Walden v. Superintendent
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying 9 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 8/18/2014. (rmc)
United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
JASON WALDEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1223 JVB
OPINION AND ORDER
Jason Walden, a pro se prisoner, filed an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding. (DE 9.) In WCC #12-04-0194, a hearing officer
found Walden guilty of engaging in sexual conduct. (DE 16-3 at 1.) The charge was initiated on
April 7, 2012, when Officer T. Nash wrote a conduct report stating as follows:
On the above date and approx. time Walden, Jason #170280 was involved in a sexual
act with Inghels, Shane #988545. I ofc. Nash was doing my rounds down A4 North
wing, as I walked the other offenders called out “movie on” (she’s coming). As I
approached the room Walden #170280 was sitting on top of Inghels #988545 they
both had their boxers and pants down. Both offenders pulled their pant[s] and boxers
up. I then order[ed] both offenders to give me their I.D.s. They began to tell me that
they [were] exercising, horse playing and they also stated they always “do this”.
Before this sexual act took place I saw both offenders kissing on each other[’s]
bodies.
(DE 16-1 at 1.)
On April 12, 2012, Walden was charged with engaging in sexual conduct and given a
copy of the conduct report. (DE 16-2 at 1-2.) He pled not guilty, declined the assistance of a lay
advocate, and waived the 24-hour notice requirement. (DE 16-2 at 1.) He did not request any
physical evidence, but requested witness statements from fellow inmates Jose Yanes, Joshua
Carlisle, and David Payton. (Id.) Statements were obtained from all three witnesses prior to the
hearing. (DE 16-3 at 2-4.) Carlisle stated that Walden and Inghels had been doing “reverse sit-
ups or Roman chairs,” and that they were “sweaty from many sets of the workout as usual.” (DE
16-3 at 2.) Yanes also stated that there was “no type of sexual activity going on between them,
just a routine workout.” (Id. at 4.) Payton reiterated that the two men were merely “working out,”
and claimed that Officer Nash was mistaken about what she saw. (Id.)
On April 23, 2012, a hearing was conducted on the charge. (DE 16-3 at 1.) Walden made
the following statement in his defense: “The conduct report is wrong. We were wrestling, we
tried to tell her we were horseplaying [and] working out.” (Id.) Based on the evidence, the
hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) As a result he lost 20 days of earned time credits, among
other sanctions. (Id.) His administrative appeals were denied. (DE 16-4; DE 16-5.)
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due process rights in
prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be
heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional
goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must
also be “some evidence” in the record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
The petition is not a model of clarity, but Walden raises a number of claims that appear to
be based on violations of internal prison policies. He asserts that Officer Nash engaged in
“official misconduct” by failing to break the two inmates up as soon as she saw them kissing,
apparently in violation of an internal “no tolerance” policy. He also complains that the hearing
officer abused his discretion in imposing the sanction, and in failing to treat him the same as the
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other inmate involved. However, even if he is correct that prison rules were violated, this would
not entitle him to federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)
(habeas relief is only available for a violation of the U.S. Constitution or other federal laws);
Hester v. McBride, 966 F. Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of Indiana Department of
Correction policy in disciplinary proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief, since
federal habeas court “does not sit to correct any errors of state law”). These claims are denied.
Walden also claims that his due process rights were violated because he was not given a
copy of an incident report written by Sergeant C. Herr. (DE 9 at 2.) A prisoner has a limited right
to witnesses and evidence consistent with correctional goals and safety. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.
A hearing officer has considerable discretion with respect to witness and evidence requests, and
may deny requests that threaten institutional safety or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary.
Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, due process only requires
access to witnesses and evidence that are exculpatory. See Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d
357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). “Exculpatory” in this context means evidence that “directly undermines
the reliability of the evidence in the record pointing to [the prisoner’s] guilt.” Meeks v. McBride,
81 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of evidence will be considered harmless, unless the
prisoner shows that the evidence could have aided his defense. See Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841,
847 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, Walden signed the screening notice which reflected that he did not request any
physical evidence. (DE 16-2 at 1.) He requested three witness statements, but these were
obtained and considered by the hearing officer. (DE 16-3 at 1-4.) Walden cannot fault the
hearing officer for failing to provide him with evidence he did not properly request. See Piggie v.
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McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, Walden has not explained (nor can the
court discern) how the incident report had any exculpatory value. Instead the report merely
provided a second-hand account of Officer Nash’s eyewitness account, and stated that both
inmates refused medical treatment after the incident. (DE 16-1 at 2.) Nothing in the report
undercuts the evidence of Walden’s guilt. To the extent the report had any exculpatory value, the
hearing officer considered it in reaching his decision, which is all that Walden was entitled to
under Wolff. See White, 266 F.3d at 768 (prisoner’s rights were not violated when evidence he
claimed was exculpatory was considered by the disciplinary board, even though he was not
permitted to view this evidence himself).
In a related vein, Walden argues that he was denied witnesses. (DE 9 at 3.) The record
belies this claim. As recounted above, Walden requested three witness statements at the time of
screening, and these statements were obtained and considered by the hearing officer. (DE 16-3 at
1-4.) Walden’s real complaint appears to be that the hearing officer did not credit these
statements, but there is nothing in Wolff that required him to do so. It was the hearing officer’s
job to assess the relative credibility of the witnesses, and this court is not permitted to reweigh
the evidence to make its own determination of guilt or innocence. McPherson v. McBride, 188
F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, these claims are denied.
Finally, Walden challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. (DE 9 at 2-4.) In reviewing a
disciplinary sanction for sufficiency of the evidence, “courts are not required to conduct an
examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence,
but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s decision to revoke good time credits
has some factual basis.” McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786. “[T]he relevant question is whether there
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is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. The court will overturn the hearing officer’s decision only if
“no reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of
the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th
Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to
establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).
Upon review, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the guilty finding.
Officer Nash reported that as she was making her rounds, she saw Walden sitting on top of
another inmate. Both inmates had their pants and underwear pulled down. Although Walden and
his witnesses claimed the two were only exercising, the evidence does not have to point to only
one logical conclusion to be constitutionally adequate. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Rather, the
question is whether there is some evidence to support the determination made by the hearing
officer. Based on the record, the court cannot conclude that the hearing officer’s decision was
arbitrary or without evidentiary support. See id. (due process is satisfied as long as “the record is
not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or
otherwise arbitrary”); Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (witness statements
constituted some evidence); McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (conduct report provided some
evidence to support disciplinary determination). Accordingly, this claim is denied.
For these reasons, the petition (DE 9) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on August 18, 2014.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division
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