Shroyer v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying the petition. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 5/30/2014. (kds)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ROCKY M. SHROYER,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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No. 3:13 CV 1131
OPINION AND ORDER
Rocky M. Shroyer, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE #1.) In WCC #12-06-0151, a hearing
officer found Shroyer guilty of forgery, and as a result he lost 20 days of earned-time
credits, among other sanctions. (DE #8-3.) The charge was initiated on June 6, 2012, when
Program Director John Schrader wrote a conduct report1 stating as follows:
On 6/6/12 at approx. 9:30 AM, I, John Schrader—Program Director,
reviewed outgoing general correspondence from Rocky Shroyer — #956193.
The letter to his mother and forms are already printed and signed by Shroyer
as another person named Rick L. Shaw living at the address of his mother.
The signature of requestor on the form is forged.
Based on the petitioner’s assertion that certain documents appeared to have been
omitted from the administrative record, the court previously ordered the respondent to
conduct a diligent search and submit any additional portions of the record that were not
previously submitted. (DE #10.) The respondent timely complied with this request. (DE
#11.) The respondent has submitted a revised copy of the conduct report, which contains
the signature of the petitioner indicating that he received a copy of it on June 12, 2012. (DE
#11-1 at 1.) The respondent also submitted revised documents from petitioner’s
administrative appeals, which included attachments that were not previously submitted.
(DE #11-2 at 1-32.) The petitioner was granted until May 15, 2014, to file a traverse or
otherwise respond to the respondent’s submission. (DE #10.) That deadline has passed and
no traverse or response has been received.
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(DE #11-1 at 1.) The correspondence was attached to the conduct report. (DE #8-1 at 24.)
On June 12, 2012, Shroyer was formally notified of the charge and given a copy
of the conduct report. (DE #8-2; DE #11-1 at 1.) He pled not guilty, declined the
assistance of a lay advocate, and waived the 24-hour notice requirement. (DE #8-2.) He
did not request any witness statements. (Id.) As physical evidence, he requested the
correspondence at issue and a copy of a notice of confiscation form. (Id.) He stated that
he would provide a copy of a note to his mother (which was also attached to the
conduct report) and an envelope she had sent him. (Id.) On June 19, 2012, a hearing was
conducted on the charge. (DE #8-3.) Shroyer made the following statement: “The
documents with Rick Shaw’s signature were already signed and sent in to me for
review and typing.” (Id.) Based on the evidence, the hearing officer found him guilty.
(Id.) His administrative appeals were denied. (DE #8-4 to DE #8-5; DE #11-2 at 1-32.)
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due
process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges;
(2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
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U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in the record
to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985).
Shroyer first claims he was denied the right to call Shaw as a witness. (DE #1 at
4.) A prisoner has a limited right to present witnesses and evidence in his defense
consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. A hearing officer has
considerable discretion with respect to witness and evidence requests, and may deny
requests that threaten institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.
Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, due process only requires
access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969
F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in this context means evidence that “directly
undermines the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s]
guilt.” Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of the right to
present evidence will be considered harmless, unless the prisoner shows that the
evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir.
2011).
Here, Shroyer signed the screening notice, which reflects that he did not request
any witnesses. (DE #8-2.) He cannot establish a due process violation based on the
denial of evidence he did not properly request. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925
(7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, even if he had made a proper request, he has not explained
how the hearing officer could compel the presence of someone outside the prison to
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participate in the hearing. If Shroyer wished to have a statement from Shaw considered
at the hearing, there was nothing preventing him from obtaining one. It is apparent he
was in regular contact with his mother, who lived with Shaw, and he also claims that
Shaw was on his visitor list. (DE #1 at 4.) He was free to ask Shaw for a statement if he
wanted one, but the hearing officer was not required to go outside the prison to
investigate or create favorable evidence on Shroyer’s behalf. See Freitas v. Auger, 837
F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th Cir. 1988); Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 773 (N.D. Ind.
1997); see also Aguilar v. Endicott, 224 Fed. Appx. 526 (7th Cir. May 11, 2007) (inmate was
not denied due process based on exclusion of witnesses, where his proposed witnesses
were unavailable because they were no longer employed by the correctional facility).
Shroyer may have envisioned this case proceeding like a criminal trial, but
“[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 556. The hearing officer was not required to produce physical evidence to support the
charge, follow the formal rules of evidence, or permit Shroyer to confront the evidence
against him. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666 (inmate had no right to cross-examine or confront
adverse witnesses); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (formal rules of
evidence do not apply at prison disciplinary proceeding); Rasheed-Bey, 969 F.2d at 361
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(“disciplinary board’s decision is not limited to evidence presented at the hearing”).
Shroyer has not demonstrated a violation of his due process rights.2
Shroyer next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE #1 at 6.) In reviewing
a disciplinary sanction for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not required to
conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility,
or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s
decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188
F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in
the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 455-56. The court will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if “no
reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis
of the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077
(7th Cir. 1994). Additionally, circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish
guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).
Upon review, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the guilty
finding. Shroyer was caught mailing documents which contained the signature of
For the sake of completeness, the court notes that Shroyer also requested the
correspondence itself, but this was already attached to the conduct report. (DE #8-1 at 2-4.)
