Wilkins v. Superintendent

Filing 28

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING the 9 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENYING a certificate of appealability, and DIRECTING the clerk to close this case. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 4/11/16. (cc: Petitioner)(ksp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

DANIEL E. WILKINS,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.

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CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-585

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition under
28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Daniel
E. Wilkins, a pro se prisoner, on May 28, 2014. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court

DENIES

the amended habeas corpus

petition, DENIES a certificate of appealability, and DIRECTS the
clerk to close this case.

BACKGROUND
Daniel E. Wilkins is challenging his convictions for robbery,
criminal confinement, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30

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years on March 24, 2008, by the Allen Superior Court under cause
number 02D04-0707-FB-98.
Wilkins filed a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals of Indiana
affirmed in Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
DE 17-7. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. DE 17-3 at 23. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the denial of his postconviction relief petition in Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074,
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12. The Indiana Supreme Court denied
transfer. DE 17-4 at 1. In this habeas corpus petition, Wilkins
raises eleven grounds for habeas corpus relief.

DISCUSSION
“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme
malfunctions

in

the

state

criminal

justice

systems,

not

a

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Woods v.
Donald, 575 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We
have explained that clearly established Federal law for
purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as
opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an
unreasonable application of those holdings must be
objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear
error will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a
habeas petitioner is required to show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal
court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015).
(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Grounds One and Two
In Ground One, Wilkins argues that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to a Speedy trial. The respondent argues that
Ground

One

was

not

fairly

presented

to

the

State

Courts.

Nevertheless, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be
denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant
to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2).
In Ground Two, Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel in connection to his speedy trial claim.
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However, “[w]ithout a meritorious speedy trial claim, [he] cannot
possibly demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his . . . counsel’s
failure to argue such a claim. As the Court noted in Strickland,
if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often
be so, that course should be followed.” Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d
741, 751 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted).
Here, because Wilkins is not entitled to habeas corpus relief
even under a de novo review, it is unnecessary to address any of
the procedural issues in connection with Ground One and Ground
Two.
The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530,
(1972), set forth the now well-established standard
governing Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges. That
four-part test considers: whether delay before trial was
uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal
defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in
due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy
trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s
result.
Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 751-752 (7th Cir. 2014) (parallel
citations and quotation marks omitted). However, all four factors
of the Barker test are not equal. “Until there is some delay which
is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Thus, “the length of the delay operates
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as a trigger — a delay longer than one year triggers the full
Barker analysis.” O’Quinn v. Spiller, 806 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir.
2015). Conversely, a delay of less than one year ends the analysis.
Here, Wilkins was charged on July 6, 2007, and his jury trial
was held on February 20 and 21, 2008. Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d
535, 536-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). DE 17-7 at 2-3. This was less
than an eight month delay. Because an eight month delay is not
presumptively

prejudicial,

a

full

Barker

analysis

is

not

necessary, and Wilkins has not established a Sixth Amendment
violation. Therefore neither Ground One nor Ground Two is a basis
for habeas corpus relief.

Ground Three
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he prevented Wilkins from waiving a jury and demanding a bench
trial. However, “there is no federally recognized right to a
criminal trial before a judge sitting alone.” United States v.
Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 1991) (ellipsis omitted) quoting
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965). Because Wilkins
could not have a meritorious bench trial demand claim, he “cannot
possibly demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his . . . counsel’s
failure” to demand a bench trial. Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741,

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751 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for
habeas corpus relief.

