Adams v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER granting plaintiff's 22 Motion for Attorney Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 7/7/2016. (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
KEVIN W. ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO. 3:14cv1680

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on a “Petition for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1)”, filed by the Plaintiff on May 13, 2016. The Defendant filed her response on May 19,
2016, indicating no objection to Plaintiff’s motion.
Discussion
The Social Security Act states that when a disability claimant is successful in Federal
Court, the court may authorize payment of reasonable attorney fees up to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the claimant’s back-due benefits. Because a Social Security claimant evaluates and pays
his own attorney, a reviewing court’s primary focus should be on the reasonableness of the
contingency agreement in the context of that individual claimant’s particular case. Wells v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court adopted that view in rejecting
Lodestar Methodology in setting attorney fees in Social Security cases in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
122 S. Ct. 1817 (U.S.2002). Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Most plausibly read, we conclude, § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully
representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for
court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they
yield reasonable results in particular cases . . . . Congress has provided one

boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for
fees exceeding 25 percent of the back due benefits. § 406(b)(1)(A) . . . . Within
the 25 percent boundary, as petitioners in this case acknowledge, the attorney for
the successful claimant must show the fee sought is reasonable for the services
rendered . . . . Id. at 1828.
The contingency agreement in this case is 25 percent of the Plaintiff’s retroactive benefits
which Plaintiff’s counsel argues should be considered reasonable and proper. As noted in
Gisbrecht, most contingency agreements in Social Security claims set the contingency rate at 25
percent. Id. at 803. As for other consideration of reasonableness noted by the Gisbrecht court,
there is no suggestion of fraud or overreaching. Counsel did not delay this matter and achieved
success in reversing the Commissioner’s decision. Counsel states that a copy of the fee petition
has been sent to the Plaintiff.
Counsel is requesting an award in the amount of $18,000.00, which represents less than
25% ($32,921.20) of the retroactive benefits awarded to the Plaintiff payable under §406(b).
Counsel states that upon receipt of this sum and the previously awarded1 Equal Access to Justice
Act fees (hereinafter “EAJA”) of $4,543.61, counsel for Plaintiff will remit the lesser of the two
fees directly to the Plaintiff.
As noted in the Plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit, counsel will also seek approval of a fee
under 406(a)2 for time spent handling Plaintiff’s case before the Social Security Administration,

1

On February 6, 2015, this court granted a joint motion to remand Plaintiff’s claim to the
Social Security Administration. Based on this successful appeal, Plaintiff’s counsel sought, and
was granted, an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA in the amount of $4,543.61. On
remand, the Appeals Council vacated the final decision of the Commissioner and remanded the
case for another administrative hearing. After this hearing, in a written decision dated February
22, 2016, the ALJ found the Plaintiff disabled.
2

Whereas Section 406(b) governs attorney fees for proceedings in the District Courts,
Section 406(a) governs fee awards for proceedings before the Social Security Administration.
2

but states that under no circumstances will the total requested fees between 406(a) and 406(b)
exceed $32,921.20 which represents 25% of the past due benefits awarded to the Plaintiff.
As noted at the outset, the Commissioner has no objection to Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee
request. As the request is supported by law and reasonable, the court will grant the petiton for
attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, is hereby GRANTED.

Entered: July 7, 2016.

s/ William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court

3