McNeeley v. Superintendent

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER re 5 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The petition is DISMISSED pursuant to 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4 because the claims are procedurally defaulted. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 8/26/2014. (rmc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
JESSE McNEELEY,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT
Respondent.

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Case No. 3:14-CV-1697-JVB

OPINION AND ORDER
Jesse McNeeley, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the prison
disciplinary hearing (WCC 12-07-601) that was held on August 6, 2012, where he was found
guilty of possessing a controlled substance by the Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) in violation
of B-202 and deprived of 20 days earned credit time. McNeeley did not appeal this result and
therefore has not presented any of his claims to the Final Reviewing Authority. Therefore they
are procedurally defaulted. See Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]o
exhaust a claim [in a prison disciplinary case], and thus preserve it for collateral review under §
2254, a prisoner must present that legal theory to the . . . Final Reviewing Authority . . ..”).
A habeas petitioner can overcome procedural default by showing both cause for failing to
abide by state procedural rules and a resulting prejudice from that failure. Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). McNeeley could not appeal because he pled guilty. He states that the
hearing officer threatened him by saying, “Don’t waste my time. I’m in a hurry. Plead guilty or
I’ll take 6 months.” DE 3-1 at 2. In effect, McNeeley was offered a plea bargain – a reduced
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Nevertheless, even in criminal prosecutions, plea

bargains are both common and Constitutional. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Therefore McNeeley does not have cause to excuse his procedural default merely because he
pled guilty as a part of a plea deal.
However, even if he did have cause, he cannot demonstrate prejudice because none of his
grounds present a basis for habeas corpus relief. McNeeley argues that it was a due process error
to have written the conduct report before the testing of the “green leafy substance” found in the
small package given to him by another inmate. He also argues that there was not conclusive
evidence that it was a controlled substance. First, there is no Constitutional requirement that
testing precede the writing of a conduct report. Indeed, there is not even a Constitutional
requirement for that the substance be tested.
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only] have the support of some
evidence in the record. This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a
modicum of evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the record is not
so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without
support or otherwise arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must
point to the accused’s guilt. It is not our province to assess the comparative
weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citations, parenthesis,
and ellipsis omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 455-56 (1985). “The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes
any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 457.
In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are not required to conduct an
examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or
weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board’s
decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.

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Id. (quotations marks and citation omitted). Here, it was reasonable for the DHB to conclude that
McNeeley possessed a controlled substance even if it had not been tested.
Finally, McNeeley argues that the DHB considered drug test results which were not
shown to him. But, “prison disciplinary boards are entitled to receive, and act on, information
that is withheld from the prisoner and the public . . ..” White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759,
767 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore this would not be a basis for habeas corpus relief and McNeeley
cannot demonstrate prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to 2254 Habeas Corpus
Rule 4 because the claims are procedurally defaulted.
SO ORDERED on August 26, 2014
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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