Baker v. Superintendent
Filing
8
OPINION AND ORDER denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 1/14/2014. (kds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
DONALD E. BAKER,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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NO. 3:13-CV-372
OPINION AND ORDER
Donald E. Baker, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 1). For
the reasons set forth below, the petition (DE 1) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2012, Baker was found guilty of threatening a
staff member under cause number ISP # 12-09-0275. The charge was
initiated on September 18, 2012, when Corrections Officer L.
Winters wrote a conduct report stating as follows:
On 9-17-12 at Approx. 5:25 a.m. I Ofc. Winters was
standing inside checkpoint 5 as chow-lines were coming
back Offender Baker was pushing Offender Anglin
“Wheelchair” [through] the metal [detector]. Upon exiting
Offender Baker [and] Offender Anglin did not pass the
metal [detector] that is inside of ckpt 5. I ask Offender
Baker to come back [through], and clear it. Offender
Baker replied “I know that bitch.” I asked Offender Baker
what did he say, he said you heard me bitch. As Offender
Baker was walking pushing Offender Anglin he, Offender
Baker, was talking out loud saying out loud as Offender
Baker was walking down the sidewalk to F-dorm, “I’ll get
me an knife to stab that bitch.” Offender Anglin told
Offender Baker, “Who that bitch Winters” Offender Baker
replied, “Yea I hate that stupid bitch.”
(DE 4-1.)
On September 21, 2012, Baker was formally notified of the
charge and given a copy of the conduct report. (DE 4-1, 4-2.) He
pled
not
guilty
and
requested
a
lay
advocate.
(DE
4-2.)
He
requested a statement from Anglin, and did not request any physical
evidence, but stated that he would bring his own statement to the
hearing. (Id.) A witness statement was obtained from Anglin, who
stated as follows:
I was outside of check point five, when Baker went back
to clear the metal detector, and before he got back
inside the officer went off on him and he said shut up
I’m going through the metal [detector], but he did not
say anything about stabbing her. She just made that part
up, she is just trying to start trouble with anybody.
This is not the first time we have had trouble with her,
there are two other witnesses in this case. One is Mr.
Petroff and other James Lofton.
(DE 4-3 at 8.) Statements were also submitted by Paul Petroff, a
GED instructor at the prison, and inmate James Lofton.1 Petroff
stated as follows:
On Monday September 17, 2012, at approximately 5:30 a.m. I,
Mr. Paul D. Petroff, was standing in Checkpoint 5 (the
Backstreet Checkpoint). I had just entered the building behind
offender Larry Anglin (#141199) and his wheelchair pusher
(whose name I did not know). When the wheelchair pusher pushed
Mr. Anglin through the metal detector, the detector went off
(due to the metal contained in the wheelchair). As offender
Anglin and his wheelchair pusher continued on, Officer Winters
1
It appears from the record that Anglin contacted these witnesses and
asked them to submit statements. (DE 1-2 at 2, DE 4-3 at 6.)
2
told the wheelchair pusher that he would need to go through
the metal detector again.
When Officer Winters made this request, the wheelchair pusher
responded with several comments in a loud but mumbled manner.
I could determine that his tone was confrontational, but I
could not determine exactly what he said. Eventually, he did
go through the metal detector, and he was able to clear the
machine with no difficulty. Following his departure, Officer
Winters unlocked the door to Backstreet, and I exited the
Checkpoint and made my way to my assigned work station.
(DE 4-3 at 7.) Lofton stated as follows:
About five seconds after Larry Anglin and his wheelchair
pusher entered checkpoint 5, so did I. When I entered the
checkpoint I heard the wheelchair pusher arguing with the
officer in the checkpoint. Although the argument
continued after I left the checkpoint, I did not hear the
wheelchair pusher threaten the officer in the checkpoint.
(DE 4-3 at 5.)
On October 1, 2012, a hearing was held on the charge. (DE 4-3
at 1.) Baker submitted a statement describing his own version of
events. (DE 4-3 at 3-4.) He claimed that when Officer Winters told
him to go back through the metal detector, he told her to “kiss my
butt,” but claimed he did not threaten her. (Id.) He further
claimed that the officer “had it in” for him because he had filed
grievances against her in 2011. (Id.) Upon considering the conduct
report, the witness statements, and Baker’s own statement, the
hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) Baker filed administrative
appeals, arguing that he did not receive a fair hearing because, in
his words, “I told [the hearing officer] I did not threaten Ofc.
