Satterly v. Robert Land

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 2/15/17. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(ksp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
STEVEN SHANE SATTERLY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT LAND, AND TARI WOLFE,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1588

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the summary judgment motion
filed by Tari Wolfe on March 22, 2016. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion for summary judgment (DE 36) is DENIED IN PART
as to the claims that Nurse Tari Wolfe denied Steven Shane Satterly
dental care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment from May 30,
2012, to July 31, 2012. The motion is GRANTED as to all other
claims.

BACKGROUND
Steven Shane Satterly was a prisoner at the Wabash County
Jail

in

2012

when

the

events

giving

rise

to

this

complaint

occurred. He filed this case pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and was granted leave to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim
for compensatory damages for a denial of dental care by Nurse Tari
Wolfe in her individual capacity from May until September 2012.

When the court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, it applied the same deliberate indifference standard
applicable to Eighth Amendment cases. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597
F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the Eighth Amendment
applies only to convicted persons, pretrial detainees . . . are
entitled

to

the

same

basic

protections

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, [courts] apply the
same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought
under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
The Defendant filed a summary judgment motion applying that
test, but after Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. __, __; 135 S.Ct.
2466 (2015), was decided, the court asked for rebriefing because
it appeared that all pre-trial detainee claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment might be subject to the test in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The defendant did so, but argues that the
Bell test is not applicable. After this motion was fully briefed,
the

Seventh

Circuit

clarified

that

Kingsley

only

applies

to

excessive force claims and did not change the test for denial of
medical treatment claims such as this one.1 Therefore the court

1

See Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n. 31 (7th Cir.
2016). (“The Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ requires
prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates,
including the provision of adequate medical care.” Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d
824, 830 (7th Cir. 2010). We note that some members of the class are pretrial
detainees and that “the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons.”
Id. at 831. However, in this context, the present case law holds that “pretrial
detainees ... are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, we apply the same legal standards
to deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth

2

will apply the same Eighth Amendment standards to this Fourteenth
Amendment claim that were cited in the screening order. See DE 8.

DISCUSSION
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view
all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court must avoid the temptation to
“make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide
which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a
factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or
a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst
Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, the court’s sole
task in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is “to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material
dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. If
a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of the nonmoving party,
summary judgment may not be granted. Id.
As a preliminary matter, the Defendant argues that the court
should not consider any facts presented by Satterly in his reply
brief because it was not formatted as required by Local Rule 56-

Amendment.” Id.; see also Smentek, 683 F.3d at 374. But see Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015)
(holding that there are different standards for sentenced prisoners and pretrial
detainees in the case of excessive force claims).)

3

1. Technical defects such as that do not invariably preclude the
court from considering the facts presented by Satterly.2 However,
because the outcome of this summary judgment motion would not be
different even if the court considered Satterly’s disputed facts,
it is unnecessary to do so.
“For a medical professional to be liable for deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he must make a decision
that

represents

such

a

substantial

departure

from

accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir.
2008)

(quotation

deliberate

marks

indifference

and
is

citations
a

high

omitted).

standard

and

Nevertheless,
even

medical

malpractice and incompetence do not state a claim of deliberate
indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000).
“Under the Eighth Amendment, [a prisoner] is not entitled to demand
specific care. She is not entitled to the best care possible.”
Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.1997). A “disagreement
with medical professionals [does not] state a cognizable Eighth
Amendment Claim under the deliberate indifference standard of
Estelle v. Gamble [429 U.S. 97 (1976)].” Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352
F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003).

2

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), the court has numerous
options “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact [including]
giv[ing] an opportunity to properly support or address the fact . . ..”

4

On May 29, 2012, Satterly submitted a Medical Request form
stating: “I broke a molar tooth on a pork/beef fritter sandwich.
I now have two molar teeth with cavities and they hurt very much.
I’m not paying $15.00 for nothing. I need to see a dentist.” DE
37-2 at 14. Later that day, Nurse Tari Wolfe examined him, gave
him Ibuprofen, and explained “[t]he jail’s dental procedure was
that an appointment to see a dentist outside the jail could be
made, but that the inmate or his family had to arrange to pay for
it.” DE 37-1 at 2. “Mr. Satterly informed [her], ‘my family
shouldn’t have to pay.’” Id. Her contemporaneous notes show that
she assessed and documented his condition. DE 37-2 at 13. She took
his temperature and weight. She noted that the rear of tooth 19
was missing, but there was no sign of infection. She recorded
giving him medication and advising him of the jail’s dental policy.
There was nothing deliberately indifferent about her response on
May 29, 2012.
The next day, she wrote on his Medical Request form: “We do
not have a dentist who comes to this jail.” DE 37-2 at 14. That
statement was not responsive to his need for healthcare. His need
for dental treatment was not conditioned upon whether he went to
the dentist or the dentist came to him. In light of her examination
of him and conversation with him the previous day, no reasonable
juror could find that she was deliberately indifferent based solely
upon what happened on those two days. However, when combined with

