Franklin et al v. Civil City of South Bend et al

Filing 43

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36] filed by Defendants Eric Mentz, Michael Stuk, and Aaron Knepper, and DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Paragraph [ECF No. 39]. Fu rther, the Plaintiffs' claim for Invasion of Privacy is DISMISSED. Still pending are the Plaintiffs' claims for unlawful entry and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and battery under state law. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 9/3/15. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
DAN FRANKLIN, VIVIAN FRANKLIN,
and DESHAWN FRANKLIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL CITY OF SOUTH BEND, PETE
BUTTIGIEG, Mayor, CHARLES HURLEY,
Interim Chief of Police of the South Bend Police
Department, ERIC MENTZ, Patrolman,
PFC MICHAEL STUK, and OFFICER AARON
KNEPPER,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 3:13-CV-207-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiffs, Dan Franklin, Vivian Franklin, and DeShawn Franklin, have sued the
Defendants for events that occurred on July 7, 2012. Dan and Vivian Franklin are the parents of
DeShawn Franklin. Around 2:30 AM, the Defendant police officers entered the Plaintiffs’
residence looking for the Franklins’ older son, Dan Jones, who they believed had just committed
a battery on his girlfriend before fleeing to his mother’s house. Jones was not inside the house.
But the police, mistakenly believing that a sleeping DeShawn was actually Jones, seized him.
Only after officers subdued the resisting DeShawn through the use of physical force did they
realize that he was not the person they were looking for. They detained him further before
deciding that he should not be charged with resisting arrest or battery.
The Plaintiffs filed a twelve-count Complaint at Law [ECF No. 1] in the St. Joseph
Circuit Court, raising claims for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state claims for trespass, battery, false arrest,
false imprisonment, negligence, negligent supervision, and assault. In addition to suing Officers

Eric Mentz, Michael Stuk, and Aaron Knepper, the Plaintiffs raised claims against Defendant
Civil City of South Bend (South Bend); Defendant Pete Buttigieg, Mayor of South Bend, and;
Defendant Charles Hurley, Interim Chief of Police of the South Bend Police Department. The
Complaint was removed to this Court.
Pursuant to an Opinion and Order [ECF No. 19] issued on September 19, 2013, the
Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for invasion of privacy, and the fifth cause of action for failure
to protect are no longer pending against South Bend, Buttigieg, and Hurley. Defendants Mentz,
Stuk, and Knepper have moved for summary judgment [ECF No. 36] on all claims brought
against them.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are derived solely from the case reports written by officers Eric
Mentz, Michael Stuk, and Aaron Knepper. The only other evidence offered, a document entitled
“Internal Affairs Investigation Report,” has not been authenticated. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)
(“the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is”). Because the proponent of the document, the Plaintiffs, do not provide an
affidavit from the author of the report or custodian of the document concerning its authenticity, it
is not admissible. Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2006); Scott
v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 n.7 (7th Cir. 2003). In any event, the contents of the report
cannot be used for the purpose the Plaintiffs attempt to present it, which is to offer legal
conclusions about the officers’ actions.
On July 7, 2012, at 2:23 AM, Officer Mentz responded to a domestic violence complaint.

