Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Lennox Industries Inc

Filing 49

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 46 MOTION for Reconsideration re 45 Opinion and Order, Terminate Motions, by Defendant Lennox Industries Inc. The motion is GRANTED as to Count III, and the Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Count III (for breach of warranty). The motion is DENIED as to Count II for strict products liability, which REMAINS PENDING. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 4/25/2016. (lhc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
THE CINCINNATI
INSURANCE COMPANY
a/s/o JASON and
MICHELLE HOWARD,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
LENNOX INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
Defendant.

CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1731

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Lennox Industries Inc.’s
Motion to Reconsider Opinion and Order, filed by Defendant, Lennox
Industries, Inc., on February 29, 2016 (DE #46).

For the reasons

set forth below, the motion (DE #46) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
ORDERED

The motion is GRANTED as to Count III, and the Clerk is
to

DISMISS

WITH

PREJUDICE

Count

III

(for

breach

of

warranty). The motion is DENIED as to Count II for strict products
liability, which REMAINS PENDING.

BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2016, this Court entered its opinion and order
on Lennox’s motion for summary judgment, granting in part and
denying in part Lennox’s motion for summary judgment.

(DE #45.)

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lennox on the claims
for design defect and failure to warn, but denied summary judgment
on

CIC’s

claims

for

breach

of

warranty

(Count

III)

and

manufacturing defect (Count II).
Lennox filed a motion to reconsider this Court’s February 9,
2016 (DE #45) order, arguing that summary judgment should have been
granted on all of CIC’s claims (including the claims for breach of
warranty and manufacturing defect).

(DE #46.)

On March 28, 2016,

this Court took the motion under advisement and ordered CIC to file
a response on or before April 11, 2016.

(DE #48.)

To date, CIC

has not filed a response to the motion to reconsider.

DISCUSSION
“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to
correct

manifest

errors

discovered evidence.”

of

law

or

fact

or

to

present

newly

Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561

F.Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982).

A motion for reconsideration

performs a valuable function where:
[T]he Court has patently misunderstood a
party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the Court by
the parties, or has made an error not of
reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis
for a motion to reconsider would be a
controlling or significant change in the law
or facts since the submission of the issue to
the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the
motion to reconsider should be equally rare.

2

Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185,
1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan
Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).
Motions to reconsider “cannot in any case be employed as a
vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced
during the pendency of the [motion].” Caisse Nationale De Credit
Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).
In other words, the parties cannot introduce evidence previously
available, but not used in the prior proceeding.

See Roche

Diagnostics Corp. v. Bayer Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1068 (S.D.
Ind. 2003).

Motions for reconsideration are also not vehicles for

“rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that
could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.”
Caisse, 90 F.3d at 1264, 1270 (citations omitted).
I.

Breach of Warranty Claim (Count III)

The Court denied summary judgment on the breach of warranty
claim (Count III), finding CIC did not specifically argue the
grounds upon which it was entitled to summary judgment on this
claim (DE #45, p. 21).

The Court was well aware that Lennox moved

for summary judgment on all claims.

It was, however, concerned

that Lennox did not put CIC on notice for the grounds that Lennox
was seeking summary judgment on Count III, the claims for breach of
warranty.

“The party opposing summary judgment has no obligation

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to address grounds not raised in a motion for summary judgment.”
Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, 449 F.3d 751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006); see
also Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1990) (“When a
party moves for summary judgment on ground A, the opposing party
need not address grounds B, C, and so on; the number of potential
grounds for (and arguments against) summary judgment may be large,
and litigation is costly enough without requiring parties to
respond to issues that have not been raised on pain of forfeiting
their position.”).
Upon

due

consideration,

and

based

upon

the

argument

in

Lennox’s brief in support of its motion to reconsider, it seems
that this Court did misunderstand Lennox’s arguments on this claim.
Going back to the summary judgment memoranda, Lennox did argue that
all of CIC’s claims against Lennox were subject to the requirements
of the IPLA, and subsumed by the IPLA.

CIC did not respond to

these arguments in its memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.

Moreover, CIC failed to file a memorandum in

opposition to the instant motion for reconsideration, despite being
ordered to do so.

Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate in

favor of Lennox on Count III.
II.

Count II - Manufacturing Defect

This Court analyzed and ruled upon CIC’s claim for strict
liability for a manufacturing defect, finding CIC’s claim survived
summary judgment. In the instant motion, Lennox reargues the merits
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of the case, and sets forth arguments about cases (Whitted v.
General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1995); and Ford Motor
Co. v. Reed, 689 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), that were
already specifically addressed and analyzed by the Court (DE #45,
pp.

17-19).

A

motion

to

reconsider

is

opportunity to reargue the merits of a case.
Holdings, Inc.

not

intended

as

an

See Neal v. Newspaper

349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming

district court’s decision to deny appellants’ Rule 59(e) motion to
alter or amend judgment where plaintiff simply reargued the merits
of his case); see also Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“A motion that merely republishes the reasons that had
failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the
tribunal no reason to change its mind.”).

Moreover, the moving

party must “clearly establish” a manifest error of law or an
intervening

change

in

the

controlling

law

or

discovered evidence to succeed under Rule 59(e).

present

newly

Romo v. Gulf

Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2001).
Lennox merely rehashes arguments previously rejected by this
Court, and has not clearly established a manifest error of law or
an intervening change in the controlling law.

Consequently, the

Court stands by its previous order (DE #45) regarding Count II, and
that claim remains pending.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to reconsider (DE
#46) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The motion is GRANTED

as to Count III, and the Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
Count III (for breach of warranty).

The motion is DENIED as to

Count II for strict products liability, which REMAINS PENDING.

DATED: April 25, 2016

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

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