Ground Four
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he incorrectly advised him that the maximum sentence possible was
50 years. Wilkins argues that if he had known that the maximum
sentence was only 30 years, he might have taken the State’s 16
year guilty plea offer. However, as the Court of Appeals of Indiana
explained, “fifty years was the maximum penalty he faced for the
charges against him.” Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *3
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 7 (emphasis in original). A
misstatement by the trial judge at sentencing did not change that
fact. Moreover, even if the maximum sentence had been shorter than
he was advised, such an error would not have made it more likely
that he would have decided to plead guilty. Rather it would have
made it less likely. Because his trial counsel was not wrong and
Wilkins would not have been prejudiced even if he had been, Ground
Four presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Ground Five
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he did not object to the testimony of two eye witnesses who
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identified him at trial. He argues that “[i]n determining whether
an

identification

is

reliable

despite

suggestive

pre-trial

identification procedures, courts” must apply a five factor test.
Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2000). He argues
that because the State could not meet that test, the objection
would have been sustained and the testimony excluded. However,
“Cossel

is

readily

distinguishable

[because]

there

is

no

allegation of any prior impermissibly suggestive identification
procedure here.” United States v. Miller, 795 F.3d 619, 628 (7th
Cir. 2015). As such, it was not unreasonable for the Court of
Appeals of Indiana to have found that “Wilkins cannot prove either
substandard performance or prejudice.” Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL
5777074, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 9. Therefore
Ground Five presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Ground Six
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he

did

not

object

Simultaneous

Latent

Commonwealth

v.

to

fingerprint

Print

Patterson,

Impressions
445

Mass.

testimony
method.
626

based
He

(2005),

on

the

argues

that

held

that

Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions is a questionable method for
analyzing fingerprints. The court in Patterson explained that,

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Such testimony is based on the theory that once a group
of latent impressions are identified as simultaneous
impressions, an otherwise unacceptably small number of
similarities between each of the impressions and its
allegedly corresponding fully inked fingerprint can form
the basis for a collective determination as to whether
the entire group of latent impressions matches a
corresponding group of full fingerprints.
Id. at 645, overruled on other grounds by Com. v. Britt, 465
Mass. 87, 987 N.E.2d 558 (2013).
However,

no

such

testimony

was

admitted

during

Wilkins’

trial. There is no mention of using the Simultaneous Latent Print
Impressions method. Eric Black testified, “In the comparison of
latent fingerprint evidence, we use a scientific method called
ACE-V, and that’s an acronym for A-C-E dash V, and it stands for
analysis, comparison, evaluation, and then verification.” Trial
Transcript at 299.
David Young did testify that “Three (3) fingers placed on
there appear to be placed in – in – in an order that appeared to
me to be a simultaneous impression, in other words close enough
together that they appeared to be laid down at the same time when
an item was picked up, the spacing between ‘em and just the
orientation of the prints appeared to be in that order.” Trial
Transcript

at

331.

He

also

testified

that

two

prints

were

“consistent with the – another finger, a simultaneous impression.”
Trial Transcript at 337. However, he clearly stated that “There
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was sufficient information within ‘em to individually identify
both prints.” Trial Transcript at 339. “These were made independent
of each other. I didn’t need the other one to substantiate what
was there, both of ‘em had more than enough information for me to
identify strictly on its own if the other one wasn’t present.” Id.
Thus, the identification of Wilkins as the person who had left
these two prints was not based on “an otherwise unacceptably small
number of similarities” with multiple prints, but on a complete
and independent analysis of each print. David Young testified that
“I was completely confident . . . I was a hundred percent (100%)
with both.” Trial Transcript at 361. Based on the testimony
presented at trial, there was no factual basis for an objection to
the use of the Simultaneous Latent Print Impressions method because
it was not used to identify any fingerprints presented during
Wilkins’ trial. Therefore Ground Six is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.

Ground Seven
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he did not object to the State’s use of a peremptory strike of
what he alleges was the only African-American juror. Here is how
the Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed the claim.