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The victim, Crystal Escobedo, told Officer Mentz that her boyfriend, Dan Jones, caused what
Officer Mentz reported were “ghastly bite marks.” (ECF No. 36-2 at 2.) Escobedo told Officer
Mentz that Jones had already left and was going to his mother’s house at 910 Bowman Street.
Officer Mentz relayed this information to Officer Knepper, who intended to look for Jones while
Officer Mentz continued to talk with Escobedo. Officer Mentz told Officer Knepper that Jones
was to be arrested on felony assault charges.
Officer Knepper saw a man jog across a street toward the 1000 block of Bowman and
contacted Officer Mentz by radio. Officer Knepper confirmed with Officer Mentz that Jones was
a black male, about 5'5", 140 pounds, and had braided hair. Officer Knepper turned his car
around to pursue the man he believed to be Jones, but lost sight of him. Another officer, Officer
Stuk, arrived to set up a perimeter. A fourth officer, who had a K-9, began tracking in the alley
where Officer Knepper last saw the man fitting Jones’s description. The K-9 led officers to the
back of a house about two blocks away. The address was 910 Bowman Street.
Officer Knepper asked dispatch to call the occupants of 910 Bowman Street and direct
them to step out of the house. Dispatch advised that the female who answered the phone said that
she lived on Fellow Street, that she was not making any sense, and that she was changing her
story. Officers Mentz and Stuk knocked on the front door of 910 Bowman Street. Vivian
Franklin answered the door. Officer Stuk had her step outside and asked her who else was in the
house. She responded that her husband and her son were inside. Officer Stuk looked over to
Officer Mentz, shrugged his shoulders, and nodded his head. Officer Mentz took this to mean
that they should proceed inside the house.
Officers Mentz and Knepper entered the house. Officer Stuk stayed outside with Vivian

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just until the K-9 officer could stay with her instead. All three officers entered a bedroom and
saw a black male laying face down on the bed. Officer Knepper saw that he had braids, but that
his clothes were not the same clothes Jones had been wearing earlier. The officers suspected that
it was Jones pretending to be asleep, and began giving him verbal commands.
When verbal commands failed to elicit any response, Officer Mentz attempted to
handcuff the male, who the officers only later discovered was not Jones and was, instead, his
younger brother DeShawn. Because DeShawn had been sleeping, Officer Mentz’s actions caused
DeShawn to jump up and become combative. He lunged at Officer Mentz, grabbing his vest and
gun belt. To subdue DeShawn, Officer Knepper used his taser, but only one probe struck him.
Officer Mentz then hit DeShawn three times in the face until he released his grip on Officer
Mentz’s vest and belt. Officers Mentz and Stuk forced DeShawn onto the bed as Officer
Knepper attempted to put his left arm behind his back to detain him. DeShawn continued to
struggle and Officer Knepper struck him in the shoulder blade area three times with his fist.
Officer Knepper was then able to gain control of DeShawn’s arm and place it behind his back
while Officer Mentz handcuffed him. DeShawn was escorted outside and secured in Officer
Struk’s police vehicle.
By then, Officer Knepper knew that DeShawn was not Jones, however, the officers
detained DeShawn for battery of an officer and resisting arrest. After reviewing the events,
DeShawn was released and treated by paramedics for removal of the taser probe.

ANALYSIS
This Court will only grant summary judgment if all of the admissible submissions

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indicate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is not to sift
through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.
The court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether
there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Heochst Corp., 24
F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). A district court should deny a motion for summary judgment only
when the non-moving party presents admissible evidence that creates a genuine issue of material
fact. Luster v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 652 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
5443 Suffield Terrace, 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2010); Swearnigen–El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2010)). Material facts are those that are outcome
determinative under the applicable law. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997).
Additionally, a court is not “obliged to research and construct legal arguments for parties,
especially when they are represented by counsel.” Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th
Cir. 2011).

A.

Constitutional Claims
When public officers violate the constitutional rights of citizens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

provides the vehicle for a legal claim. But the Defendants have asserted that they are entitled to
qualified immunity, which is a doctrine that protects government officials “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

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818 (1982) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity is intended to strike a balance between
“protect[ing] a government official’s ability to function without the threat of distraction and
liability” and “afford[ing] members of the public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations
by government officials who abuse their offices.” Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evaluating a qualified immunity defense
requires two inquires: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Williams v. City of Chi., 733 F.3d 749,
758 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the
defendant official is entitled to summary judgment.” Gibbs, 755 F.3d at 537. The Court is not
required to address the prongs in order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

1.

