Holly v. Sevier et al
Filing
6
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 10/24/2013. ***Civil Case Terminated (lyb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
WILLIAM HOLLY,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK SEVIER, et al.,
Defendant.
CAUSE NO. 3:13-CV-1065
OPINION AND ORDER
William Holly, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint on October
1, 2013, attempting to sue various defendants for the value of his
lost property. For the reasons set forth below, this case is
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is legally
frivolous and fails to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
BACKGROUND
The papers filed by Holly are at first confusing, but upon
examination it is clear what he is trying to do. He begins by using
a
habeas
corpus
form
intended
for
challenging
state
court
convictions, but he is not attempting to challenge his conviction.
Rather he is challenging a Marion Small Claims Court judgment
dismissing that case on January 18, 2012. See Holly v. Sevier,
49K01-1109-SC-9282. Holly writes that the “clerk won’t transfer
case.” (DE #1 at 2.)
Next, Holly attaches pages from this court’s Civil Rights
Complaint form. Here he lists five defendants and explains that in
the Marion Small Claims Court he sued for $581.15 for the loss of
his property by employees of the Indiana Department of Correction.
He also sought $5,000 in punitive damages, but his case was
dismissed. Holly argues that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was
perjury and that the state court’s have refused his efforts to
appeal. Finally, he attaches various paperwork from the Marion
Small Claims Court proceeding.
DISCUSSION
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, the court must review prisoner
complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
There
are
several
reasons
why
this
complaint
must
be
dismissed. To the extent that Holly is asking this court to relitigate the claims that were dismissed by the Marion Small Claims
court, any claims that were (or could have been) raised in that
prior action are barred the doctrine of res judicata. See Highway
J Citizens Group v. U.S. Dep’t Transp., 456 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir.
2006).
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A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication,
embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel
and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction cannot be disputed in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their
privies. Under res judicata, a final judgment on the
merits bars further claims by parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action.
Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation
marks, ellipsis and citations omitted) (quoting Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).
To the extent that Holly is attempting to have this Court
review the judgment of the Marion Small Claims Court, his claims
are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923 ). Simply put, the RookerFeldman doctrine “precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over
claims seeking review of state court judgments or over claims
‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court judgments.” Remer v.
Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).
To the extent that Holly is arguing that his notice of appeal
was rejected by the state courts, such a claim would also have to
be dismissed. Putting aside that this federal court would not be
the correct venue for challenging events which occurred in Marion
County (which is located in the geographical boundaries of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana),
the paperwork that Holly identifies as a notice of appeal is merely
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a request for a docket sheet. (See DE #1-1 at 20.) Additionally,
none of the named defendants are employees of the state courts, and
it is not plausible that they were involved in failing to transfer
the record despite Holly’s assertion that they are “like an
organized crime family.” (DE #1 at 14.) See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583
F.3d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2009) (Allegations of a vast conspiracy
must meet a high standard of plausibility and a bare allegation of
a conspiracy does not state a claim.)
Moreover, even if Holly had not already litigated this claim
in state court, it would nevertheless still be dismissed because
though the Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall
not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,” a state tort claims act that provides a method by
which a person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or
intentional depravation of property meets the requirements of the
due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v.
Palmer,
468
U.S.
517,
533
(1984)
(“For
intentional,
as
for
negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s
action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to
provide a suitable post deprivation remedy.”) Indiana’s tort claims
act (INDIANA CODE § 34-13-3-1 et seq.) and other laws provide for
state judicial review of property losses caused by government
employees
and
provide
an
adequate
post-deprivation
remedy
to
redress state officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of
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a person’s property. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th
Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the
Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”) To the
extent that Holly might argue that preventing him from appealing
deprived him of a suitable remedy, it did not because Indiana also
provides a means of compelling the processing of his appeal.
An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any
inferior tribunal, corporation, public or corporate
officer, or person to compel the performance of any:
(1) act that the law specifically requires; or
(2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station.
INDIANA CODE § 34-27-3-1. See also Bramley v. Tipton Circuit Court,
835 N.E. 2d 479 (Ind. 2005).
Finally, even if Indiana did not provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy, this claim is untimely. Though Holly argues
that he did not immediately learn of the loss of his property and
that it was not until 2011 that he knew it was gone, he must have
known of its absence when he filed a Tort Claim Notice on June 2,
2010.
“Indiana’s
two-year
statute
of
limitations
.
.
.
is
applicable to all causes of action brought in Indiana under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force,
239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, even if he learned of the
loss on the same day that he filed his Tort Claim Notice, the
statute of limitations for these claims expired more than a year
ago.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it is legally frivolous and
fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
DATED: October 24, 2013
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court
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