Sheppard v. Meade et al
Filing
94
OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING 81 MOTION for Summary Judgment Kosciusko Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants F Court, Cory Fields, M Holderman, J Jones, E Kelle, C Marsh, Darcy Meade, D Meza, Shaun Mudd, T Nichol, T Rockey, D Shingle, Jaynn Stoops, C Summers, J Winters, J Zimmer. Signed by Judge Philip P Simon on 2/20/2018. (lhc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JASON L. SHEPPARD,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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OFFICERS DARCY MEADE, SHAUN )
MUDD, C. SUMMERS, T. ROCKEY, )
F. COURT, T. NICHOL, J. WINTERS, )
C. MARSH, J. JONES, D. SHINGLE, )
J. ZIMMER, E. KEELE, D. MEZA,
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SERGEANT CORY FIELDS, NURSE )
JAYNN STOOPS, OFFICER M.
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HOLDERMAN, DOCTOR COLLIER )
and DOCTOR AL SHANI,
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Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 3:14CV1669-PPS
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jason Sheppard filed this suit against 16 officers and employees of the
Kosciusko County Jail, and two doctors who were not county employees, alleging that
his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by their deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs while he was in custody there. Sheppard has acknowledged on
the record that he intends to pursue his claims against only six of the defendants –
Officers Meade, Mudd, Summers, and Marsh, Sergeant Fields, and Nurse Stoops. [DE
91 at 1.] Now before me is a fully-briefed motion for summary judgment by the
Kosciusko County defendants.
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party opposing summary judgment may not rely on
allegations or denials in his or her own pleading, but rather must “marshal and present
the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut
up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518
F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).
FACTS
Sheppard was at the jail for two separate stretches of time – roughly five months
from late June to early December in 2012, and then again for approximately two months
from late November 2013 until the end of January 2014. Sheppard’s evidence supports
his assertion that in October 2012 when he began to experience severe pain in
connection with bloody bowel movements, he complained to jail officers verbally
and/or in writing each time it occurred, several times each week, including specifically
to defendant Meade. [DE 91-1 at ¶¶3-4.] Sheppard attests that his abdominal pain was
severe enough to double him over and lasted at least two hours. [Id. at ¶3.] Sheppard
says that Meade examined his rectal area and told him “it appeared swollen but was
fine.” [Id.] Sheppard claims that although he continued to make complaints to Meade
“at least 5 or six times,” he was not seen by a nurse until November 16, 2012. [Id.] On
that day, November 16, 2012, Sheppard was evaluated by defendant Jaynn Stroop, a
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nurse, who directed him to use hemorrhoid cream, and set up a doctor’s appointment
for Sheppard. [DE 83-1 at 4.]
It was obvious that Sheppard had a severe problem because on November 20, a
medical progress note indicates that Sheppard was seen by a doctor (with an illegible
signature), who noted a rectal prolapse. [DE 83-1 at 5.] The doctor said that Sheppard
should be sent for a general surgery consult and that time was of the essence; the doctor
said it should be scheduled “ASAP.” [Id.] Sheppard was prescribed Miralax and
Metamucil for constipation. [Id.]
Sheppard’s medical problem was so acute that he was actually released from the
jail on December 3 on a personal recognizance bond. The very next day he went to a
doctor’s appointment jail personnel had made for him with Dr. Funil Ramrakhiani. [Id.
at 21-22.] Dr. Ramrakhiani ordered upper and lower GI testing, and diagnosed
Sheppard as having polyps and severe hemorrhoids. [Id. at 23.] Sheppard visited Dr.
Ramrakhiani about six times. [Id. at 24.] Sheppard complained in his deposition
testimony that none of doctors he’s seen over three years have “told [him] anything,”
but just keep giving him creams and laxatives while he continues to bleed. [Id.]
Sheppard has testified that a nurse on Dr. Ramrakhiani’s staff discussed with him a
possible surgical procedure to address his bowel issues. [Id. at 25.]
When Sheppard returned to the Kosciusko County jail in November 2013, the
medical screening report dated November 26 reflected that he was then undergoing
treatment for hemorrhoids, for which he’d had a recent hospitalization. [DE 83-1 at 6.]
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Sheppard reported experiencing rectal bleeding at that time. [DE 83-1 at 7.] In his
affidavit, Sheppard attests that his report of a recent hospitalization referred to the
upper GI procedure ordered by Dr. Ramrakhiani. [DE 91-1 at ¶19.] Sheppard was
housed in the medical section throughout the approximately two months of his second
period of incarceration at the jail. [DE 83-1 at 28.]
Sheppard attests that in December 2013 he told defendant Meade about his
continued severe pain and rectal bleeding “on multiple occasions,” but that Meade did
not let him see a nurse or doctor, and he did not see the nurse until later that month.