He requested a “Notice of Confiscation” form, but none was prepared in his case. (Id. at 5.)
Shroyer also claims that he brought an envelops from his mother to the hearing, and a
visiting log showing that Shaw visited him at the prison, but the hearing officer refused to
consider this evidence. (DE #1 at 5.) There is nothing in the record to support his argument
that he presented this evidence to the hearing officer. (See DE #8-3.) In any event, Shroyer
has not demonstrated that empty envelops or a visitors log would have exculpated him
from the forgery charge. See Jones, 637 F.3d at 847; Meeks, 81 F.3dat 721.
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someone outside the prison. He did not deny that these documents were in his
possession. His defense was that Shaw signed the documents ahead of time and sent
them to him for “review and typing.” (DE #8-2.) However, the documents at issue were
not typed; they were forms that Shroyer completed by hand. (DE #8-1 at 3-4.) The
documents were public records requests directed to the clerk of Madison County,
seeking criminal records of persons named Jerry Clemons and Shannon Flockhart. (DE
#8-1 at 3-4.) In the accompanying note to his mother Shroyer stated, “I have enclosed
the request for access to public records for Rick to mail for me. They are all completed
and signed. All you have to do is put them in the envelope and mail them ok. . . . Tell
Rick I said hello and I appreciate his assistance in this matter.” (DE #8-1 at 2.) Thus, the
record reflects that Shaw was mailing the forms that Shroyer had completed as a favor
to Shroyer, not that Shroyer was reviewing the forms for Shaw.
In any event, it is not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence and make its
own determination of guilt or innocence. See McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. To be
constitutionally adequate, the evidence need not point to only one logical conclusion.
Rather, the question is whether there is some evidence to support the hearing officer’s
determination. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. That standard is satisfied here. See id. (due
process is satisfied as long as “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings
of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary”); see also Moffat
v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements constituted some
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evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some evidence to
support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this claim is denied.
Shroyer next claims he was denied the right to an impartial decision-maker. (DE
#1 at 8.) In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators are “entitled to a presumption
of honesty and integrity,” and “the constitutional standard for improper bias is high.”
Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits a prison official who was substantially
involved in the underlying incident from acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id.
However, due process is not violated simply because the hearing officer knew the
inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited involvement in the
events underlying the charge. Id.
Shroyer does not argue, nor is there any evidence in the record to show, that the
hearing officer was involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. Instead, he
asserts that the hearing officer was biased because she spoke with other prison staff
about the conduct report before the hearing. There is no evidentiary support for this
argument, but regardless, this was not a formal criminal proceeding, and an off-therecord conversation between the hearing officer and other prison staff does not deny an
inmate due process. See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If the
[disciplinary] board were a court, ex parte proceedings would be irregular and would
raise constitutional issues . . . But non-record discussions between an agency’s
decisionmakers and members of the agency’s staff are common and proper.”).
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Shroyer also asserts that the hearing officer was biased because she rejected his
proffered defense. However, it was the hearing officer’s job to weigh the evidence and
assess the relative credibility of the witnesses, and her adverse ruling does not establish
impermissible bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). This claim is
denied.
Shroyer next argues that the hearing officer’s written decision was inadequate.
(DE #1 at 8.) The written statement requirement is intended to ensure “administrative
accountability and meaningful review,” but it is “not onerous.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485
F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). To satisfy due process, “[t]he statement need only
illuminate the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the decision.” Id. Furthermore,
“the kind of statements that will satisfy the constitutional minimum will vary from case
to case depending on the severity of the charges and the complexity of the factual
circumstances and proof offered by both sides[.]” Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 631
(7th Cir. 1987).
Here, the hearing officer stated that in reaching her decision she considered staff
reports and Shroyer’s statement, and concluded that “C/R supports” the charge. (DE
#8-3.) While her statement was brief, this case did not involve complex factual or legal
issues. Shroyer was caught with documents containing the signature of someone
outside the prison, and he did not deny this fact. The sole issue for the hearing officer to
decide was whether Shaw had signed the documents ahead of time and sent them to
Shroyer for “review and typing,” as he claimed. The hearing officer’s statement
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adequately identified the evidence relied on and her reasoning, specifically, that she
rejected Shroyer’s proffered explanation. “As there is no mystery about [the hearing
officer’s] reasoning process,” her statement was constitutionally adequate. Saenz v.
Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Culbert, 834 F.2d at 631 (although
written statement merely referred to conduct report as basis of guilty finding, “nothing
more is constitutionally required where the only issue presented at the hearing involved
an assessment of the relative credibility of the conduct report and the plaintiff’s account
of the incident”). Therefore, this claim is denied.
Finally, Shroyer asserts that there were errors during the administrative appeal
process. (DE #1 at 8.) However, appeal rights are not one of the rights enumerated in
Wolff, and the court cannot require additional due process protections beyond those
specified. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; see also Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 702 (7th
Cir. 1986) (observing that Wolff “sets forth specific minimum procedures and expressly
leaves the development of additional safeguards to the discretion of the prison
authorities”). Accordingly, even if he is correct, his argument would not entitle him to
federal habeas relief.
For these reasons, the petition (DE #1) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May 30, 2014
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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