5

subsequent events, a reasonable juror could find that was the
beginning of her being deliberately indifferent.
After she left work on May 30, 2012, Satterly wrote an Inmate
Grievance. “I have a broken tooth and I’m in severe pain. I filled
out a medical request to see a dentist and the response I received
was ‘we do not have a dentist who comes to this jail.’ This is
unacceptable. I have at least 4 more months here. I need a dentist
A.S.A.P. I will contact the A.C.L.U. if I need to. All I want is
my tooth fixed.” DE 37-2 at 11. Nurse Wolfe did not see that
grievance until she returned to work on June 5, 2012. When she
returned, she wrote a response. Because she was not at the jail
for several days, no reasonable juror could find that she was
deliberately

indifferent

merely

because

she

did

not

respond

sooner.
However, on June 5, 2012, she wrote, “If you need to see a
dentist, the condition HAS to be assessed and documented by medical
– per policy. This is a charged medical visit.” DE 37-2 at 11.
This response is confusing. To the extent that Satterly needed to
have a documented assessment, it appears that Nurse Wolfe did one
on June 29, 2012. See DE 37-2 at 13. Her response appears to be
telling him that he has to do what he has already done. It is
possible that a reasonable juror could find that the creation of
such an obstacle was deliberately indifferent. Though Satterly had
previously refused to pay, nothing in this grievance mentioned

6

cost. To the extent that he should have (but did not) pay for that
prior examination, Nurse Wolfe makes no mention of that being a
reason why the prior documented assessment of his dental problem
would not qualify under the policy. Though a reasonable juror might
not be convinced that this was proof of deliberate indifference,
it is possible that a reasonable juror could be – particularly in
light of the fact that she did not see him again until July 31,
2012. DE 37-1 at 3.
Nurse Wolfe has presented undisputed evidence that during the
next two months she obtained approval from jail officials for a
dental visit and contacted dentists to find one who would see
Satterly. This evidence, if presented at trial, could influence a
juror to believe that she was not being deliberately indifferent.
However, even with such evidence, the court cannot conclude that
no reasonable juror could find for Satterly. It is her undisputed
testimony is that she waited two months for him to complain again
even though her last message to him was that he had to re-do an
assessment which she had already done. DE 37-1 at 3. Perhaps
Satterly

should

have

complained

more

frequently

and

more

intensely. How jurors will weigh these facts is unknown, but it is
not for the court to make this decision on summary judgment.
Reasonable jurors could find for the defendants, but because it
would not be unreasonable for a juror to find for Satterly, the
court will not grant summary judgment on his claim that Nurse Wolfe

7

was deliberately indifferent to his need for dental treatment from
May 30, 2012, to July 31, 2012.
The undisputed evidence shows that on July 31, 2012, Nurse
Wolfe examined him again. DE 37-2 at 10. She contacted the doctor,
provided Satterly with pain medication, and scheduled a dentist
appointment.

DE

37-1

at

4.

She

then

followed

the

treatment

decisions of the doctor and dentists who provided care for him. DE
37-1 at 4-5. No reasonable juror could find that her actions after
July 31, 2012, were deliberately indifferent. Though his dental
treatment was delayed and he was dissatisfied with the pain
management he received, there is no indication that Nurse Wolfe
was liable for any of those events. Even if the court were to
consider the facts in Satterly’s reply brief, he has provided
nothing which would create a genuine issue of fact about the events
occurring after July 31, 2012.
Satterly was originally granted leave to proceed on a claim
for a denial of medical treatment from May to September. However
this summary judgment motion has clarified that Nurse Wolfe was
not deliberately indifferent before May 30, 2012, nor after July
31, 2012. Therefore the motion for summary judgment will be granted
as to Satterly’s claims before and after those dates. However, the
motion for summary judgment will be denied and Satterly may proceed
on the question of whether Nurse Wolfe denied him dental care in

8

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment from May 30, 2012, to July
31, 2012.
Satterly is proceeding only on a claim for compensatory
damages. In light of this ruling, the parties are encouraged to
seriously consider settlement options before preparing for trial.
Trials

have

costs

and

uncertainties

for

both

plaintiffs

and

defendants. Given the facts of this case, reasonable jurors could
find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Settlement is a
way to reduce costs and eliminate uncertainties. Because Satterly
is indigent and cannot afford to pay for a mediator, the court
would consider referring this case to a magistrate judge for
mediation if the parties cannot reach a settlement on their own.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary
judgment (DE 36) is DENIED IN PART as to the claims that Nurse
Tari Wolfe denied Steven Shane Satterly dental care in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment from May 30, 2012, to July 31, 2012.
The motion is GRANTED as to all other claims.

DATED: February 15, 2017

/s/Rudy Lozano, Judge
United States District Court

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