Freed v. Duffy et al

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 22 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Christopher Duffy, Mazick. Judgment entered in favor of defendants Duffy and Mazick and against Plaintiff. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 12/26/13. (jld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL G. FREED,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER DUFFY,
et al.,
Defendants.

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NO. 3:13-CV-592

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary
judgment filed by the Defendants, Christopher Duffy and Bradley S.
Mazick, Ph.D., on September 13, 2013 (DE 22). For the reasons set
forth below, the motion (DE 22) is GRANTED, and the clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Christopher Duffy
and Bradley S. Mazick.

BACKGROUND
Michael Gene Freed, a pro se prisoner, filed this action in
June 2013, claiming that he is not receiving adequate medical care
for mental health problems. (DE 1.) He was granted leave to proceed
solely on a claim for injunctive relief pertaining to his current
medical treatment at the Westville Control Unit (“WCU”) against
Christopher Duffy, an official with Corizon Medical Services, a
private company that provides medical care at WCU, and Bradley S.

Mazick,

Ph.D.,

a

licensed

psychologist

at

WCU.

(DE

6.)

The

defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that Freed has failed
to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in connection with his
medical care. (DE 23.) Freed has filed a response to the motion.
(DE 26.)

DISCUSSION
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue
of

material

fact

exists

when

“the

evidence

is

such

that

a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not
every

dispute

between

the

parties

makes

summary

judgment

inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Ogden v. Atterholt,
606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). A party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations in
her own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present the court
with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v.

2

Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). If the
non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an essential
element on which he or she bears the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment is proper. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716
(7th Cir. 2006).

Undisputed Facts
Freed, a 25-year old male, arrived at WCU in September 2012 to
serve a period of long-term segregation due to behavioral issues.
(DE 25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6.) When he arrived, he had a history
of mental health issues, but did not have a current diagnosis of an
“Axis I” mental illness and had not been on psychiatric medication
since April 2011. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to the American Psychiatric
Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (“DSM-IV”), Axis I disorders are clinical disorders
such as depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, whereas
Axis II disorders are developmental disorders and personality
disorders, such as Antisocial Personality Disorder. (Id. ¶ 5.) Axis
I disorders often require treatment with psychiatric medications,
whereas Axis II personality disorders do not. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) In the
view of mental health staff at WCU, Freed presents with an Axis II
personality disorder and substance abuse issues, not a clinical
disorder that requires psychiatric medication. (Id. ¶ 5.)

3

Freed’s evaluation and treatment is fully recounted in the
medical records. Those records reflect that on September 12, 2012,
shortly before his transfer to WCU, he was seen in the segregation
unit at Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”) by a mental health
clinician, and denied any mental health concerns. (DE 25-3, Medical
Records at 20.) He was offered the opportunity to be seen one-onone, but declined. (Id.) He was transferred to WCU later that day,
and after his transfer mental health staff at WCU conducted three
separate intake interviews on September 12, 2012, September 21,
2012, and October 2, 2012, to determine his need for treatment.
(Id. at 12-19.)
During those interviews, Freed reported that he had a history
of mental health treatment both as an adolescent prior to his
incarceration and at a different correctional facility, including
prior diagnoses of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). (Id. at 17.) However, he
had not been on any psychiatric medications since April 2011. (DE
25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶ 6.) Freed reported to staff that he had not
been bipolar since he stopped the medication. (DE 25-3, Medical
Records at 12.) He reported that he still had rage and anger, and
that when things did not go his way he would “punch doors,” that he
sometimes heard voices telling him to hurt others, and that he had
caused self-inflicted pain in the past. (Id.) He reported an

4

extensive history of substance abuse dating back to when he was 11
years old. (Id. at 13.)
Based upon these interviews and a review of the medical
records, mental health staff at WCU determined that Freed did not
have an Axis I diagnosis, and that his primary problems were a
personality disorder, as well as anger management issues and a lack
of coping skills. (Id. at 13-15.) It was determined that he had a
Global