Entry Into the Plaintiffs’ Home and Seizure of DeShawn
It is undisputed that the Defendant officers entered the Plaintiffs’ home and seized

DeShawn, and did so without a warrant or consent. “At the core of the privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment is the right to be let alone in one’s home.” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee,
751 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2014). The Fourth Amendment thus “‘prohibits the police from
making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine
arrest,’ even for a felony, and even with probable cause.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983,
992 (7th Cir. 2014) (ellipses omitted) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980));
cf. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1981) (holding that police may not lawfully
enter the home of a third party to search for a person named in an arrest warrant without first

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obtaining a search warrant). The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to warrantless
arrest inside a person’s home, which is to say that police officers may not execute a warrantless
arrest in a home unless they have both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See, e.g.,
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“[W]arrantless . . . arrests in the home are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.”).
“Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of
the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” Welsh, 466
U.S. at 750. “[A] warrantless entry into a dwelling may be lawful when there is a pressing need
for the police to enter but no time for them to secure a warrant.” Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 557
(citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978), and Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725,
730 (7th Cir. 2013)). The underlying pragmatic concern is “whether the exceedingly strong
privacy interest in one’s residence is outweighed by the risk that delay will engender injury,
destruction of evidence, or escape.” United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980).
The first question the Court asks then, is whether the Defendants had an objectively
reasonably belief that there was an “urgent need to cross the threshold,” of the Plaintiffs’ home
Acevedo, 627 F.3d at 70, so that they could find the person they believed was inside and arrest
him for recently committing a battery on his girlfriend at a different location. The Defendants

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claim that they were so justified because they were in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect. See
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976). They assert that “the interest in finding a
person who committed an act of violence and is evading police intervention outweighs any
inconvenience the [Plaintiffs’] claim in their constitutional right.” (Mem. in Support 8, ECF No.
36-1.)
The Supreme Court first upheld a warrantless entry and search in light the “exigencies of
the situation” brought about by circumstances involving pursuit in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967). The Court held:
The police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the
suspect had entered [a certain house] less than five minutes before they reached it.
They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man
of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the
robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require
police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a
thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that
Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons
which could be used against them or to effect an escape.
Warden, 387 U.S. at 298–99. This Court is using the term pursuit loosely in connection with
Warden, as it is aware that the majority opinion did not actually use the term “hot pursuit.”
Those words appear only in the concurring and dissenting opinions. In a later decision, the
Supreme Court noted in a footnote that Warden was actually based on the “exigencies of the
situation,” and did not “even involve a ‘hot pursuit’ in the sense that the term would normally be
understood,” as there was no element of a chase. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42 n.3.
In United States v. Santana, the case cited by the Defendants in support of their
warrantless entry, an undercover officer arranged to buy heroin from an individual who obtained
the drugs from inside Santana’s house. Thus, immediately after the crime had been committed,
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police officers had probable cause to arrest Santana, but no warrant. They saw her standing
outside her open doorway as they approached the house. When they shouted “police,” Santana
retreated into her home. The police followed her inside and arrested her. After concluding that
Santana was in a “public place” when they first encountered her, so that the police were clearly
justified in attempting to arrest her without a warrant, the Court explained:
The only remaining question is whether her act of retreating into her house could
thwart an otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not. . . . This case,
involving a true “hot pursuit,” is clearly governed by Warden; the need to act
quickly here is even greater than in that case while the intrusion is much less. The
District Court was correct in concluding that “hot pursuit” means some sort of a
chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry “in and about (the) public
streets.” The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not
render it any the less a “hot pursuit” sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into
Santana’s house. Once Santana saw the police, there was a realistic expectation
that any delay would result in destruction of evidence.
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–43 (footnote cited above omitted).
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, decided eight years after Santana, the Supreme Court found that
the government had not met the heavy burden of showing that an urgent need justified a
warrantless home arrest. A witness had observed a car swerve off the road and come to a stop in
an open field. After the witness blocked the car from returning to the road, the driver emerged
from the vehicle and asked for a ride home. When the witness suggested they wait for assistance,
the driver walked away from the scene. 466 U.S. at 742. The police arrived a few minutes later
and questioned the witness. They also located the vehicle registration of the abandoned car and
learned that it was registered to Welsh, who lived a short distance from the scene. The police
proceeded to Welsh’s home where they gained entry after a family member answered the door.
Id. at 743. The officers found Welsh lying in bed and arrested him for driving or operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The government attempted to “justify
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the arrest by relying on the hot-pursuit doctrine, on the threat to public safety, and on the need to
preserve evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level.” Id. at 753. In disposing of the hot
pursuit argument, the Court stated that it was “unconvincing because there was no immediate or
continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.” Id.
The Court has reviewed the designated evidence and applied the facts most favorable to
the Plaintiffs to the pertinent case law. Having done so, the Court finds that genuine issues of
material fact preclude the Court from finding as a matter of law that it was reasonable for the
police officers, in light of the circumstances they faced, to believe that there was a compelling
need to act and no time to obtain a warrant.
The Defendants urge the Court to consider the nature of the offense—describing it as a
violent attack. The record reveals that Officer Mentz was dispatched to a residence in reference
“to a domestic.” (Mentz Case Supp’l Report, ECF No. 36-2 at 2.) According to Officer Mentz,
the victim, “had suffered some ghastly bite marks from her boyfriend Dan Jones.” (Id.) Although
the nature of the offense may be a factor in the exigency analysis, it is not instructive as to
whether the officers were in hot pursuit of Jones for committing that offense. See, e.g., Stanton v.
Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2013) (noting that whether a crime was a felony or a misdemeanor was
separate inquiry from whether police were in hot pursuit). The officers responded to a domestic
disturbance call to learn that Jones had already left the scene. The officers attempted to locate
Jones based on the victim’s statement that he was going to his mother’s residence. One of the
officers saw Jones jogging in the direction of the house, but lost sight of him and did not regain a
visual of Jones at any point before entering the house. A K-9 tracked Jones’s scent to the back
door of his mother’s house (a place he presumably visited at some time but not necessarily that

