Sahlhoff v. Gurley-Leep Automotive Management Corporation et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 25 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Defendants Gurley-Leep Automotive Management Corporation, Gurley-Leep Buick-GMC Truck Inc. Plaintiff has 21 days from the date of this Opinion and Order in which to file an Amended Complaint. Should Plaintiff choose not to do so, judgment will be entered for Defendants. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 9/28/15. (cer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JACOB SAHLHOFF,
Plaintiff
vs.
GURLEY-LEEP AUTOMOTIVE
MANAGEMENT CORP, et al.,
Defendants
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CAUSE NO. 3:14cv1790RLM-CAN
OPINION AND ORDER
Jacob Sahlhoff sues two defendants collectively called “Gurley-Leep” in this
opinion. He contends that he worked for Gurley-Leep as an automobile salesman
and that Gurley-Leep retaliated against him in violation of, and interfered with his
rights under, the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Gurley-Leep
moves to dismiss Mr. Sahlhoff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Because the
amended complaint contains nothing from which it could be inferred that Mr.
Sahlhoff suffered from a serious health condition within the meaning of the FMLA
or that he engaged in activity protected by the FMLA, the court grants GurleyLeep’s motion and dismisses the complaint with leave to amend.
The defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. To state a claim, a
complaint need only contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff
is entitled to relief. See EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776
(7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true
all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d
575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) if it contains sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (ellipsis in original).
The court’s understanding of the facts comes from Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended
complaint; no alternative set of facts is in the record. Mr. Sahlhoff was working for
Gurley-Leep when he started having severe headaches centralized around his right
eye in March 2012 (all dates discussed were in 2012). Gurley-Leep discouraged
him from seeing a doctor, and encouraged him to work despite the pain. When Mr.
Sahlhoff sought medical help in May, the eye doctors found nothing wrong but
recommended more testing. Gurley-Leep discouraged him from seeking more
medical treatment and belittled his ability to work through pain, so Mr. Sahlhoff
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worked through the pain, even working overtime, and delayed further testing or
treatment. As the pain worsened, though, he decreased his overtime.
On July 6, Gurley-Leep fired Mr. Sahlhoff because he wasn’t “committed to
the job.” In August, doctors determined the reason for Mr. Sahlhoff’s pain: he had
cancer in his right eye tear duct, and eventually had his right eye surgically
removed.
Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint doesn’t state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. It omits allegations from which various elements of his FMLA
claims can be inferred; with respect to some elements, the amended complaint’s
allegations are inconsistent with the elements of an FMLA retaliation or
interference claim.
An FMLA interference claim requires (a) a plaintiff eligible for FMLA
protection, (b) an employer covered by the FMLA, (c) a plaintiff entitled to FMLA
leave, (d) sufficient notice to the employer to take leave, and (e) a denial by the
employer of FMLA benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled. Scruggs v. Carrier
Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). To be entitled to FMLA leave, the
employee must have suffered from a serious health condition that left him unable
to perform the functions of his job. Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d
665, 669 (7th Cir. 2011). A “serious health condition: is one that involves inpatient
care in a facility of some sort or continuing treatment by a health care provider.
29 U.S.C. §2611(11); Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Without a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the FMLA, an
employee isn’t entitled to FMLA leave, and so can’t succeed on a FMLA
interference claim. Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint alleges in ¶28 that he had
a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the FMLA, but courts don’t take
legal conclusions in a complaint as true. See Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 292
(7th Cir. 2011)
Mr. Sahlhoff says his amended complaint alleges a serious health condition
because serious headaches can constitute a serious health condition. That
proposition no doubt is true, but the cases Mr. Sahlhoff cites demonstrate the
difference between such a case and his own case. In Hendry v. GTE North, Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 816, 827 (N.D. Ind. 1995), the court denied summary judgment for
the employer on an FMLA claim when the record allowed a finding that the
plaintiff had received continuing medical care for her migraines, and a finding that
she was unable to perform her job when the migraines struck. Similarly, in
Kennedy v. United States Postal Svc., Cause No. 2:10cv0279-PPS-PRC, doc. 159
at *14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 17, 2014), summary judgment was denied because there
was “evidence that Kennedy’s migraines, for which she repeatedly saw a doctor,
rendered her unable to perform her job duties.”
Mr. Sahlhoff’s amended complaint doesn’t allege anything that would
support, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, an inference that
he underwent inpatient care in any facility or continuing treatment. The amended
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complaint contains allegations that contravene the existence of a serious health
condition within the meaning of the FMLA: he always returned to work, put in
overtime, and let several weeks pass without seeking medical care or testing.
The amended complaint doesn’t allege that Mr. Sahlhoff was entitled to
FMLA leave, because entitlement requires a serious health condition. Without
allegations that would allow an inference that Mr. Sahlhoff was entitled to FMLA
leave, the amended complaint states no claim upon which relief can be granted.
Mr. Sahlhoff’s retaliation claim would also fail on the facts alleged in, or
inferable from, the amended complaint. An FMLA retaliation claim can be proven
either through a direct method of proof or an indirect method of proof; Mr.
Sahlhoff’s response to Gurley-Leep’s motion directs the court to the direct method.
To prevail on an FMLA retaliation claim under that method, an employee must
show that (a) he engaged in a protected activity, (b) the employer took an adverse
employment action — such as denying leave or termination — against him, and
(c) a causal connection exists between (a) and (b). Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2014); Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d
625, 663 (7th Cir. 2010).
Nothing in the amended complaint would allow an inference that Mr.
Sahlhoff notified Gurley-Leep of any serious medical need. The complaint alleges
Gurley-Leep’s awareness that Mr. Sahlhoff suffered from headaches — according
to the amended complaint, Gurley-Leep personnel mocked Mr. Sahlhoff’s pain and
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his ability to work through it, and discouraged him from seeking medical care. But
the amended complaint makes repeated reference to Mr. Sahlhoff’s cancer
diagnosis: if Gurley-Leep fired Mr. Sahlhoff because his cancer led Gurley-Leep’s
decision-maker to believe Mr. Sahlhoff he wasn’t “committed to the job,” a
retaliation claim likely would have been alleged. The amended complaint
forecloses that scenario when it alleges that Mr. Sahlhoff learned in August — not
until about a month after he was fired — that he had cancer. In July, Gurley-Leep
couldn’t have known more than that Mr. Sahlhoff had worsening headaches;
that’s all Mr. Sahlhoff knew himself. As the court of appeals explained in
Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass GmbH, 359 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2004), “If you
have brain cancer but just tell your employer that you have a headache, you have
not given the notice that the Act requires.” See also Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack,
Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Spurling's statement to Bellant on
April 16 (and prior to her medical evaluation), was simply that she needed time
off to figure out why she was falling asleep. Given the circumstances of this case,
this can hardly be deemed as notifying C & M of a ‘serious health condition.’”).
For all these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim on which relief can be granted, so the court GRANTS the defendant’s
motion to dismiss (doc. #25). The court will give Mr. Sahlhoff 21 days from the
date of this order within which to file an amended complaint. Should he choose
not to do so, judgment will be entered for Gurley-Leep.
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ENTERED:
September 28, 2015
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge
United States District Court
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