Woods v. Goodman et al

Filing 7

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING 3 Amended Complaint pursuant to 28:1915A., ***Civil Case Terminated. Clerk directed to send plaintiff blank habeas corpus petition AO-241. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 5/22/13. (smp)(Form sent)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
BRIAN WOODS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-CV-250 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Brian Woods, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF
No. 3.] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603.
Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must be liberally construed, “however inartfully pleaded.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Here, Woods is suing his parole officer, Terry Goodman, as well as the Indiana Parole Board
and the State of Indiana. According to the complaint, in September 2012, Woods was on parole for
an unspecified offense, when he was accused of assaulting someone with a knife. After a police
investigation, he was arrested. He was later brought before the parole board and his parole was
revoked. He was ordered to serve an additional 28 months in prison, which he is presently serving.
He alleges that Goodman lied during the parole hearing when he claimed that Woods admitted

owning a knife. He further claims that he is not guilty of committing any offense, and that there was
insufficient evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints, to conclude that the knife belonged to him. He
seeks to have his “freedom back,” as well as an award of monetary damages for the time he has
spent in prison. [ECF No. 3 at 4.]
Upon review, his claims cannot proceed in this action. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87; see also Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that Heck
applies to a civil rights suit premised on the invalidity of confinement pursuant to “some legal
process, whether a warrant, indictment, information, summons, parole revocation, conviction or
other judgment”). Here, Woods claims that his parole was revoked based on false testimony and
insufficient evidence, and that as a result he is being wrongfully incarcerated. Unless and until the
parole determination is reversed on appeal, vacated, set aside, or otherwise called into question, he
cannot pursue a claim for damages based on his alleged wrongful incarceration.1
As for Woods’ request for release from prison, this type of relief can only be pursued in a
habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488
(1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing

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As an additional matter, the State of Indiana and the Indiana Parole Board would both be immune from an
award of damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1987).

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that “collateral attacks disguised as civil rights actions should be dismissed”). Apparently
anticipating this procedural problem, Woods attached a completed habeas petition as an exhibit to
his amended complaint. [ECF No. 3-1.] Woods cannot proceed with two distinct causes of action
under one cause number, nor has he followed the proper procedures for pursuing relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. This action will be dismissed, but the dismissal will not preclude Woods from filing
a new case challenging his parole revocation under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if he so chooses. For his
convenience, the clerk will be directed to send him the necessary form.
For the reasons set forth above, the amended complaint [ECF No. 3] is DISMISSED pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The clerk is DIRECTED to send the plaintiff a blank habeas corpus petition,
AO-241 (Rev. 10/07) (INND Rev. 3/10).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 22, 2013
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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