Assessment

of

Functioning

(“GAF”)

score

of

60,

which

indicates “moderate difficulty” in functioning. (DE 25-1, Mazick
Aff. ¶ 7(d).) This was just below a GAF range of 61-70, which would
signify only “some difficulty” in functioning. (Id.)
On October 24, 2012, Freed requested psychiatric medication
during a behavioral health round by mental health staff, but in the
clinician’s view he did not appear to be having any symptoms of a
psychiatric disorder. (DE 25-3, Medical Records at 10-11.) On
November 9, 2012, Freed was seen by a counselor after he reported
that he sometimes heard voices telling him to hurt people. (Id. at
7-9.) He again asked for psychiatric drugs. (Id. at 7.) The
counselor observed that Freed was loud and irritable during their
meeting, but his appearance, behavior, and thought processes were
otherwise normal. (Id. at 7-8.)
On November 26, 2012, mental health providers reviewed Freed’s
prior medical records, noting that his prior diagnoses of bipolar
disorder and schizophrenia had been fully evaluated in July 2011,

5

January 2012, and January 2013 when he was at MCF. (Id. at 5-6.)
His then-current mental health code was an “A,” meaning staff at
MCF

determined

that

he

did

not

have

a

psychiatric

disorder

requiring medication. (Id. at 6; DE 25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶¶ 6 & 7(g).)
On November 29, 2012, Freed was seen by a counselor, and
complained that his diagnosis and medications on the street would
be different than what he was receiving at WCU. (Id. ¶ 7(h); DE 253, Medical Records at 3-4.) He reported that he was feeling
stressed about a number of things, including getting “shorted” on
lunch trays, dirty showers, and long waits to see the doctor. (DE
25-3, Medical Records at 3-4.) He stated that he sometimes had
thoughts about hurting people, and that if he were on the street he
would act out on those thoughts. (Id. at 3.) Although Freed’s mood
was

anxious

and

irritable,

the

counselor

observed

that

his

appearance, behavior, and thought processes were otherwise normal.
(Id. at 3-4.)
On December 17, 2012, Freed was seen by mental health staff
during rounds and was observed to be free of psychotic symptoms or
other signs of mental illness. (DE 25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶ 7(j).) On
December 27, 2012, Freed was seen at his cell and reported that he
had no mental health concerns. (DE 25-2, Medical Records at 24.)
The clinician noted that Freed was sarcastic during their meeting;
in his view Freed’s subjective symptom reports and behavior did not

6

indicate an Axis I mental illness, and instead were indicative of
Antisocial Personality Disorder. (Id.)
On January 8, 2013, a counselor went to Freed’s cell, but
Freed responded that he had no mental health concerns; Freed later
advised that the counselor was coming by too early and that he was
very cranky in the mornings. (Id. at 23.) The counselor responded
that he would come by at a different time of day. (Id.) On January
24, 2013, Freed was seen in his cell by a counselor, and stated
that he was angry about not receiving recreation and showers, and
that he had an urge to hurt the guards. (Id. at 21-23.) In the
clinician’s view, other than Freed’s irritable mood, his thought
processes, appearance, memory, and affect were normal. (Id. at 21.)
The counselor discussed coping mechanisms with him, including
managing stress and anger levels. (Id.) On February 1, 2013, Freed
was seen in his cell by a counselor and reported no mental health
concerns. (Id. at 19-20.) His thought processes, appearance, and
mood were observed to be normal. (Id. at 19.) On February 3, 2013,
Freed reported that he had been sleepwalking. (Id. at 18.) He was
seen by medical staff for this issue on February 23, 2013. (Id. at
16-17.)
On February 28, 2013, Freed was seen by a counselor, during
which time he reported having issues with anger. (Id. at 14-15.)
The counselor attempted to discuss these issues with him but he
again stated that he wanted psychiatric drugs. (Id.) However, his
7

appearance, affect, and thought processes were observed to be
normal. (Id. at 14.) On April 1, 2013, Freed was seen in his cell
by a counselor. (DE 25-2, Medical Records at 12-13.) He was angry
and agitated, and had just been before the disciplinary board for
a conduct violation and received another 90 days in segregation.
(Id.) His thought processes, affect, and appearance were observed
to be normal, despite the fact that he was irritable. (Id.)
On April 7, 2013, Freed sent a request to the counselor
reporting feelings of hopelessness and crying fits. (Id. at 11.) He
stated that he had not told anyone about this previously because
once it would pass he would feel extremely angry, and he also did
not want staff or other inmates to know he was crying. (Id.) The
counselor responded that at their next visit he would pull him out
of his cell so they could speak more privately. (Id.) On May 3,
2013, the counselor went to Freed’s cell, but he refused to be
pulled out for a one-on-one meeting; he reported that he did not
want to speak to the counselor because he did not think it would do
any good.(Id. at 9-10.) He reported that he had recently talked to
another staff member about participating in a self-help program,
through which he could earn a television for good behavior. (Id.)
The counselor noted that Freed was much less irritable than he had
been in the past, and that he had gone 30 or more days without a
conduct report. (Id.)