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If Juror 62 was the only African–American in the
venire, the burden would have shifted to the State to
offer a race-neutral reason as the basis for striking
him. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral. The following exchange occurred
during voir dire:
PROSECUTOR: All right. These three (3)
questions that I asked, if you would agree
to ask yourself: Do I have a doubt? Does it
go to the elements? And is my doubt
reasonable? Would you ask yourself those
three (3) questions? And if your answer is
“no”, then—to any of those, I've done my
job. Right? Is that fair?
JUROR 63: (Responds
affirmative.)

by

nodding

in

the

JUROR 62: (Responds
affirmative.)

by

nodding

in

the

Q: And then, in fact, that your—would you
return a verdict of guilty in that
circumstance?
JUROR 62: I really couldn't say.
Q: Pardon me?
JUROR 62: I couldn’t say. I said I—I really
couldn't say.
Q: Okay. Well—well, if you don’t have a doubt
that goes to one of the elements then you
wouldn't return a verdict of guilty?
JUROR 62: I don’t know.
Q: Okay. Well—well, then I guess I just want
to make sure that I’m under-that I’m able
to hear you okay. Is it—why would that be,
sir?
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JUROR 62: I don't know, ‘cause I've never been
on a jury trial before.
Transcript at 111–112. In the discussion that followed,
the prosecutor noted that Juror 62 had filled out a
questionnaire asking if there was anyone close to him
that had been charged or convicted of a crime. He
answered “yes”. Assuming that question was answered in
the affirmative, the questionnaire sought additional
information. The prosecutor noted that Juror 62 had
failed to provide on the questionnaire any of the details
pertaining to his affirmative response. The prosecutor
asked Juror 62 why he did not answer that portion of the
questionnaire. Juror 62 responded that he did not
remember the dates and details, but he did share that
the subject of the previous arrest was his son. Upon
further questioning, Juror 62 shared that his son had
been convicted of burglary many years before.
When he exercised his peremptory strike of Juror
62, the prosecutor explained his reasoning as follows:
Oh. Well then, that being the case, ma‘am, I've provided
a race-neutral reason. I—he—he was—when I was asking the
questions, I asked him two (2) or three (3) times and he
said, “I don’t know, I’ve never been a juror before.”
And—and while he may have corrected it, which would
support not taking him for cause, I think it’s a—it’s a
sufficient race neutral reason for—to take it as a
peremptory. Id. at 119. Essentially, the State sought to
exclude Juror 62 because he indicated that he may not
vote to convict even if he was convinced the State had
established all elements necessary to achieve a
conviction.
The
State’s
subsequent
questioning
established a possible basis for Juror 62’s reluctance,
i.e., Juror 62’s son had been convicted of a crime. This
was a sufficiently race-neutral reason to withstand a
Batson challenge. Thus, even if an objection had been
made, the trial court would not have sustained it.
Therefore, Wilkins has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to raise a Batson
challenge with respect to the exclusion of Juror 62.
Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *5-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted), DE 17-12 at 11-13.
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“When the claim at issue is one for ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . federal courts are to afford both the state court
and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v.
Etherton, 578 U.S. __, __; 2016 WL 1278478 at *2 (2016) (quotation
marks omitted). Because the Court of Appeals of Indiana accurately
stated the Batson standard and did not unreasonably apply it to
the facts of this case, Ground Seven is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.

Ground Eight
Wilkins argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
during the second phase of his bifurcated trial, he did not make
an

opening

statement,

cross-examine

witnesses,

object

to

the

State’s evidence, nor make a closing argument. “After Wilkins was
convicted of Counts 1 & 2 the proceedings continued and the jury
was instructed on count (3) which alleges that the defendant
omitted the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by an
individual with a prior conviction enumerated under I.C. 35-47-45.” DE 9-1 at 45 and DE 22 at 31. The Court of Appeals of Indiana
explained that “Wilkins has failed to articulate what trial counsel
would or could have said during opening and closing statements
that would have had any meaningful impact on the outcome of this
case. Having failed to establish prejudice, his argument with
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respect to those claims is without merit.” Wilkins v. State, 2013
WL 5777074, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE 17-12 at 13. This was
not an unreasonable determination. Even now in his habeas corpus
filings, Wilkins has provided no explanation as to what his trial
counsel could have said or done which would have resulted the
exclusion

of

any

admitted

evidence

or

the

inclusion

of

any

additional evidence. Neither has he provided any suggestion as to
what could have been said in opening or closing which would have
given the jury an alternative perspective on the State’s evidence.
Because

the

State’s

adjudication

of

this

claim

was

not

unreasonable, Ground Eight is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.