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night). These circumstances may describe a pursuit of a suspect, but they do not describe one
that was “immediate and continuous . . . from the scene of the crime.” See Welsh, 466 U.S. at
753. And as the police did not first attempt to arrest Jones while he was in a public place, this
case is unlike Santana’s continuation of a legitimate doorway arrest.
Absent a true “hot pursuit,” there is little exigency to justify the officers’ actions.
Although no categorical rule was announced in Welsh, the Court did state that, in situations
where only a minor offense has been committed, “application of the exigent-circumstances
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned.” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
What can be gleaned from the record is that Jones bit his girlfriend. The Defendants attempt to
bolster the justification for their actions by arguing in their Memorandum in Support of summary
judgment that they “remained uncertain if Jones was armed.” (Mem. 6, ECF No. 36-1; see also
id. at 8 (stating that the officers “were uncertain whether Jones was in the house or if he was
armed”).) But there is no indication that Jones’s offense involved a firearm or other dangerous
weapon, that he had used such a weapon in the past, or that he had access to such a weapon, and
the Court cannot assume that the officers had an objective reason to be concerned. See Fed. R.
Fed. P. 56(c) (stating that a party must support an assertion of fact by “citing to particular parts
of materials in the record”). Additionally, the Defendants had no reason to believe that Jones
could destroy any evidence (having used his teeth on the victim), which was a legitimate concern
in Santana when the suspect retreated inside her house from a public place after completing a
drug deal. Nor was there reason to believe that Jones posed a danger to his family inside the
house or to the police officers outside the house. The officers have not presented any evidence to
suggest that they were concerned that Jones was planning an escape or a return to his girlfriend,

