VanAsdall v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER: The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 9/8/15. (cer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
BRENDA FAY VANASDALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 3:14-CV-1597 JD
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Brenda Fay VanAsdall’s complaint for review
of the denial of her claim for disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security. For the
following reasons, the Court reverses the decision of the Commissioner and remands this matter
for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prior to applying for disability benefits, Ms. VanAsdall worked for about 25 years as a
waitress. However, she alleges that as of June 6, 2009, she was no longer able to maintain
employment due to a number of mental and physical health conditions, including depression,
anxiety, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
coronary artery disease, and obesity. Ms. VanAsdall primarily cites severe back pain and
depression as limiting her ability to work. She thus applied for disability insurance benefits, but
her application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Ms. VanAsdall requested an
administrative hearing before an administrative law judge, at which she and a vocational expert
appeared and testified. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Ms.
VanAsdall was not disabled. While the ALJ agreed that each of the above conditions constituted
severe impairments, he found that Ms. VanAsdall’s impairments did not meet or equal any
listing at step three. He also found that Ms. VanAsdall was not able to perform her past relevant
work, but that she would be able to perform a significant number of other jobs. In reaching those
decisions, the ALJ found that Ms. VanAsdall was not fully credible, and he assigned little weight
to the opinions of her treating pain specialist and her psychiatrist. The Appeals Council
subsequently denied Ms. VanAsdall’s request for review, so Ms. VanAsdall commenced this
civil action, over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the Court evaluates the ALJ’s decision as
the final word of the Commissioner of Social Security. Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707
(7th Cir. 2013). A court must affirm the Commissioner’s findings of fact and denial of disability
benefits if they are supported by substantial evidence. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th
Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
This evidence must be “more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, even if “reasonable minds could differ” about
the disability status of the claimant, the Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision as long
as it is adequately supported. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
It is the duty of the ALJ to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make
independent findings of fact, and dispose of the case accordingly. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399–400.
In this substantial-evidence determination, the Court considers the entire administrative record
but does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute the
Court’s own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d
535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Court conducts a “critical review of the evidence”
2
before affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Id. An ALJ must evaluate both the evidence
favoring the claimant as well as the evidence favoring the claim’s rejection and may not ignore
an entire line of evidence that is contrary to his or her findings. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d
881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). Consequently, an ALJ’s decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary
support or an adequate discussion of the issues. Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539. Ultimately, while the
ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, the ALJ must
provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence and the conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d
471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, conclusions of law are not entitled to deference; so, if the
Commissioner commits an error of law, reversal is required without regard to the volume of
evidence in support of the factual findings. Binion ex rel Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782
(7th Cir. 1997).
III. DISCUSSION
Ms. VanAsdall argues that the Commissioner erred in denying her claim for disability
benefits. Disability benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish disability
under the terms of the Social Security Act. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998).
Specifically, the claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration’s regulations create a
five-step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining whether the claimant has
established a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). The steps are to be used in the
following order:
1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;
2. Whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment;
3
3. Whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one listed in the regulations;
4. Whether the claimant can still perform relevant past work; and
5. Whether the claimant can perform other work in the community.
Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
At step three, if the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations, disability is acknowledged
by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). However, if a listing is not met or
equaled, in between steps three and four, the ALJ must then assess the claimant’s Residual
Functional Capacity (“RFC”), which is defined as the most a person can do despite any physical
and mental limitations that may affect what can be done in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
The ALJ then uses the RFC to determine whether the claimant can perform his past work under
step four and whether the claimant can perform other work in society at step five. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e). The claimant has the initial burden of proof in steps one through four, while the
burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that there are a significant number of jobs
in the national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
Here, Ms. VanAsdall’s primary complaint with the ALJ’s decision is that he
mischaracterized and over-relied on her daily activities in finding that she was not disabled. Ms.
VanAsdall contends that this error affected the ALJ’s assessment of her credibility and also the
weight that he gave to the opinions of her treating physicians. In turn, those matters affected the
ALJ’s listing analysis at step three, and impacted the RFC upon which the ALJ based his stepfive finding. Ms. VanAsdall also argues that the ALJ inadequately articulated his consideration
4
of the pertinent factors in deciding what weight to give to her treating doctors’ opinions, and that
his discounting of those opinions was improper for that additional reason.
The Court agrees with Ms. VanAsdall that the ALJ did not adequately address her
activities, and that this error warrants remand. The ALJ’s decision repeatedly discusses Ms.