Ground Nine
Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of
both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or
raise on appeal a claim that the Information charging him with
Confinement was inadequate. “An [Information] is constitutionally
sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense intended
to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the accused of what he
must be prepared to meet, and (3) enables the accused to plead a
judgment

under

prosecution

for

the
the

indictment
same

as

offense.”

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a

bar

U.S.

to
ex

any
rel.

subsequent
Ballard

v.

Bengston, 702 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1983) citing Russell v.
United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962).
Wilkins argues that the Information should have specifically
stated where the victims were confined pursuant to Indiana Code
35-34-1-2(a)(8) which requires “stating the place of the offense
as definitely as can be done if the place is of the essence of the
offense . . ..” However, specific location is not a part of the
essence

of

Confinement

intentionally

confin[ing]

which

only

another

requires

person

“knowingly

without

the

or

other

person’s consent . . . .” Indiana Code 35-42-3-3. Moreover, even
“[w]here

a

charging

instrument

may

lack

appropriate

factual

detail, additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit
supporting the charging instrument may be taken into account in
assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges
against him.” Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1061 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
Here the Probable Cause Affidavit states that Wilkins “made all
the victims go into the office bathroom and used a new pool stick
to jam in the door handle to lock them in” at the Stadium Bar and
Grill.

Trial

Record

at

22.

Thus,

the

Information

was

not

insufficiently specific and Ground Nine is not a basis for habeas
corpus relief.

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Ground Ten
Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of
both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or
raise on appeal a Double Jeopardy claim asserting that the elements
of his Confinement conviction were not distinct from his Robbery
conviction. The Court of Appeals of Indiana explained that
Robbery consists of taking property “by using or
threatening the use of force” or “by putting any person
in fear.” See Ind. Code Ann. § 35–42–5–1 (West, Westlaw
current with all 2013 legislation). Criminal confinement
consists of confining a person or removing them by fraud,
enticement, force, or threat of force from one place to
another. See I.C. § 35–42–3–3 (West, Westlaw current
with all 2013 legislation). Our Supreme Court has
indicated that confinement is not a lesser-included
offense of robbery. See Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633
(Ind. 2001). Moreover, confinement is a separate
criminal act where the confinement is greater than that
which is inherently necessary to rob the victim, even
where the confinement is a part of the robbery. See id.
Wilkins confined the three victims well beyond that
which was necessary to carry out the robbery. He forced
his victims to the restaurant’s bathroom. It was not
necessary to do this in order to take the restaurant’s
money. A double jeopardy challenge would not have
succeeded, and therefore cannot be the basis of a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wrinkles v.
State, 749 N.E.2d 1179.
Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE
17-12 at 14-15. Wilkins has not provided any explanation for why
this was an unreasonable adjudication of this claim. The facts of
this case show that after committing Robbery, he went on to
separately

commit

Confinement

by

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locking

his

victims

in

the

bathroom. Therefore Ground Ten is not a basis for habeas corpus
relief.