8

On June 12, 2013, Freed was evaluated by Dr. Barbara Eichman,
the prison psychiatrist. (DE 25-2, Medical Records at 5-8.) She
reviewed his chart from the period of his first incarceration in
2007 to the present. (Id. at 5.) She noted that he had been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and ADHD as an
adolescent, and had been in treatment for several years and had
been prescribed several different medications. (Id.) She noted that
he

had

been

hospitalized

three

times

as

an

adolescent

for

aggressive and violent behavior, and that he had an extensive
history of substance abuse. (Id.) She further noted his social
history, family history, and past medical history. (Id.) In her
view his past problems may have been due to behavior issues fueled
by alcohol and drugs, coupled with an abusive family history. (Id.)
She noted that he had a history of self-injurious behavior,
including overdosing on pain medication at MCF in March 2012, which
he reportedly did to “feel good.” (Id.) She reported that at
present he had no suicidal or homicidal ideations. (Id. at 5-6.)
During the interview, his eye contact and affect were good, he was
“very appropriate and polite,” did not exhibit any mood swings or
psychotic symptoms, and his thought processes was logical and
sequential. (Id. at 5-6.) She noted that he seemed to be responding
to the self-help program, and reported to her that he had been
working hard to change his behavior. (Id.) He reported that his
sleep and mood were good. (Id.)
9

Based on her evaluation, Dr. Eichman concluded that at present
Freed

was

not

demonstrating

signs

of

depression,

mania,

or

psychotic symptoms. (Id. at 7.) She assessed his GAF at 65. (Id.)
She found no indication of a need for psychotropic medications at
that time. (Id.) She encouraged Freed to talk with his counselor
about any needs or issues he had, and if necessary she or another
mental health provider would see him again. (Id. at 6.)
On July 2, 2013, Freed asked to speak with a counselor,
stating, “I want to talk about something but don’t want the range
listening.” (DE 25-2, Medical Records at 4.) He was told that he
would be seen the week of July 8-12. (Id.) On July 9, 2013, Freed
was seen by a counselor, who reported that he was “calm, pleasant,
and

conversational.”

(Id.

at

2-3.)

Freed

reported

that

his

television and his participation in the self-help program had given
him “something to do.” (Id. at 2.) He reported some sleep issues,
but did not feel that anxiety was the cause. (Id.) The counselor
observed that he was noticeably less agitated and more cooperative
than months earlier. (Id.) Freed requested materials on anger and
stress management, which were provided. (Id.)
On July 30, 2013, Freed was seen in his cell by a counselor
and reported no mental health concerns. (Id. at 1.) His cell was
observed to be “clean and tidy.” (Id.) Freed continues to be seen
at least every 30 days by mental health staff during rounds. (DE
25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶ 7(y).)
10

Analysis
Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate
medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To
establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and
subjective

component

by

showing:

(1)

his

medical

need

was

objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a
physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th
Cir. 2005). This includes psychiatric disorders. Rice v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 671 (7th Cir. 2012).
On the subjective prong, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner,
i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at
serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to
prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily
done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). For
a

medical

professional

to

be

held

liable

for

deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or she must make a
11

decision

that

represents

“such

a

substantial

departure

from

accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697
(7th Cir. 2008). “[T]he prison physician, as the inmate’s acting
primary care doctor, is free to make his own, independent medical
determination
medications,

as
so

to

the

long

as

necessity
the

of

certain

determination

is

treatments
based

on

or
the

physician’s professional judgment and does not go against accepted
professional standards.” Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700
F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2012).
A mere disagreement with medical professionals about the
appropriate course of treatment does not establish deliberate
indifference, nor does negligence or even medical practice, since
“the Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). When an inmate has
received some form of treatment for a medical condition, to
establish deliberate indifference he must show that the treatment
was

“so

blatantly

inappropriate

as

to

evidence

intentional

mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id.
Although prisoners are entitled to a minimum level of adequate
care, they are not entitled to demand specific medical treatment,
nor are they entitled to the “best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar,
112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Maggert v. Hanks, 131