VanAsdall’s personal activities, but its description of those activities is decidedly one-sided, and
it fails to acknowledge other evidence that puts those activities into context. For example, in
recounting Ms. VanAsdall’s testimony, the ALJ stated: “Despite her alleged impairments, the
claimant testified that she has no significant difficulty performing personal care tasks. She also
reported that she performs light cleaning around the house, including vacuuming, sweeping,
cooking, dishes, and laundry. In addition, she indicated that she drives, goes grocery shopping,
and attends church on a weekly basis.” (R. 24). However, while Ms. VanAsdall indeed testified
that she was able to perform various light household tasks, she also testified to significant
limitations relative to those tasks. Specifically, she testified as to her back pain: “If I do small
tasks, small tasks like sweeping or mopping or just basically housework that will set it off or,
because I’m fine when I get up in the morning. It’s just when I start getting mobile and start
doing small tasks in the house I start, I will have to sit down and relax.” (R. 52).
Ms. VanAsdall further testified during questioning by her attorney:
Q.
So now you talked about doing some of this housework, this light
housework. Are you doing that in between these times that you’re --
A.
Yes, I have to stop and rest between each job or stop in the middle of a job.
Q.
And go and do what?
A.
Sit down and relax.
(R. 68). The ALJ’s decision never discusses those lines of Ms. VanAsdall’s testimony, though,
and never acknowledges any evidence of limitations in Ms. VanAsdall’s ability to complete
5
those tasks. Likewise, the ALJ noted that Ms. VanAsdall was able to go grocery shopping. (R.
24). However, Ms. VanAsdall testified that when she goes to the store, she goes with her father
because she can’t lift the groceries on her own. (R. 68). Again, that testimony is absent from the
ALJ’s decision, as the ALJ only discussed the aspect of this evidence that supported his finding,
which was improper. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ
erred by failing to consider the manner in which the claimant performed the activities and the
effect they had on him); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
claimant’s minimal daily activities, which she performed with difficulty and with assistance, did
not support the ALJ’s conclusion that she did not suffer disabling pain);
In addition, the ALJ noted at least seven times in his decision that Ms. VanAsdall had
“help[ed] her father clean and rehabilitate a rental property.” (R. 22, 27, 30, 31). So far as is
apparent from the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ may have believed that Ms. VanAsdall was
performing arduous construction work. Her testimony, however, painted a starkly different
picture. She testified that on only a couple days, she helped her sister prime a wall and paint the
bottom trim, but that it affected her very much and that she “suffered for it.” (R. 71). She also
testified that she had received an injection in her back right before doing that, and that she would
not be able to do it over the course of a number of days or weeks. (Id.) Similarly, the treatment
note the ALJ cited for this fact stated that Ms. VanAsdall “says this has caused her additional
physical issues.” (R. 631). Nonetheless, the ALJ did not acknowledge the pain that this activity
caused or the fact that Ms. VanAsdall had just received a pain injection, both of which could
have affected the extent to which these activities actually contradicted her complaints of severe
pain. Czarnecki v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that an ALJ erred by
discrediting a claimant for having helped remodel a house, where the ALJ did not acknowledge
6
that the claimant suffered severe pain as a result and was only able to do so because she had just
received a pain injection).
The ALJ also noted that Ms. VanAsdall cared for her father and her nephew, a sixteenyear-old with cerebral palsy, both of whom she lived with. Though the ALJ appears to have
placed particular emphasis on that fact, mentioning it multiple times in his decision, it is not
apparent how that fact is inconsistent with Ms. VanAsdall’s inability to maintain gainful
employment. To the contrary, so far as the record reflects, Ms. VanAsdall’s role in caring for her
father and nephew appears quite limited. The only activities Ms. VanAsdall testified to relative
to caring for her nephew were that she watches television with him and that she occasionally
attends meetings at school, and the record does not appear to contain any details about what Ms.
VanAsdall did to take care of her father. (R. 59–61). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly “urged caution in equating these activities with the challenges of daily employment in
a competitive environment, especially when the claimant is caring for a family member.”
Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d
865, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the claimant took care of her children because she
“must . . . , or else abandon them to foster care or perhaps her sister, and the choice may impel
her to heroic efforts”); Jenkins v. Colvin, No. 1:12-cv-1519, 2014 WL 900920, at 7 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 6, 2014). An individual might care for family members despite their genuine disability
simply because they have no other choice, and they may be able to do so only through selfaccommodations or flexibility that may not be available in the workplace. Beardsley, 758 F.3d at
838; Gentle, 430 F.3d at 867–68. Yet, the ALJ’s decision did not explore or acknowledge any of
those details or limitations in this evidence.