Ground Eleven
Wilkins argues that he was denied the effective assistance of
both trial and appellate counsel because they did not preserve or
raise on appeal a claim that the charging Informations were not
properly sworn. The Court of Appeals of Indiana explained:
Finally, under the broad claim that his convictions
violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
Wilkins claims, “The Charging Information for Counts 1,
2 & 3 failed to meet the requirements of Ind. Code 35–
34–1–2.4(A).” Brief of Appellant at 50. He explains that
the charging information was defective in that it failed
to comply with Ind. Code Ann. § 35–34–1–2.4 (West,
Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation), which
provides that a charging information must be “verified
or sworn under oath”. Further, the statute provides a
model affirmation clause meeting that requirement, i.e.:
“I swear (affirm), under penalty of perjury as specified
by IC 35–44.1–2–1, that the foregoing (the following)
representations are true.” We note, however, that the
statute explicitly does not narrow the list of
acceptable forms to only the model affirmation set out
therein. Rather, it provides that “a substantially
similar form” would be acceptable as well. Id.
In the present case, the charging informations, in
pertinent part, read as follows: “Undersigned, upon
information and belief, being duly sworn upon oath, says
that: On or about the thirty-first day of May, 2007, in
the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, said
defendant, Daniel E. Wilkins ...”—at this point, the
charging informations set out the allegations specific
to the respective offenses with which he was charged. By
including in the statute a provision indicating that
language substantially similar to the model form would
suffice, the Legislature signaled its intention not to
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create “magic words.” Although it would perhaps be
preferable to use the model language, the failure to do
so is not fatal error. The charging informations in the
present case indicate that the person signing the
informations did so while “duly sworn upon oath” and
that it was “[s]ubscribed and sworn to before me”.
Appellant's Appendix at 363 and 364, respectively. “The
essential purpose of a verification is that the
statements be made under penalty of perjury.” Austin v.
Sanders, 492 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Ind. 1986). I.C. § 35–34–1–
2.4 prescribes a method of verification without the
presence of a notary or other officer authorized to
administer an oath. The rule allows verification by
reciting the statutory language, or substantially
similar language.
To “swear” is “to take an oath.” Black's Law
Dictionary 1461 (7th ed. 1999). “The legal effect of an
oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury
if the testimony is false.” Id. at 1099. In Indiana, a
person commits the crime of perjury when he or she “makes
a false, material statement under oath or affirmation,
knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to
be true[.]” Ind. Code Ann. § 35–44. 1–2–1(a)(1) (West,
Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation). In the
present case, the deputy prosecutor affirmed the
representations contained in the charging informations
were true, and did so swearing an oath to that effect.
As such, the deputy prosecutor who signed the charging
informations subjected himself or herself to the
penalties of perjury if the sworn statement was false.
Thus, although not in the form set out in I.C. § 35–34–
1–2.4, the affirmation language incorporated in these
charging informations was sufficient to satisfy the
purpose of the requirement set out in the statute. In
light of this, a legal challenge by trial or appellate
counsel on the grounds that Wilkins identifies here
would not have succeeded. We reiterate that counsel
cannot be deemed to have rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to present a meritless claim.
Wilkins v. State, 2013 WL 5777074, at *8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), DE
17-12 at 15-17. Wilkins has not provided any explanation for why
this was an unreasonable adjudication of this claim. The charging
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Informations were properly sworn under oath and he had no valid
basis for objecting. Therefore Ground Eleven is not a basis for
habeas corpus relief.

Cumulative Prejudice
Wilkins

argues

that

even

if

no

individual

error

was

sufficiently prejudicial to merit habeas corpus relief, the Court
should grant him relief based on the cumulative prejudice of all
of the errors combined. “[P]rejudice may be based on the cumulative
effect of multiple errors. Although a specific error, standing
alone, may be insufficient to undermine the court’s confidence in
the outcome, multiple errors together may be sufficient.” Malone
v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2008) quoting Hough v. Anderson,
272 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001). However, cumulative prejudice is
only possible where there was more than one error. Here, Wilkins
has not demonstrated that any errors occurred. Therefore there are
no errors to combine.

Evidentiary Hearing
Wilkins argues that this court should hold an evidentiary
hearing before ruling on Grounds One through Eight. Nevertheless,
he provides no explanation as to why a hearing is needed, nor what
new evidence might be obtained during a hearing. Neither does he
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provide any explanation for how he meets the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as required by Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781,
790 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore there is no basis for holding an
evidentiary hearing in this case.

Certificate of Appealability
Finally, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases, the Court must consider whether to grant a certificate
of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right by establishing “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
As previously explained, all of the grounds raised by Wilkins are
meritless

and

none

of

them

deserve

encouragement

to

proceed

further. Therefore Wilkins will not be granted a certificate of
appealability.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the amended
habeas corpus petition, DENIES a certificate of appealability, and
DIRECTS the clerk to close this case.

DATED: April 11, 2016
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court

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