Young v. Dallas et al

Filing 84

OPINION AND ORDER denying 66 Motion to Compel Discovery filed by John G. Young, a pro se prisoner. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 2/26/2016. (cc: Young) (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JOHN G. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1603-JTM-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Compel Discovery [DE 66] , filed by John G.
Young, a pro se, prisoner on January 27, 2016. Defendants Fanning, Kimberly Myers, Dishon,
Marandet, Siblisk, Cattin, Ivers, Dallas, Michelle Myers, Mitcheff, and Frye filed a response on
February 8, 2016, and Defendants Sevier and Lemmon filed a response on February 10, 2016. Young
has not filed a reply and the time to do so has passed. In the instant Motion, Young seeks an order
compelling Defendants to respond to the discovery requests he hand delivered to them during his
deposition on November 23, 2015. Defendants argue that they are not obligated to respond because
Young’s requests were untimely.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is “construed
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could
bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351
(1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). A party may seek an order to compel
discovery when an opposing party fails to respond to discovery requests or provides evasive or
incomplete responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). A party objecting to the discovery request bears the
burden of showing why the request is improper. See McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d
660, 670 (N.D. Ind. 2008). The Court has broad discretion when deciding discovery matters. Thermal
Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng’rs, Inc., 755 F.3d 832, 837

(7th Cir. 2014); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1110 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Young served his discovery requests on Defendants on November 23, 2105, creating a response
date after the December 2, 2015, discovery deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (responding party must
serve its answers and any objections to interrogatories within 30 days after being served with such
interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (responding party must respond to a document request within 30
days after being served with such request). Requests for discovery must be made in sufficient time to
allow the opposing party to respond before the discovery deadline, and when a discovery request is not
filed within that time frame, the opposing party is under no duty to respond. See Shadle v. First Fin.
Bank, N.A., No. 1:09-CV-37, 2009 WL 3787006, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2009); Westbrook v. Archey,
No. 1:05-CV-00057, 2006 WL 545008, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2006); Shroyer v. Vaughn, No.
1:00-CV-256, 2002 WL 32144316, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2002). In this case, Young does not dispute
that he served the discovery requests less than 30 days prior to the discovery deadline, nor does he
provide any explanation for his failure to serve the discovery earlier. Therefore, Defendants have no
duty to respond to Young’s untimely discovery requests.
As a final matter, Young asserts that he mailed his discovery requests to the Court on November
20, 2015. Because this is a pro se case, all discovery must be filed with the Court pursuant to the Local
Rules. See N.D. Ind. L.R. 26-2(a)(2). However, a review of the docket reveals that Young has not filed
any discovery requests in November of 2015.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Compel Discovery [DE 66].
SO ORDERED this 26th day of February, 2016.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record
Plaintiff, pro se

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