–77. The ALJ’s
reasoning should be based on the relevant factors applied to all medical opinions, including the
length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; frequency of examination; the
physician’s specialty; the types of tests performed; and the consistency and support for the
physician’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).
In this case, the ALJ analyzed several opinions by Drs. Allman and Filipowicz, as well as
those of state reviewing physicians. In total, the record indicates that the ALJ evaluated about
seven separate medical source opinions when determining Hatter’s RFC. (R. at 26–28). The ALJ
first considered Dr. Allman’s March 2010 opinion, in which Dr. Allman stated that Hatter was
unable to work. (R. at 26). The ALJ gave this opinion “very little weight” because the treatment
notes from the office visit that day indicated that Hatter had no complaints. (See R. at 26, 402–

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04). The next opinions the ALJ considered were those of State agency physicians that opined that
Hatter’s back condition was not a severe impairment. (R. at 26). He gave these opinions “very
little weight” because he believed that Hatter did in fact have a severe impairment. (R. at 27).
The ALJ then considered an opinion from Dr. Allman dated March 19, 2010, which the ALJ
assigned “limited weight,” because “the medical evidence . . . does not fully support these
limitations.” (R. at 27). Additionally, the ALJ gave “some weight” to the twenty-five pound
lifting restriction given by Dr. Allman in December 2009. (Id.). Specifically, the ALJ found that
Hatter was more restricted and limited to lifting no more than ten pounds. (Id.).
The ALJ then evaluated notes from Drs. Allman and Filipowicz made in February,
March, and April 2011. (Id.). These opinions stated that Hatter was unable to work due to
chronic back pain and his back surgery. The ALJ gave these opinions “limited weight,” finding
that Hatter was temporarily unable to work before and after his back operation, and that he
improved significantly after the surgery, noting Dr. Filipowicz’s recommendation that Hatter see
a physiatrist or physical therapist to improve his physical abilities. (Id.).
Subsequently, the ALJ “reject[ed]” Dr. Allman’s March 2010 Lumbar Spine Residual
Functional Capacity Questionnaire, because “it [was] inconsistent with the medical evidence of
record.” (Id.). The ALJ stated that the medical evidence available at the time Dr. Allman gave
the opinion was insufficient to support the limitations Dr. Allman noted. (Id.). Specifically,
Hatter’s back pain was stable with the use of Adderall and objective diagnostic tests were
generally unremarkable. (Id). Even though he rejected Dr. Allman’s Questionnaire, the ALJ
agreed with that portion of the opinion indicating a need to alternate between sitting and
standing, and he incorporated it into his final RFC. (Id.).

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The final medical opinion the ALJ considered was the medical source statement prepared
by Dr. Filipowicz in September, 2011. (R. at 28). The ALJ adopted Dr. Filipowicz’s opinions
regarding Hatter’s ability to lift and carry, sit, stand, and walk for one hour at a time, his need to
never use his right foot to operate foot controls, and his ability to occasionally engage in postural
activities except climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. (Id.). The ALJ also found Hatter more
limited than Dr. Filipowicz did regarding climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds, and that he
cannot drive or operate machinery, nor be exposed to unprotected heights, exposed flames, large
bodies of water, or unguarded hazardous machinery. (Id.). The only portion of the opinion the
ALJ did not adopt in his final RFC is Dr. Filipowicz’s statement that Hatter can only sit, stand,
and walk for one hour each in total in an eight-hour workday, and that he could never use his left
foot to operate foot controls. (Id.).
Hatter argues that the ALJ “credited his own interpretation of unspecified ‘objective
evidence’ over substantial portions from the two long-term treating experts,” and that he
“offer[ed] no more than vague reasons for rejecting the opinions provided by the treating
physicians.” (DE 11, at 10). The Court is not persuaded, and finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. Initially, the ALJ noted Hatter’s long history of back pain and that it
was well controlled with the use of prescription medicine up until 2010. (R. at 25). He then
discounted Dr. Allman’s March 2010 opinion that stated Hatter was unable to work because the
records from the same office visit state that Hatter had no complaints regarding his lower back.
(R. at 26). The ALJ also gave limited weight to Dr. Allman’s second March 2010 statement
regarding Hatter’s ability sit, stand, and walk because this opinion was prepared one year before
Hatter’s back operation, and post-operative notes indicate that Hatter’s ability to walk and move
improved significantly after the operation. (R. at 27). Additionally, the ALJ discounted Dr.

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Allman’s Lumbar Spine Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire, completed in March 2010,
because at the time of the report, Hatter’s pain was constant and unchanging, and the objective
medical findings were unremarkable. (Id.). In his opinion, the ALJ noted that Hatter was unable
to work before and after his March 2011 operation, but found that this restriction was only
temporary due to his post-operative improvement, and buttressed by Dr. Filipowicz’s
recommendation that Hatter begin physical therapy. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ adopted the majority
of Dr. Filipowicz’s September 2011 medical source statement in his final RFC, discounting only
that portion that was not substantiated by the record. Throughout his opinion, the ALJ referenced
the relevant factors applied to medical opinions, including the length, nature, and extent of the
treatment relationships, the frequency of examinations, Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s
specialties, the objective medical tests performed, and the overall consistency and support for the
physician's opinion. In short, the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably articulated his reasons for
not assigning Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s numerous opinions controlling weight.

