Freed v. Duffy et al

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER granting plaintiff leave to proceed against Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick in their official capacities for injunctive relief related to current care he is receiving for mental health problems. Party Wardell (Mental Health Corizon), Elhert (Lead Psychologist at Miami Corizon) and Ms Richardson (MA Mental Health Corizon) dismissed. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/20/2013. (cc: USM)(kds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
MICHAEL GENE FREED,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CHRISTOPHER DUFFY, et al.,)
)
Defendants.
)

NO. 3:13-CV-592

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a complaint filed by Michael Gene Freed,
a pro se prisoner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 1.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave
to proceed against Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick in their
official capacity for injunctive relief related to the current care
he is receiving for mental health problems; (2) DISMISSES Dr.
Elhert, Ms. Richardson, and Mr. Wardell; (3) DISMISSES any and all
other claims contained in the complaint; (4) DIRECTS the United
States Marshals Service to effect service on Christopher Duffy and
Dr. Mazick; and (5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2),
Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick to respond, as provided for in the
FEDERAL RULES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the

claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in
this screening order.

BACKGROUND
Michael Gene Freed, a pro se prisoner, filed this action on
June 13, 2013. (DE # 1.) He alleges that he has been denied proper
care for mental health problems while incarcerated within the
Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”).

DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such

relief.

28

U.S.C.

§

1915A.

In

determining

whether

the

complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as
when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE

12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.
2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ.
Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable

inference

that

the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Thus,
the plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper
that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that
something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.
2

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original). The Court must bear in mind, however, that
“[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
According to the complaint and attachments, Freed has a
history of mental health and substance abuse problems, dating back
to when he was approximately seven or eight years old. He was
evaluated

by

a

forensic

psychologist

in

September

2010

in

connection with his present offense, and was found to suffer from
schizoaffective disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”), antisocial personality disorder, and substance addiction.
The

psychologist

recommended

that

he

receive

psychotropic

medication while in prison “in order to achieve some degree of
stability of mood and thought.” (DE # 1-1 at 16.) Other records he
attaches show that a psychiatrist diagnosed him with bipolar and
antisocial personality disorder in 2007 in connection with a prior
criminal offense, and that at some point prior to his incarceration
he took psychiatric medications prescribed by a psychiatrist. (Id.
at 19-33.)
In the present suit, Freed claims that he has been denied
proper

care

for

his

mental

health

problems

while

at

Miami

Correctional Facility (“MCF”) in 2011 and 2012, and at his current

3

facility,

Westville

Correctional

Facility

Control

Unit

(“Westville”). He claims that he has been hearing voices “that tell
me to hurt and kill others,” and has been acting out by hurting
himself. He states that despite these problems, mental health staff
at MCF and Westville have refused to prescribe him with any
psychiatric medication. He seeks injunctive relief pertaining to
his current care, asking the Court to order that he be provided
with treatment for his mental disorders. (DE # 1 at 5.) He sues an
official from Corizon Healthcare, which employs the medical staff
at the prisons, as well as mental health staff from both MCF and
Westville.
Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate
medical care for serious medical needs, including psychiatric
disorders. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Rice v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). For a medical
professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to a
serious

medical

need,

he

or

she

must

make

a

decision

that

represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). A mere
disagreement with medical professionals about the appropriate
course of treatment does not establish deliberate indifference, nor
does

negligence

or

even

medical

4

practice,

since

“the

Eighth

Amendment does not codify common law torts.” Arnett v. Webster, 658
F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). An inmate who has received some form
of treatment for a medical condition must show that the treatment
was

“so

blatantly

inappropriate

as

to

evidence

intentional

mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Id.
Here,

the

records

Freed

attaches

present

a

conflicting

picture. Although they do indicate he has a history of mental
health problems, at least one mental health professional evaluating
him

in

the

past

questioned

whether

he

has

a

mental

illness

requiring medication. (DE # 1-1 at 24) (“He states he has a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder and has been on medications for that,
however his description of that illness is not that convincing to
me . . .”). It appears from an attachment that mental health staff
within IDOC evaluated Freed and concluded that he suffers from
antisocial personality disorder, not a psychiatric problem that
requires medication. (DE # 1-1 at 57.) Records also show that he
has not been fully cooperative with staff, in two instances
refusing to speak with a therapist who came to his cell because, in
his own words, he is “extremely cranky” in the mornings. (DE # 1-1
at 41.) Another document reflects that he was previously prescribed
some type of psychiatric medication while in prison, but it was
discontinued because he would not go to the medication window to
pick it up. (Id. at 51.)

5

However,

at

this

stage,

the

Court

must

accept

Freed’s

allegations as true and draw all inferences in his favor. As
recounted above, he alleges that he has suffered from mental health
problems for many years, has been hearing voices, and feels that he
might hurt himself or others if he does not receive medication. He
also alleges that at present he is not receiving any form of mental
health treatment. Although further factual development may show
that medical staff properly evaluated his need for treatment,
giving him the inferences to which he is entitled at this stage, he
has alleged enough to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim.
As

a

procedural

matter,

Freed

is

only

seeking

relief

pertaining to his current need for treatment, and he has no claim
for injunctive relief against the defendants from MCF. Higgason v.
Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If a prisoner is
transferred to another prison, his request for injunctive relief
against officials of the first prison is moot unless he can
demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.”). Freed does
not claim, nor is there anything before the Court to suggest, that
he is likely to be transferred back to MCF anytime in the near
future. Accordingly, the MCF defendants will be dismissed.
In connection with his current care, he sues Dr. Mazick (first
name unknown), the lead psychologist at Westville, as well as
Christopher Duffy, vice president of operations for Corizon, who
reviewed complaints he made about his medical care. (See DE # 1-1

6

at 51.) Both of these individuals are proper defendants for
purposes of a claim for injunctive relief, since they could ensure
that an order pertaining to Freed’s medical care is carried out.
See Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 1989). Accordingly,
Freed will be permitted to proceed against these two defendants in
their official capacity for injunctive relief.
Freed also sues Mr. Wardell (first name unknown), a therapist
at Westville, but there is no indication he is a final decisionmaker

or

otherwise

a

proper

party

for

purposes

of

ordering

injunctive relief. Nor is there anything to indicate Mr. Wardell
was deliberately indifferent to Freed’s mental health needs. As
stated above, Freed twice refused to speak with him when he
attempted to evaluate his need for mental health treatment. In
response to Freed’s complaint that he was coming by too early,
Wardell went to speak him at a different time of day. After their
meeting, Freed informed him that he was having a problem with
“crying a lot,” which he had failed to mention because, in his
words, “as soon as it passes I get extremely angry.” (DE # 1-1 at
43.) Wardell responded that he would come to speak with him again
so they could discuss the problem further. (Id.) That is the extent
of Wardell’s involvement in these events, as reflected in the
complaint

and

construction,

attachments.
Freed

has

Even

not

giving

alleged

7

these
a

filings

plausible

liberal

deliberate

indifference

claim

against

the

therapist.

Accordingly,

this

defendant will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Christopher
Duffy and Dr. Mazick in their official capacity for injunctive
relief related to the current care he is receiving for mental
health problems;
(2) DISMISSES Dr. Elhert, Ms. Richardson, and Mr. Wardell;
(3) DISMISSES any and all other claims contained in the
complaint;
(4) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to effect
service on Christopher Duffy and Dr. Mazick; and
(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Christopher
Duffy and Dr. Mazick to respond, as provided for in the FEDERAL RULES
OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE and N.D. IND. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which

the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening
order.

DATED:

June 20, 2013

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

8