Winters at any time, and she act[ed] like she didn’t care that I
said that.” (DE 4-4.) His appeals were denied. (DE 4-4, 4-5.)
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DISCUSSION
When prisoners lose earned time credits in a disciplinary
proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees
them certain procedural protections: (1) advance written notice of
the charge; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process,
there must also be “some evidence” in the record to support the
hearing officer’s determination. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Baker’s petition is not a model of clarity, but it is apparent
that he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.2 In reviewing
a disciplinary determination for sufficiency of the evidence,
“courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire
record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the
evidence,
but
only
determine
whether
the
prison
disciplinary
board’s decision to revoke good time credits has some factual
basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).
2
Baker formulates his first claim as follows: “The DHB Officer abused her
discretion by ignoring the other witness statements and relying only on the
conduct report regardless of errors and falsehoods.” (DE 1-2 at 3.) “Abuse of
discretion” is not a cognizable claim under Wolff or Hill, but his claim can be
read to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on which the hearing officer
relied.
4
“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the
record
that
could
support
the
conclusion
reached
by
the
disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The
court will overturn a guilty finding only if “no reasonable
adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense
on the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a
hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to
establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th
Cir. 1992).
Upon review, there is sufficient evidence to support the
hearing
officer’s
determination
that
Baker
was
guilty
of
threatening. Officer Winters reported that Baker was upset with her
on the date of this incident when she told him to go back through
the metal detector. She reported that in response he called her a
bitch, and then stated loudly to Anglin that he would get a knife
“and stab that bitch.” (DE 4-1 at 1.) Baker claimed he never
threatened her, but his own statement corroborated other aspects of
Officer Winter’s account, including that he had been told to go
back through the metal detector and was angry as a result. (DE 4-3
at 3-4.) Anglin’s account also confirmed that Baker was perturbed
with Officer Winters during this incident. (DE 4-3 at 8.) Although
Anglin and Baker both claimed that Baker did not threaten Officer
Winters,
the
hearing
officer
was
5
permitted
to
make
her
own
assessment of their credibility, and was not required to simply
accept
their
accounts.
Indeed,
their
accounts
were
not
even
consistent with each other, since Anglin stated that Baker told
Officer Winters to “shut up,” whereas Baker claims he told her to
“kiss my butt.” (DE 4-3 at 4, 8.)
Baker assigns much significance to the statements of Lofton
and Petroff, who he views as unbiased third-party witnesses, but
neither of their statements were actually exculpatory. Instead,
both confirmed that Baker had a verbal altercation with Officer
Winters on the date in question. Lofton stated that while he was
there he did not hear any threats, but he acknowledged that the
altercation was still going on when he left the area. (DE 4-3 at
5.) Petroff confirmed that Baker was angry with Officer Winters and
made several remarks to her in a loud and “confrontational” tone,
although he could not actually hear what was said. (Id. at 7.)
Neither of these statements directly undermine Officer Winters’
account.
The hearing officer was not required to credit Baker’s denials
or prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the question is
solely
whether
there
is
“some
evidence”
to
support
her
determination, and that standard is satisfied. See Hill, 472 U.S.
at 457 (“Although the evidence in this case might be characterized
as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of
three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of
6
evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without
support or otherwise arbitrary.”); see also Moffat v. Broyles, 288
F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some
evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some
evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this
claim is denied.
Baker may also be claiming that he was denied the right to an
impartial decision-maker. In the prison disciplinary context,
adjudicators
are
“entitled
to
a
presumption
of
honesty
and
integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is
high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Due
process
prohibits
a
prison
official
who
was
personally
and
substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting as a
decision-maker in the case.
Id.
However, due process is not
violated simply because the hearing officer knew the inmate,
presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited
involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id.
Here, Baker does not clearly explain why he believes the
hearing officer was biased, but there is no indication that she was
involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. He appears
to believe the hearing officer violated internal prison policies in
connection with her handling of the case, but even if this is true,
it would not provide a basis for granting federal habeas relief.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas
7
relief cannot be granted for violations of state law); Hester v.
McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 774-75 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (claim premised
on violation of prison policy was not cognizable in federal habeas
proceeding). He also suggests that she was biased because she
rejected his claim that he did not threaten Officer Winters, but
adverse rulings alone do not establish impermissible bias. Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). Baker has failed to
establish a violation of his federal due process rights.
Baker also appears to claim that the hearing officer’s written
decision was inadequate. The written statement requirement is “not
onerous,” and to satisfy due process “[t]he statement need only
illuminate
the
evidentiary
basis
and
reasoning
behind
the
decision.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).
