Wells v. Superintendent
Filing
4
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Eugene Wells pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 4. This case is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 7/21/15. cc: Wells (mc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
EUGENE WELLS,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
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No. 3:14 CV 1748
OPINION AND ORDER
Eugene Wells, a pro se prisoner, filed this habeas corpus petition challenging the
prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 13-09-207) that was held at the Westville Correctional
Facility on January 21, 2014. The Disciplinary Hearing Body (DHB) found him guilty of
Assault on Staff in violation of A-117 and sanctioned him with the loss of 365 days earned
credit time. Wells raises four grounds in his petition.
First, he argues that the hearing officer was not impartial because it was the same
officer who had heard the original case against him before his adminstative appeal
resulted in a rehearing.
An inmate facing disciplinary charges has the right to an impartial
decisionmaker. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571. But “the constitutional standard for
impermissible bias is high,” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003),
and an adjudicator is entitled to a presumption of “honesty and integrity”
absent clear evidence to the contrary, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95
S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Due process requires disqualification of a
decisionmaker who was directly or substantially involved in the underlying
incident, Gaither, 236 F.3d at 820, and we have assumed that a decisionmaker
might likewise be impermissibly biased if his spouse is a crucial witness in
the proceeding, see Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). A hearing
officer is not automatically deemed biased, however, simply because he
adjudicated or was involved in a previous disciplinary charge against the
prisoner. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502.
Perotti v. Marberry, 355 Fed. Appx. 39, 43 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Wells has not alleged that
the hearing officer was in any way involved in the underlying incident. Rather, his sole
allegation is that the hearing officer had previously adjudicated a case against him – albeit
the same case which was subsequently remanded for a new hearing. Nevertheless,
previous involvement with prior hearings does not make the hearing officer
presumptively biased. Indeed, both State and federal judges commonly preside over cases
remanded for retrial. Therefore Ground One is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Second, Wells argues that he was denied the ability to obtain a witness statement
from Sgt. Gentry. Though an inmate has a right to present relevant, exculpatory evidence,
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974), “[p]rison officials must have the necessary
discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits.” Id. at 556. Here, the conduct
report was written by Sgt. Gentry and thus Wells was not denied the opportunity to have
the DHB consider his testimony. Though Wells was prevented from questioning Sgt.
Gentry about the report, an inmate in a prison disciplinary hearing has no right to confront
or cross-examine witnesses. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003); see Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings
does not apply”). Ground Two is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Third, Wells argues that he was found guilty of Assault with a Weapon in violation
of A-102 even though there was no evidence he had a weapon. Perhaps that was the
finding during his first hearing, but that is not what happened during the rehearing that is
at issue in this habeas corpus proceeding. Here, the DHB found Wells guilty of Assault on
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Staff in violation of A-117. (DE #2 at 6.) This charge does not require a weapon. Moreover,
the facts reported in the Conduct Report state that Wells “threw his shower shoe out of the
cuff port and struck Officer Major above the left eye.” (DE #2 at 4.) Though shower shoes
are not traditionally considered weapons, here Wells used the shower shoe as a weapon.
Therefore Ground Three is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Fourth, Wells argues that the sanctions were excessive because he was punished
more harshly during the rehearing than he was during the original hearing. However,
harshness is not a valid basis for challenging a DHB punishment that is within the range of
the offence for which the inmate was found guilty. Cf. United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418
F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1970) (Where a sentence is “within the range established by the
legislature . . . this court will not [on habeas corpus review] question the trial judge’s
discretion in imposing sentence, nor will it question the refusal of the Illinois Supreme
Court to reconsider appellant’s petition for reduction of sentence.”) Here, the punishment
imposed was within the limits permitted by The Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders.*
Therefore Ground Four is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
For these reasons, the habeas corpus petition is DENIED pursuant to Section 2254
Habeas Corpus Rule 4. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 21, 2015
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
*
Violations of A-117 may be punished with the loss of 12 months earned credit time “with
justification from the Hearing Officer.” Policy 02-04-101 at 37. See http://www.in.gov/idoc/3265.htm.
The conduct report notes that Wells caused a severe injury resulting in $3,232.41 in medical bills.
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