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or that he would be able to escape the house undetected with their perimeter in place. Cf.
Warden, 381 U.S. at 298–99 (police justified because delay would have “gravely endanger[ed]
their lives or the lives of others,” or that “only a thorough search of the house for persons and
weapons could have insured that [the robber] was the only man present and that the police had
control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape”).
The only other reason, in addition to the nature of the offense, the Defendants have
offered thus far for bypassing the constitutional requirement of a warrant is that Jones was
attempting to evade arrest. This fact, however, hardly seems unique to criminal suspects and,
thus, is not an appropriate justification for the warrantless entry. The Supreme Court, explaining
that search warrants are not a mere formality, but serve a “high function,” has stated:
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield
criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to
enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be
true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948). In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978), the Court warned that “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient
can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” 437 U.S. at 393 (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s
home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in
enforcement of the criminal law.”).
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The record developed thus far reveals genuine issues surrounding whether the
warrantless entry was a matter of exigency, or was simply the more efficient course of action. A
reasonable jury, considering the facts most favorable to the Plaintiffs, could conclude from the
current record that there were no exigencies that rendered it unreasonable for the Defendants to
obtain a warrant, and that their failure to do so violated the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the first inquiry of the qualified immunity analysis does not favor the Defendants.
Next, the Court considers whether the Fourth Amendment right at issue was clearly established
at the time of the incident.
“To be ‘clearly established,’ the right in question must be ‘sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.’” Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Courts “do not require a case directly on
point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
No reasonable officer could claim to be unaware of the general rule, well established by
the Supreme Court, that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is
presumptively unconstitutional. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586–88; see also Steagald, 451 U.S. at
214–15 (holding that police cannot personally determine when there is sufficient justification for
searching the home of a third party for the subject of an arrest warrant, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, any more than they can justify warrantless entry to search for objects). Turning to

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the specific context of this case, the Court finds that the law was sufficiently clear to make it
apparent to the officers that the situation lacked the exigency necessary to justify a warrantless
entry.
In 1984, the Supreme Court warned that police “bear a heavy burden when attempting to
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify” warrantless entry. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749–50
(explaining that exigent circumstances that may excuse a warrantless entry of a home were “few
in number and carefully delineated”). In Welsh, the Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the
contention that the arresting officers were in hot pursuit of the suspect where the officers arrived
at the scene after the suspect had left, and then proceeded to arrest him at his home. Id. at 753.
Arguably, this case presents some differences—Officer Knepper saw Jones jogging across the
street at one point during his canvas of the neighborhood and a K-9 tracked his scent to the
house. But there is no precedent to suggest that the eventual and interrupted pursuit could be
considered immediate and continuous based on these differences. For example, there is no case
to support a belief that the K-9 track is the same as a continuous pursuit by officers. Even if the
record were not so sparse on details about the K-9’s actions—such as whether it picked up a
scent immediately, how long the dog tracked the scent, how old the scent could have been for the
dog to still track it, whether the dog went straight to the residence, or whether it stopped only at
the residence—the pursuit could not be called continuous under any existing case law.
Additionally, this case presents an added layer that warranted caution. The home the
officers entered was not that of the suspect, but that of a third party. None of the facts presented
to the Court suggest that the Defendants had reason to believe that the home on Bower Street
was Jones’s residence. In 1981, the Supreme Court recognized that the availability of telephonic

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search warrants minimized the burden of obtaining a search warrant to enter a third person’s
house to seize a fugitive. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(3) (allowing
warrant to be obtained based on information “communicated by telephone or other reliable
electronic means”).
The law was clearly established before the officers acted. This was not a “close case,” for
which qualified immunity is intended so as to protect “the officer’s snap judgment in a legally
hazy area.” White v. Stanley, 745 F.3d 237, 241 (7th Cir. 2014). Rather, based on the
circumstances currently before the Court, the Defendants were faced with a scenario that
required them to identify a true exigency before invading the privacy of the Plaintiffs inside their
home. A jury will be allowed to consider the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants violated their
Fourth Amendment rights when they entered their home and seized DeShawn.

2.

