Oruta v. 5th 3rd Bank et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE pursuant to 28 USC 1915(e)(2)(B) and denying plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 6/21/13. (smp)
United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
LARRY ORUTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FIFTH THIRD BANK and
CONTINENTAL AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-600 JVB
OPINION AND ORDER
Larry Oruta, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (DE 1, 2.) The Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen the complaint before service on the defendant, and to dismiss it if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim,
the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.
2006). To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to [him] that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
Here, Oruta is suing two private companies, Fifth Third Bank and Continental Air
Transport, Inc. (“Continental”) for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
complaint is not a model of clarity, but it can be discerned that his claims arise from an Illinois
court case in which he obtained a judgment against Continental, apparently for an injury he
suffered while working for the company. He later successfully enforced the judgment through a
garnishment proceeding, and obtained approximately $80,000 from a Fifth Third Bank account
owned by Continental. However, in December 2012, the state court determined that the
judgment had been fraudulently obtained, and ordered the return of all funds that had been
released to Oruta. As a result, Fifth Third Bank seized one of Oruta’s bank accounts, and he was
also later found in contempt and arrested when he failed to appear in court. (DE 1 at 8-9.) In this
lawsuit, he seeks the return of his money, an additional $10 million in damages for violation of
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and “reversal of the biased and illegal repeal of
judgment” issued by the Illinois court. (DE 1 at 6.)
Upon review, this case cannot proceed. Both of the defendants are private companies,
and a private company cannot be sued for constitutional violations, since the Constitution only
applies to state actors. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822-23 (7th
Cir. 2009). In limited circumstances a private company can be sued for a constitutional violation
when it conspired with a state actor. Id. at 823. Here, however, Oruta does not allege, nor can it
be plausibly inferred from the complaint, that the two companies conspired with a state actor to
deprive him of his constitutional rights. He may be alleging that the companies indirectly caused
his arrest through their involvement in the state proceeding, but this alone would not transform
them into state actors. See Wilson v. McRae’s, Inc., 413 F.3d 692, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2005)
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(department store was not a state actor and could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the
basis of an incident in which store employees accused the plaintiff of theft and called police,
resulting in his arrest). Accordingly, Oruta cannot sue the defendants for constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
Furthermore, this Court has no authority to review, reverse, or otherwise invalidate the
orders issued by the Illinois court as Oruta requests. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower
federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts in civil cases. Gilbert v. Ill.
Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010). The doctrine “prevents a state-court loser from
bringing suit in federal court in order effectively to set aside the state-court judgment,” and it
applies “even though the state court judgment might be erroneous or even unconstitutional.” Id.
It is apparent that Oruta strongly disagrees with the Illinois court’s decision to revoke the
judgment he was previously granted. He may have some appellate remedy available in the
Illinois courts, but he has no remedy available in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain
review of the Illinois court’s orders.
For these reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DE 2) is
DENIED and the complaint (DE 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SO ORDERED on June 21, 2013.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division
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Oruta also makes vague reference to violations of the “Consumer Protection Act, Privacy Act, and 1990
H[u]man Rights Act,” but it is unclear what he is referencing. Even giving the complaint liberal construction, the Court
cannot discern within it any plausible federal claim. Oruta also does not make any allegations about the citizenship of
the parties, nor can it otherwise be plausibly inferred that he is trying to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
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