[DE 91-1 at ¶10.] Sheppard’s affidavit recounts an incident in December 2013 when his
bleeding ran down both legs and pooled on the floor. [Id. at ¶11.] Sheppard attests that
defendant Fields came to the cell and screamed at him, saying that “they weren’t going
to release me from the jail to get medical treatment and that I should just stop what he
called ‘the bull-shit,’” and that “it was my fault I was bleeding and in pain because I
had not gotten my condition fixed while I was still outside the jail.” [Id.]
On December 10, 2013, Sheppard initiated a Sick Call Request to be seen by a
nurse for rectal bleeding. [Id. at 9.] A rectal bleeding protocol questionnaire was
completed on December 24, 2013, reflecting that examination revealed “massive
hemorrhoids” and that Sheppard had “bloody tissue stuffed in anus.” [Id. at 10.] The
questionnaire was signed by defendant Mudd and reviewed by a physician whose
signature is illegible. [Id. at 11.]
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The same day, Nurse Stoops signed a medical progress note reporting that
Sheppard “did not have upper GI as doctor requested,” because “[h]e doesn’t have
insurance” and is not working. [DE 83-1 at 12.] Stoop noted “[h]e can’t have anything
done on outside of jail.” [Id.] Sheppard’s deposition testimony suggests he had the
upper GI test, and instead it was a possible surgical procedure that he did not undergo,
because his lack of money and insurance prevented him from getting all the necessary
testing “to determine if [he] was appropriate for that procedure.” [DE 91-1 at ¶7.]
Sheppard’s affidavit addresses this as well, with Sheppard explaining that he “did not
tell her that I failed to get an ‘upper GI,’” but “did tell her that [I] did not have
insurance or enough money to get my condition fixed during my release from the jail.”
[DE 91-1 at ¶12.] Stoop’s treatment plan advised Sheppard to “keep medical aware of
his condition,” to use “warm moist cloths to rectum area,” “avoid straining during
bowel movements,” and “keep anal area clean and dry.” [DE 83-1 at 12.]
In support of his summary judgment opposition, Sheppard submits and
expressly agrees to the accuracy of the jail’s Medication Administration Record. [DE 911 at ¶24.] That record reflects that he was given Miralax and Metamucil daily from
November 21 through 29 and December 1 and 2, 2012, and was also given Colace1 and
hemorrhoid cream. [DE 91-5.] Sheppard was seen by a physician on December 26,
2013, whose notes indicate that Sheppard had stopped his medication. [DE 83-1 at 13.]
This appears to be further explained in a medical progress note dated December 28, in
1
Colace is a common stool softener laxative.
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which Nurse Stoops noted that Sheppard “felt that the colace was too strong.” [Id. at
14.] Sheppard reported diarrhea-like stools. [Id.] Stoops explained that Sheppard
could reduce his dose from “1 tab of the colace instead of 2,” but reports “he refuses.”
[Id.] Stoops listed three other treatment recommendations: to increase fluids, to eat soft
foods or chew food well, and to report to the medical department. [Id.]
Sheppard’s affidavit describes his complaints on or around January 6, 2014 to
defendants Rockey and Court about severe pain and bleeding, but that he was not seen
by medical personnel that day. [DE 91-1 at ¶15.] In his affidavit, Sheppard attests that
during his second incarceration he was never “provided with medication that helped
with my severe pain or bleeding,” and that none of the steps he was advised to take
provided relief from either of those symptoms. [Id. at ¶16.] On approximately January
21, 2014, Sheppard was transferred to the Indiana Department of Correction. [Id. at ¶2.]
ANALYSIS
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). “Correctional officials have
long been warned that they cannot ignore an inmate’s known serious medical
condition.” Orlowski v. Milwaukee County, 872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017). The
Kosciusko County defendants do not dispute that Sheppard’s regular and persistent
rectal bleeding and pain constituted a serious medical need. [DE 93 at 4.] This
concession is appropriate, because “[a] medical condition need not be life-threatening to
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be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury
or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d
610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The seriousness of Sheppard’s medical condition is plainly suggested by the jail
doctor’s conclusion on November 20, 2012 that an urgent surgical consult was needed.
[DE 83-1 at 5.] And even where defendants are not medical professionals, their
observations may nonetheless disclose a condition that is “so obvious that even a lay
person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 620
(quoting Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Sheppard’s claims are pursued against the six individual defendants in their
individual capacities. [DE 59 at ¶2.] “[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable
under §1983 for a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights, the inmate must show
that the defendant was personally responsible for that violation.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856
F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017). The defendants’ generalized argument for summary
judgment fails to address Sheppard’s theory of relief as against particular defendants.