Excessive Force
The right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to

use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989). In assessing whether an officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment,
the question is whether the officer’s “actions are objectively reasonable in light of the
information known at the time of an arrest.” Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir.
2014). This question turns on such factors as “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Courts
also consider “whether the citizen was under arrest or suspected of committing a crime, was

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armed, or was interfering or attempting to interfere with the officer’s execution of his or her
duties.” Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000). An officer’s use of force is
unreasonable if in light of all those circumstances at the time of the seizure, the officer used
greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the seizure. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
The Defendants argue that they used no greater force than was “necessary to return safety
to them and others in the vicinity to make the eventual arrest of DeShawn.” (Defs.’ Mem. 11.)
The Plaintiffs have not disputed that DeShawn became combative and grabbed Officer Mentz’s
utility belt and refused to give Officer Knepper his arm. Additionally, nothing in the record
provides a reason to questions the Defendants’ accounts. It was 2:00 in the morning when
DeShawn was awakened in his bed by the officers attempting to force his hands behind his back.
A common sense reaction would include “fighting back” against these unknown assailants.
Rather than dispute these specific facts, the Plaintiffs assert that the officers “knew that 17 year
old DeShawn Franklin was asleep and posed no threat when they struck and tased him thereby
using excessive force.” (Pls.’ Mem. 8, ECF No. 37 (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780
(7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that “officers do no have the right to shove, push, or
otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever”).) Nothing in the
designated evidence supports the assertion that the Defendants knew DeShawn was asleep.
Rather, all of the designated evidence indicates that the officers believed the person in the bed
was Jones, not DeShawn, and that he was only pretending to be asleep when he ignored the
officers’ commands. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes regarding DeShawn’s active
resistance to the Defendants’ attempts to seize him, and the immediate threat to the safety of the
officers that his reaction posed. Under these circumstances, officers would not have had reason

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to believe that their conduct in restoring order and controlling DeShawn was unreasonable.
The Plaintiffs also appear to be relying on pre-seizure conduct to support the excessive
force claim. Weaved into the excessive force argument, in fact dominating it, is an analysis about
lack of exigencies, which rendered the entry into the home unlawful and led to the seizure of the
wrong person—a minor who was asleep in his bedroom and who had committed no crimes. This
is essentially an argument that the Defendants are liable for excessive force because they
unreasonably created the encounter that led to the use of force against DeShawn. “Pre-seizure
police conduct cannot serve as a basis for liability under the Fourth Amendment; [courts] limit
[their] analysis to force used when a seizure occurs.” Marion v. City of Corydon, Ind., 559 F.3d
700, 705 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit stated recently that its “caselaw is far from clear as
to the relevance of pre-seizure conduct, or even as to a determination as to what conduct falls
within the designation ‘pre-seizure,’ although the majority of cases hold that it may not form the
basis for a Fourth Amendment claim.” Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep’t, — F.3d —, No.
14-2523, 2015 WL 4772639, at *10 (7th Cir. Aug. 13, 2015). Given this lack of clarity, the court
granted qualified immunity to an officer who used deadly force, because he would not have been
“on notice that his conduct leading up to the encounter could itself be the basis for Fourth
Amendment liability.” Id.
Because caselaw in this Circuit does not clearly establish that an officer may be liable
under the Fourth Amendment solely for his pre-seizure conduct that led to the encounter, and the
Plaintiffs do not dispute that DeShawn actively resisted the officers, the Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. There is, likewise, no basis to proceed to a
jury on the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants are liable for failing to intervene in these

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circumstances.
However, even if DeShawn does not have an independent cause of action for excessive
force, the amount of force used against him may be pertinent to the damages he incurred for
other constitutional violations. The Seventh Circuit has said that “when an illegal arrest sets off a
chain of indignities inflicted on the hapless victim, including offensive physical touchings that
would be privileged if the arrest were lawful, she is entitled to obtain damages for these
indignities whether or not they are independent violations of the Constitution.” Herzog v. Vill. of
Winnetka, Ill., 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2002). This is because “they are foreseeable
consequences of the illegal arrest, and the ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional
tort suits.” Id.

3.

