Boyd v. Superintendent

Filing 12

ORDER GRANTING 10 Motion to Dismiss Case; DENYING 11 Motion Grant the Petition. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/23/2013. (lyb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JOSIAH BOYD,

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Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-337

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed
by the respondent on September 3, 2013, and the motion to grant the
petition filed by the petitioner on September 18, 2013. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss (DE 10) is GRANTED
and the motion to grant the petition (DE 11) is DENIED.

DISCUSSION
Josiah Boyd, a pro se prisoner initiated this case by filing
a Petition under 28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus
attempting to challenge the prison disciplinary proceeding (MCF 1206-639) held at the Miami Correctional Facility on July 6, 2012.
Boyd was sanctioned with the loss of 60 days of earned credit time
and

demoted

to

from

Credit

Class

1

to

Credit

Class

2.

The

respondent has now filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, “Because
the conviction and sanction challenged in the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus in this case have been vacated, this proceeding is
now moot and this Court lacks a case or controversy to adjudicate.”

DE 10 at 2. In addition the respondent has submitted a letter from
the Indiana Department of Correction indicating that the sanctions
imposed as a result of that hearing were vacated and credited back.
DE 10-7.
In response, Boyd filed a motion asking that the court grant
his habeas petition. Boyd argues that he has been re-tried and
found guilty again on July 23, 2013. He does not dispute that his
original loss of credit time was restored; rather he argues that it
was double jeopardy to have tried him a second time. However, this
habeas petition is a challenge to the July 6, 2012, hearing – not
the July 23, 2013, hearing. As to the July 6th hearing, it was
vacated. That is to say, Boyd won. Though the respondent conceded
by granting him a re-hearing, Boyd could not have obtained any
better result if he had litigated this case to a final judgment.
That is to say, even if this court had granted him habeas corpus in
this case and vacated the sanctions imposed on July 6th, the prison
could have still re-charged him with the same prison disciplinary
violation and given him a new hearing.
Boyd argues that this is double jeopardy, but double jeopardy
is not applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings because such
a hearing does not constitute “prosecution” for double jeopardy
purposes. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that an acquittal in an earlier prison disciplinary
hearing did not bar a subsequent hearing to consider the very same

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charge); and Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that prison disciplinary proceedings do not bar a
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense).
Though Boyd could challenge the July 23rd hearing, he would
have to do so in a different habeas corpus case after he has
exhausted his administrative remedies. This case is about the July
6th hearing and there are no issues left to adjudicate about that
hearing. Thus, this case must be dismissed because there is no case
or controversy to adjudicate. See Hadley v. Holmes, 341 F.3d 661,
664 (7th Cir. 2003).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (DE 10)
is GRANTED and the motion to grant the petition (DE 11) is DENIED.

DATED: September 23, 2013

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court

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