2. The ALJ’s credibility determination was not patently wrong.
In addition to disputing the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Allman’s and Dr. Filipowicz’s
medical opinions, Hatter also challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination, asserting that he
applied the wrong legal standard in assessing Hatter’s credibility. ALJs are in a special position
to hear, see, and assess witnesses, so their credibility determinations are given special deference
and will only be overturned if they are patently wrong. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th
Cir. 2012). An ALJ’s credibility determination will only be considered patently wrong when it
lacks any explanation or support. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008).

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“Patently wrong” is a high burden. Turner v. Astrue, 390 Fed. Appx. 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2010).
“In analyzing an ALJ’s opinion for such fatal gaps or contradictions, we give the opinion a
commonsensical reading rather than nitpicking at it.” Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th
Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “careful consideration must be given to any
available information about symptoms because subjective descriptions may indicate more severe
limitations or restrictions than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone.” SSR 96-8p.
Claimants are responsible, however, for providing medical evidence showing how the
impairments affect their functioning. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912.
In assessing a claimant’s subjective symptoms, particularly pain, the ALJ must follow a
two-step process. SSR 96-7p. First, the ALJ must determine whether a medically determinable
impairment exists that can by shown by acceptable medical evidence and can be reasonably
expected to produce the claimant’s pain or other symptoms. Id. Second, after showing an
underlying physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the
claimant’s pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of the impairment to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant’s
ability to work. Id. Whenever a claimant’s statements about the symptoms and limitations of
their impairment are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a
finding on the credibility of the individual’s statements based on consideration of the entire case
record. Id.
Hatter’s main claim is that he suffers from low back pain that radiates into his legs. In
determining the credibility of Hatter’s testimony regarding the symptoms associated with his
pain, the ALJ concluded that his medically determined impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the symptoms he alleged in his testimony. (R. at 25). The ALJ found, however,

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that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
[were] not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with the above [RFC].” (Id.). Hatter
contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated the consistency of his testimony against the RFC
instead of the evidence in the record. As Hatter correctly states, in Bjornson v. Astrue, the
Seventh Circuit rejected an ALJ’s use of the exact same boilerplate language used in this case.
671 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2012). The court in Bjornson, however, criticized the ALJ for not
linking his conclusion to the evidence in the record. See 671 F.3d at 645. Moreover, even though
the ALJ used boilerplate language, this alone “does not automatically undermine or discredit the
ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility
determination.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013).
Hatter identifies two separate grounds for which he claims the ALJ erred in determining
his credibility. First, he argues that the ALJ focused on medical records before his alleged onset
date and then cherry-picked later medical records to support his credibility finding. (DE 11, at
15). Next, he argues that the ALJ erred by improperly basing the credibility finding on Hatter’s
apparent lack of discomfort at the disability hearing. (DE 11, at 16). Both of these points are
without merit.
The ALJ began his credibility determination by focusing on Hatter’s testimony regarding
his activities of daily living and his functional limitations, noting that Hatter is able to drive,
check e-mail, help with chores, and help his children with homework. (R. at 25). The ALJ then
discussed Hatter’s history of low back pain stemming from a previous injury. (Id.). Although
Hatter alleged a disability onset date of November 2008, and stated at the hearing that his pain
level was about the same from 2008 to 2011, the ALJ noted that the medical records indicate that
Hatter’s low back pain was controlled and generally stable with the use of Adderall until 2010.

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(Id.). He also considered the objective tests and exam results before Hatter showed a need for
surgery in March 2011. (R. at 26). For example, the ALJ cited an “unremarkable” January 2010
physical consultative exam, as well as normal x-ray, EMG, and nerve conduction studies of his
legs performed in June, 2010. (Id.). The ALJ also discussed the Third Party Function Report
completed by Hatter’s wife, giving it “some weight,” and disregarded those parts that were
inconsistent with the RFC, and noted that Hatter’s wife may not be entirely objective in her
analysis. (R. at 28).
Additionally, the ALJ mentioned Hatter’s appearance during the hearing, noting that
Hatter did not appear “overly uncomfortable during the hearing,” and that after Hatter switched
from sitting to standing, he “appeared comfortable while standing.” (Id.). Contrary to Hatter’s
assertion, the Seventh Circuit “ha[s] repeatedly endorsed the role of [ALJ] observation in
determining credibility . . . .” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, if an
ALJ’s observation was “one of several factors that contributed to the [ALJ]’s credibility
determination, we cannot say this rendered that judgment ‘patently wrong.’” Id. As noted above,
the ALJ discussed the relevant medical and opinion evidence, including his observations of
Hatter, and concluded that Hatter’s testimony regarding the limiting effects of his symptoms was
not credible. (R. at 25). Moreover, he accommodated Hatter’s impairments by limiting him to
sedentary work. Thus, the ALJ considered multiple factors in arriving at his credibility
determination, and his opinion is not patently wrong.
In sum, the ALJ articulated the specific reasons he discounted Hatter’s testimony,
including his activities of daily living and his medical history. This Court will not reweigh the
record evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, as Hatter invites. See Nelson v.
Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1997). The ALJ’s reasons are properly supported by record

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evidence and are sufficiently specific to make clear the weight given to Hatter’s testimony and
the specific reasons for that weight. See SSR 96-7p. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility
determination did not lack explanation or support, and so is not patently wrong, and will be
upheld. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 2013); Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d
306, 311 (7th Cir. 2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008).

E. Conclusion
The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported with substantial evidence and free
of legal error. Therefore, Hatter’s motion to reverse or remand is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
Clerk is instructed to term this case and enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

SO ORDERED on October 7, 2013.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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