Formal Arrest of DeShawn For Resisting Arrest and Battery
The Complaint alleges that the officers arrested DeShawn in violation of his right to be

secure in his person from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In the Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, they note that the initial seizure was the result of mistakenly
believing that DeShawn was Jones. After they realized DeShawn’s true identity, he was then
“briefly” arrested for battery on an officer and resisting arrest. (Mem. in Support 6, ECF No. 361.)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from arrest without probable
cause. D.Z. v. Buell, — F.3d —, No. 14-1490, 2015 WL 4652778, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015)
(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)). “Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense
to any claim against police officers under § 1983 for wrongful arrest.” Wagner v. Washington

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Cnty., 493 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007). A police officer has probable cause if, at the time of the
arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed an offense. Id. Where probable cause
is lacking with respect to an arrest, an officer is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity if his
belief that he had probable cause was an objectively reasonable belief. D.Z., 2015 WL 4652778,
at *4 (citing Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 1998)). This is known as
“‘arguable’ probable cause.” Id.
According to the Defendants, DeShawn attacked them, which is battery upon an officer,
and he appeared to be resisting arrest. (Defs.’ Mem. 9, ECF No. 36-1.) In Indiana, resisting law
enforcement is a Class A misdemeanor if a person “knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly
resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer
while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” Ind. Code § 3544.1-3-1. At the time of the events in question, the rule in Indiana was that a private citizen could
not “use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by an individual who he knows, or has reason to
know, is a police officer performing his duties regardless of whether the arrest in question is
lawful or unlawful.” Casselman v. State, 472 N.E. 2d 1310, 1315 (Ind. 1985); see also Shoultz v.
State, 735 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). However, it was also true that when an officer
unlawfully enters a residence to make an arrest, he is not “lawfully engaged in the execution of
his duties as a law enforcement officer.” Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175, 178 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000). Additionally, nothing in the facts suggests that DeShawn knew, or should have known,
that the men in his room in the middle of the night were police officers. Accordingly, the
Defendant did not have arguable probable cause to arrest DeShawn for resisting arrest.

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Likewise, it is unclear whether, under the facts and circumstances known to the
Defendants, they would have reasonable grounds to believe that DeShawn had committed the
criminal offense of battery or whether, instead, he was justified by statute in using force to
protect himself against persons who were using force against him. “A person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the
person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c);
cf. Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (applying a different subsection
of the use of force statute to overturn a conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where
the officer had unlawfully entered the suspect’s apartment and resisted the suspect’s attempts to
close the door on the officer, thus providing a reasonable belief that force was necessary to
terminate the unlawful entry into his apartment). When the Defendants arrested DeShawn, they
were already aware that he was not the person they were looking for and had simply been asleep
in his bed when they tried to seize him. There is no indication in the record that the Defendants
identified themselves as police officers when DeShawn began resisting.1 Thus, the Defendants
had no reason to believe that DeShawn was not simply using reasonable force to protect himself
against unknown individuals who were attacking him in the middle of the night.
Because the Defendants have not shown that the undisputed facts support arguable
probable cause to arrest DeShawn, his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim should be decided
by a jury.

1

Even if they had identified themselves as police officers, the same statute provided, in July
2012, that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant if the person
reasonably believes the force is necessary to: (1) protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i)(1).

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4.

Invasion of Privacy
The Plaintiffs allege in their fourth cause of action that the Defendants violated their First

Amendment right to privacy when they informed the media that the officers had entered the
home because a violent crime had been committed and the suspect was inside the house. The
Plaintiffs appear to be alleging that some or all of the Defendants personally went to local media.
However, nowhere in the Complaint do they identify which Defendant took this action. Granting
a Motion to Dismiss, the Court has already dismissed the claims in the Plaintiff’s fourth cause of
action as against Defendants South Bend, Buttigieg, and Hurley.
The Defendant officers have not moved for summary judgment on the First Amendment
claim. Normally, this would mean that the Plaintiffs were not yet required to defend the claim.
However, given the lack of any factual allegations suggesting that the Defendant officers made
any statements to the media, the claim fails to plausibly suggest the possibility of relief against
them. Additionally, this Court previously directed the Plaintiffs to file “a status of the case
setting forth the discrete claims they intend to pursue to trial, including which Defendants are
being sued for each particular claim.” (1-27-15 Opinion & Order 7, ECF No. 34.) The Plaintiffs’
Status of the Case Report [ECF No. 35] does not acknowledge any First Amendment claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Complaint does not state a First
Amendment violation against the officers, and that the Plaintiffs have not pursued a First
Amendment claim against the officers or given them any reason to believe one was being
pursued. Accordingly, the fourth cause of action is dismissed.