12

F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A prison is not required by the
Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner care that is as good as he
would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free
person.”).
Applying those principles here, Freed has failed to establish
an Eighth Amendment violation. Assuming his personality disorder
and anger management issues constitute a serious medical need, he
has not satisfied the second prong, because the record shows that
the evaluation and treatment he has received has been adequate and
reasonable.
The record reflects that upon his arrival at WCU, he was fully
and carefully evaluated by mental health staff to determine whether
he was in need of medication or other mental health treatment. (DE
25-3, Medical Records at 12-19.) It was determined by staff,
including Dr. Mazick, that Freed had a personality disorder and
anger issues, but was not in need of psychotropic medication. (DE
25-1, Mazick Aff. ¶¶ 4-7; DE 25-3, Medical Records at 12-19.)
Mental health staff continued to monitor him at regular intervals,
and they were responsive whenever he made a specific request to
speak with someone about a mental health concern. (DE 25-2, Medical
Records at 1-25; DE 25-3, Medical Records at 1-15.) After he
continued to express a need for medication, he was seen and fully
evaluated by the prison psychiatrist. (DE 25-2, Medical Records at
5-8.) She reviewed all of his mental health records and considered

13

his extensive mental health history, including the fact that other
health professionals had diagnosed him with certain disorders and
prescribed him medication in the past.1 (Id.) Her notes suggest an
alternative view about the possible reasons for Freed’s violent
past behavior, but in any event she concluded that at present he
did not exhibit any symptoms indicating a need for psychiatric
medication. (Id.)
It is clear from Freed’s filings that he disagrees with the
defendants’ treatment decisions, but his mere disagreement with
medical professionals over the proper course of treatment does not
establish deliberate indifference. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751; see
also Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864, 866 (7th
Cir. 2013)(prisoner failed to establish Eighth Amendment violation
simply because he felt “sure . . . physicians could do better”
regarding his care); Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 395-96 (7th
Cir. 2006)(difference of opinion over proper treatment did not
establish deliberate indifference). In support of his argument that
he should be receiving medication, Freed points to his long history

1

Freed asserts that he has been unable to obtain a copy of his medical
records from a private hospital that treated him several years ago prior to his
incarceration. (DE 28.) It appears he did not follow proper procedures for doing
so, and for unknown reasons sent his request to a state court judge rather than
to the hospital itself. (DE 28 at 3.) In any event, records from Freed’s
treatment years ago have little relevance to the issue of his current need for
care. To the extent these records are relevant, it is apparent that Dr. Eichman
fully considered his mental health history, including his prior diagnoses and his
treatment at the hospital he references, in evaluating his present need for care.
(See DE 25-3, Medical Records at 5-7.) The law permits her to make her own
professional judgment about his care, regardless of what another doctor may have
concluded in the past. See Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1074.

14

of mental health issues, as well as past incidents during his
incarceration when he injured or tried to injure himself. (DE 26.)
As stated above, however, the record reflects that mental health
staff at WCU were well aware of this information, and considered it
in determining whether he had a current need for medication. (See
DE 25-2, Medical Records at 5-7; DE 25-3, Medical Records at 1219.)

In

the

view

of

Dr.

Eichman

and

other

mental

health

professionals at WCU, Freed suffers from a personality disorder and
anger

management

issues,

not

a

clinical

disorder

requiring

medication. (DE 25-2, Medical Records at 5-7; DE 25-1, Mazick Aff.
¶¶ 4-7.) If Freed were a free person and could afford to do so, he
might choose to seek out another opinion, in hopes of finding a
mental health professional willing to prescribe him medication.
However, the Eighth Amendment does not entitle him to demand such
care. See Maggert, 131 F.3d 671-72; Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. Freed
is entitled to adequate care, and as recounted above, the record
shows that he received it.
Notably, the record also shows that Freed was recently able to
make a marked improvement in his behavior and attitude, without the
use of medication, through his participation in a self-help program
and his own personal efforts to change his conduct. (See DE 25-2,
Medical Records at 1-8.) His efforts deserve commendation. However,
this further demonstrates that the care Freed has received to date
for mental health issues has been reasonable and adequate. Based on

15

the record, no reasonable jury could find the defendants liable for
an Eighth Amendment violation.

Accordingly, they are entitled to

summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary
judgment (DE 22) is GRANTED, and the clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants Christopher Duffy and Bradley S.
Mazick.

DATED:

December 26, 2013

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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