In his affidavit, Sheppard contends that when his problems started in October 2012, he
complained to “the jail officers,” identifying Meade in particular by name. [DE 91-1 at
¶4.] During his later period of incarceration at the jail, when his bleeding was even
more severe, he complained to jail staff including Meade, Mudd and Fields [DE 91-1 at
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¶¶9-11.]2 As for Nurse Stoops, Sheppard attests that he repeatedly complained to her
about the severity of his pain and the ineffectiveness of the treatment measures he’d
been afforded, but he was never sent to the hospital nor “ever provided medication that
helped with [his] severe pain or bleeding” or with materials to clean himself. [DE 91-1
at ¶16.]
Analyzing the record as to Sheppard’s particular theories for various defendants’
liability, I find that there is substantial agreement about the medical treatment Sheppard
received, but that there are genuine disputes of material fact about what did not occur
that the Eight Amendment may have required. The first of these issues is the timeliness
of treatment based on Sheppard’s complaints to the jail officers. “Intentional delays in
medical care may constitute deliberate indifference, even if the inmate’s medical
condition is non-life threatening.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2017).
The defendants don’t dispute Sheppard’s claims about the frequency of his
complaints and the severity of the pain he complained about, but no explanation is
offered, much less an undisputed one, for the delay in treatment between his
complaints beginning in mid-October 2012 and his (apparently first) visit with Nurse
Stoops on November 16, 2012. Then upon his return to the jail on November 26, 2013,
Sheppard’s history of hemorrhoids and current rectal bleeding were noted on an intake
2
Particular allegations concerning defendant Marsh are not specifically made by
either party in connection with the motion for summary judgment. In the absence of a
showing of meritorious undisputed fact by either side, summary judgment will not be
granted to defendant Marsh.
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screening report. [DE 83-1 at 6-7.] Sheppard attests that in December 2013 he also
reported incidents of severe pain and bleeding to jail staff including defendants Meade,
Mudd and Fields, but the movants’ records don’t show a visit to medical personnel
until December 24, after Sheppard’s request for a sick call on December 10. [DE 91-1 at
¶9; DE 83-1 at ¶¶9-12.] “A delay in treatment may show deliberate indifference if it
exacerbated the inmate’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain,” and “even brief,
unexplained delays in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference.” Perez v.
Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015).
The argument portion of the Kosciusko County defendants’ brief suffers from a
lack of citations to the record, particularly where it asserts facts not addressed in its
“Undisputed Factual Matters.” For instance, the defendants claim that it is undisputed
that the jail records “denote that [Sheppard] made a number of requests for medical
treatment regarding his hemorrhoids” and that “[e]ach of these requests was responded
to by jail personnel.” [DE 82 at 8.] Their documentary evidence does not support these
claims, and Sheppard’s affidavit and deposition testimony contradict them. In addition,
the Kosciusko County defendants have not expressly claimed that the few sick call
requests they have submitted constitute all the requests Sheppard made for medical
attention. Sheppard points out that the sick call request forms submitted by the
defendants are computer-generated, not completed personally by Sheppard, and that
they do not contain “all of the information I reported about my symptoms, such as
information about my pain or its level.” [DE 91-1 at ¶18.]
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Concerning responsibility for delays in treatment, the record also contains no
evidence explaining how inmate requests for medical treatment were handled or
scheduled. No conclusions can be drawn as to whether the officers to whom Sheppard
complained were responsible, or whether Nurse Stoops or other medical personnel
were responsible for delays in treatment.
Another issue precluding summary judgment in favor of the defendants
concerns whether defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Sheppard’s
complaints of severe pain. Surprisingly, the Defendants offer no evidence – such as an
affidavit or deposition testimony from Nurse Stoops or any other medical authority – to
explain why Sheppard’s complaints of severe pain were not addressed or why the
medical treatment he was offered was an adequate response to those complaints.
Indeed, the defendants have offered no affidavits or deposition testimony from any of
the defendants on any issue. Failing to provide any evidence from one’s own client
isn’t usually a good recipe for getting summary judgment. In all events, unnecessarily
prolonging an inmate’s pain may show deliberate indifference. Perez, 792 F.3d at 77778.
The jail personnel repeatedly invoke case law from the Circuit about non-medical
defendants relying on determinations by medical professionals. [DE 82 at 7; DE 93 at 3.]
But this principle is of no help to them, because their argument for summary judgment
is not specific for each defendant and does not suggest how (or support with evidence
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that) any jail officer relied on any medical professional’s determination at any particular
point in Sheppard’s time at Kosciusko County Jail. [DE 82 at 7; DE 93 at 3.]
CONCLUSION
The Kosciusko County defendants have failed to demonstrate that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jason Sheppard’s Eighth Amendment claims.
Disputed questions of material fact exist concerning whether delay in medical treatment
for Sheppard’s complaints of severe pain and rectal bleeding, and the failure to address
his complaints of severe pain in particular, constituted deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.
ACCORDINGLY:
The Kosciusko County defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DE 81] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: February 20, 2018.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
United States District Judge
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