Here, the hearing officer’s report indicated that she considered
the
witness
statements,
the
conduct
report,
and
Baker’s
own
statement, and decided to credit the conduct report.3 (DE 4-3 at 12.) Her statement is not lengthy, but it adequately identified the
evidence relied on and illuminated the basis for her decision,
which was that she chose to credit Officer Winter’s account over
Baker’s denials. The written statement the hearing officer provided
3
The conduct report originally stated in error that the incident occurred
on September 18, 2012, instead of September 17, 2012. (DE 4-1.) The hearing
officer confirmed with Officer Winters that September 17, 2012, was the correct
date, and that she had simply made a scriveners error in completing the report.
(DE 4-3 at 1-2.) Baker does not raise any argument that he was unable to mount
a defense or otherwise prejudiced by this minor error. Indeed, it is apparent
from his statement submitted to the hearing officer that he was well aware of the
underlying facts giving rise to the conduct report. (See DE 4-3 at 3-4.)
8
satisfied the minimal requirements of due process, and therefore
this claim is denied.
Baker next claims that he was denied the right to present
exculpatory evidence. As the respondent points out, principles of
exhaustion that apply to federal review of criminal convictions
also apply to review of prison disciplinary proceedings. See Eads
v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002); Markham v. Clark, 978
F.2d 993, 994-95 (7th Cir. 1992). Before seeking federal habeas
relief, a prisoner must take all available administrative appeals,
and must raise in those appeals any issue on which he seeks federal
review. Eads, 280 F.3d at 729. An inmate’s failure to properly
exhaust his claims in the state administrative process means the
claims are procedurally defaulted. Id.
Here, Baker did not raise any claim about the denial of
exculpatory evidence in his administrative appeals. (See DE 4-3.)
He cannot raise a claim here that was not properly presented in the
administrative process. Eads, 280 F.3d at 729. Baker filed a
traverse in support of his petition, but he did not respond to the
state’s procedural default argument. (See DE 7.) Thus, he has not
established cause and prejudice for setting aside his procedural
default, and the court cannot reach his claim on the merits. See
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Harris v. McAdory, 334
F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Assuming arguendo the court could reach this claim, Baker has
not demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief. A prisoner has a
limited right to present witnesses and evidence in his defense
consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566. A hearing officer has considerable discretion with respect to
witness and evidence requests, and may deny requests that threaten
institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.
Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Furthermore, due process only requires
access
to
witnesses
and
evidence
that
are
exculpatory.
See
Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992).
“Exculpatory
evidence”
in
this
context
means
evidence
that
“directly undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record
pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717,
721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of the right to present evidence
will be considered harmless unless the prisoner shows that the
evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d
841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, the record shows that Baker requested a statement from
Anglin at the time of screening, and that statement was obtained
and considered. (DE 4-2, 4-3 at 8.) He also indicated that he would
be bringing his own statement to the hearing, which he did, and
this was also considered. (DE 4-2, 4-3 at 3-4.) There is nothing to
reflect that Baker requested any other exculpatory evidence when he
had the opportunity to do so, and he cannot fault the hearing
10
officer for failing to consider evidence he did not properly
request. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002).
Nor has he demonstrated prejudice. It appears Baker wanted to
obtain copies of grievances he filed against Officer Winters more
than a year prior to this incident. (See DE 1-2 at 8.) Such
evidence, even if it had been properly requested, would not
directly undermine Officer Winters’ account of what occurred on the
date in question. Furthermore, the hearing officer was already
aware from Baker’s statement that he believed Officer Winters had
fabricated the entire charge because of grievances he filed against
her. (DE 4-3 at 4, 8.)
There is nothing to reflect that reviewing
the actual grievances from a year earlier would have made any
difference
in
her
decision-making.
In
short,
Baker
has
not
demonstrated a due process error, even if the court could consider
this claim.
In a related vein, Baker claims that his rights were violated
because the entire charge was false. “[P]risoners are entitled to
be free from arbitrary actions of prison officials.” McPherson, 188
F.3d at 787. However, “even assuming fraudulent conduct on the part
of prison officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is
found in the procedures mandated by due process.” Id. In other
words,
the
protections
to
which
Baker
was
entitled
are
the
protections afforded by Wolff, and as discussed above, he has not
11
established a violation of his Wolff rights. Accordingly, he has
not demonstrated an entitlement to habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petition (DE 1) is
DENIED.
DATED:
January 14, 2014
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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