7
Likewise, the ALJ noted that for a year after her alleged onset of disability, Ms.
VanAsdall received unemployment benefits and actively sought work. As the Commissioner
argues, it is not inappropriate for an ALJ to consider such evidence in evaluating the credibility
of a claimant’s claim of disability. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746 (7th Cir. 2005).
Again, however, the ALJ failed to consider other evidence that would put this evidence into
context. Specifically, Ms. VanAsdall reported that unemployment benefits were her only source
of income, and that as a condition of receiving those benefits, she had to make an effort to find
work. Accordingly, she looked for work, but due to her health conditions and medications, there
were no opportunities available to her. (R. 178–79). Evidence that these efforts were born of Ms.
VanAsdall’s financial need, and that they were hampered by her conditions, casts them in quite a
different light than the ALJ portrayed them, and could have supported a different consideration
of this evidence. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 699 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that while an
ALJ may consider the fact that a claimant sought unemployment benefits, “attributing a lack of
credibility to such action is a step that must be taken with significant care and circumspection”
after carefully considering all of the surrounding facts); Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 746 (noting that a
claimant’s financial need may impact the extent to which their seeking work as a condition of
receiving unemployment benefits affects their credibility); see Gentle, 430 F.3d at 867 (“A
person can be totally disabled for purposes of entitlement to social security benefits even if,
because of an indulgent employer or circumstances of desperation, he is in fact working.”). The
ALJ did not acknowledge this contrary evidence, though.
Picking up where the ALJ left off, the Commissioner’s brief does not acknowledge any
of the above evidence that the ALJ failed to consider. Rather, the Commissioner’s argument on
this issue, which spans a single sentence, is that Ms. VanAsdall’s argument fails because it relies
8
on her own testimony, “the veracity of which is, of course, the matter that is at issue.” [DE 21 p.
9]. That misses the point. The ALJ need not have credited the evidence in question, but he
needed to consider it before discrediting it. It is possible that, in further considering these issues
without mischaracterizing or selectively considering the record, the ALJ will come to the same
conclusion and find that Ms. VanAsdall was not fully credible and that the treating physicians’
opinions were only due limited weight. Those determinations are for the ALJ to reach, but he
must reach them after considering the record as a whole—not just those aspects of it that
supported his decision. Scrogham, 765 F.3d at 699; see Czarnecki, 595 F. App’x at 644 (holding
that the ALJ erred by adopting “an impermissible ‘sound-bite’ approach in evaluating the
record”).
The Court finds that the ALJ’s improper handling of this evidence requires reversal. An
ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence, but he must build a logical bridge from
the evidence to his conclusion. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. Thus, an ALJ’s “apparent selection of
only facts from the record that supported [his] conclusion, while disregarding facts that
undermined it, is an error in analysis that requires reversal.” Scrogham, 765 F.3d at 699. The
ALJ relied on such a selective consideration of the facts here, and that error impacted both his
analysis of Ms. VanAsdall’s credibility and his analysis of what weight to place on her treating
physicians’ opinions. Granted, Ms. VanAsdall’s activities were not the only reason he cited in
support of either conclusion. The ALJ also noted, for example, that Ms. VanAsdall had made
comments suggesting that the reason she was not seeking work was not her inability to work, but
her desire to receive benefits. The ALJ also noted that the treating physicians’ opinions were not
entirely supported by medical evidence. However, the Court cannot be positive that the ALJ
would reach the same conclusions even after accurately considering the above evidence, so it
9
cannot consider this harmless error. Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
that an ALJ’s error was harmless where the court was “convinced that the ALJ will reach the
same result” on remand). Conversely, given the presence of contradictory medical opinions in
the record and some potential reasons for discrediting Ms. VanAsdall’s testimony and the
treating physicians’ opinions, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. VanAsdall is necessarily
entitled to benefits. Thus, the appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for further
proceedings rather than to direct the Commissioner to award benefits.
Having concluded that remand is necessary on that basis, the Court need not resolve Ms.
VanAsdall’s independent argument that the ALJ did not adequately explain his reasoning behind
the weight he gave to her physicians’ opinions. On remand, the ALJ will need to undertake this
analysis anew, so it is not necessary to resolve whether he adequately explained his analysis in
his present decision. However, the Court notes that it would be helpful for purposes of review for
the ALJ to more clearly articulate his consideration of the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c) as to the weight to give to the physicians’ opinions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Commissioner denying Ms. VanAsdall’s claim for benefits is
REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 8, 2015
/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?