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5.

Trespass, Battery, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Negligence, Negligent
Supervision, and Assault
The Plaintiffs Complaint includes claims for trespass, battery, false arrest, false

imprisonment, negligence, negligent supervision, and assault, yet their Memorandum in
Opposition to the Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment mentions only trespass and
battery—in the following heading: “Qualified Immunity/excessive force/ITCA
immunity/Trespass/Battery.” The text under the heading does not include any citation to state
law, or any analysis of state law. The Plaintiffs did not include any state claims in the Status of
the Case Report filed on February 27, 2015.
For their part, the Defendants assert immunity under subsection (8) of the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8). According to this subsection, “[a] governmental
entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if a
loss results from” the “enforcement of . . . a law.” Id. However, immunity does not apply if the
“act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.” Id.. The Plaintiffs have not
attempted to explain why the Defendants’ actions should not fall within the ITCA’s immunity
provision. Even though the heading in their Memorandum indicates that the text will address
ITCA immunity, the Plaintiffs do not actually include any discussion of law enforcement
immunity under Indiana Code § 34–13–3–3(8), relying instead on a previous discussion
regarding qualified immunity in the context of § 1983 claims.
The law enforcement immunity section of the ITCA does not immunize the Defendants
from the Plaintiffs’ claims, under Indiana law, for false arrest or false imprisonment. See Hogue
v. City of Fort Wayne, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Ind. 2009); see also Thomas v. Brinker, No.
1:09-CV-01516-TWP, 2011 WL 1157622, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2011) (stating that “even
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where an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, a plaintiff may still
bring state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, or excessive force”). Additionally, the
Defendants do not seek immunity for battery, arguing instead that their actions were brought on
by DeShawn’s “provocation,” as defined by Indiana Code. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-3 (making it
a Class C infraction to “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engage[ ] in conduct that is likely
to provoke a reasonable person to commit battery”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no immunity applies to the Plaintiffs’ claims
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and battery. Moreover, there are triable issues of fact
surrounding these claims that must be decided by a jury.

B.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Paragraph
The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion [ECF No. 39] to strike a sentence contained within the

Defendants’ Reply brief. The sentence at issue is that the Defendants were “informed that the
woman inside the house, presumably Jones’ mother, was uncooperative and constantly changing
her story.” (Motion 1.) The Plaintiffs argue that this statement is “wildly inaccurate” and
“scandalous,” and should therefore be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
They assert that there is no evidence that police contacted Vivian Franklin before they knocked
on her door, or that she was uncooperative or changing her story.
The Court denies the Plaintiffs’ Motion. First, Rule 12(f) applies to pleadings, and a brief
filed in connection with a motion for summary judgment is not a pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
7(a) (listing the pleadings that are allowed). Second, the Court does not read the Defendants’
statement to mean, or be intended to mean, that dispatch actually talked to Vivian Jones. The

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implication of the statement, particularly in light of the entire record, is that dispatch told the
Defendants that a female occupant of the house was contacted and was being uncooperative. The
fact that dispatch called the wrong number does not change the facts the dispatch officer relayed
to the Defendants, or the inferences they drew from this information. The Court assures the
Plaintiffs that it did not, in ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, consider it
an established fact that dispatch spoke to Vivian Franklin before the Defendants knocked on the
Plaintiffs’ front door.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 36] filed by Defendants Eric Mentz, Michael Stuk,
and Aaron Knepper, and DENIES the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Paragraph [ECF No. 39].
Further, the Plaintiff’s claim for Invasion of Privacy is DISMISSED. Still pending are the
Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful entry and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and claims for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and battery under state law.
SO ORDERED on September 3, 2015.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

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