Bloch v. USA
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING the motions to amend and/or supplement the § 2255petition [Doc. Nos. 109, 114 in 3:12cr2];DENYING the motion to compel [Doc. No. 124 in 3:12cr2]; andDENYING the motion to vacate [Doc. No. 78 in 3:12cr2].. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 9/18/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jld)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JOHN W. BLOCH, III,
Petitioner
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
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CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1868 RLM
(Arising out of 3:12-CR-2 RLM)
OPINION AND ORDER
In April 2012, a jury found John W. Bloch, III guilty of illegal possession
of a firearm. After two appeals, the court sentenced Mr. Bloch to a total of 105
months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release, and
the court of appeals affirmed the sentence. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d
862 (7th Cir. 2016). Mr. Bloch’s petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [Doc. No. 78], his motions to amend or
supplement his petition, [Doc. Nos. 109, 114], and his motion to compel, [Doc.
No. 124], are before the court.1 For the following reasons, the court denies his
motions and his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
I. Background
The factual background underlying Mr. Bloch’s conviction is set out in
Mr. Bloch filed his motion to vacate while his third appeal was pending, so the court
deferred ruling pending disposition of the appeal. [Doc. No. 111].
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detail in the court of appeals’ opinion addressing Mr. Bloch’s first direct appeal.
See United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2013). The court assumes the
reader’s familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, but will briefly
summarize the facts relevant to issue presented in Mr. Bloch’s motion and his
petition.
After getting two calls reporting gunshots in the vicinity, one of which
specifically identified Kirsten Steven’s apartment as the source of the gunfire,
Elkhart police officers responded to the apartment and knocked on the door. Mr.
Bloch—visibly intoxicated and somewhat combative—opened the door. The
officers told Mr. Bloch to step outside, handcuffed him, and asked Ms. Steven,
Mr. Bloch’s girlfriend, to step outside as well. After the officers were told that a
young child was sleeping in the apartment, they conducted a sweep of the
apartment to see if anyone was injured. The officers found a loaded Glock
handgun sitting on a nightstand and an SKS assault rifle in an open closet, both
in plain view. Next to the rifle, officers found 54 rounds of ammunition in a clip
and discovered 144 rounds of ammunition for the handgun nearby. As the
officers removed the firearms from the apartment, Mr. Bloch professed
ownership of the guns and complained that the officers were taking them.
Because Mr. Bloch was a convicted felon who couldn’t possess a firearm lawfully,
he was arrested. He continued to protest the seizure of the weapons even after
his arrest. A jury convicted Mr. Bloch of illegal possession of a firearm.
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II. Discussion
The rules governing petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide that
once a motion is filed, “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any
annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not
entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its
summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.” Rule 4(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. After
reviewing the record in this case, the court finds that Mr. Bloch’s motion can be
resolved without a hearing. See Bruce v. United States, 256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th
Cir. 2001); Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1995).
A. Motion to Amend
Mr. Bloch moves to amend and/or supplement his § 2255 motion
contending that there have been “some changes” in his case and “some issues
that were not apparent to the Defendant when the initial . . . Petition was
submitted,” but he didn’t identify what those changes and issues were or what
claims he’d like to add or modify, or provide a copy of the proposed amended
petition. The court deferred ruling on the motion to amend to allow Mr. Bloch to
supplement his motion with a copy of the proposed amended § 2255 petition,
[Doc. No. 111], which he did. [Doc. No. 114].
The Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings don’t contain a provision
for amending motions for collateral review, so the court must look to Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 15(a) to determine whether leave to amend should be granted in this case.
Johnston v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1999). Rule 15(a)(2)
provides that leave to amend should be freely granted “when justice so requires.”
“Under Rule 15, a court may deny the amendment due to undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, prejudice or futility.” Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972,
980 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Bethany Pharmacal Co. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854,
861 (7th Cir.2001)).
In his amended petition, Mr. Bloch seeks to add a third claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel against his trial counsel, arguing that his trial counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective because he didn’t challenge the multiplicity of the
charges in the indictment. Mr. Bloch contends that being charged with violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. The court disagrees. As the court of appeals noted in ruling
on Mr. Bloch’s first appeal, the government was free to pursue both counts
through trial, so any pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment or a count of the
indictment would have failed. See United States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d at 643. And
to the extent Mr. Bloch seeks to challenge his counsel’s failure to object to the
court sentencing him on both counts, that issue was addressed on appeal, see
id. at 643–644, and resolved on remand, [see Doc. Nos. 67, 95], so he can’t show
prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that
an ineffective assistance claim fails if the petitioner can’t “show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
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the proceeding would have been different”). Because this ineffective assistance
of counsel claim has no merit, it would be futile for Mr. Bloch to amend his §
2255 petition.2 Accordingly, the court denies the motion to amend. See Indep.
Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (“it is
well settled that a district court may refuse leave to amend where amendment
would be futile”).
B. Motion to Compel
Mr. Bloch’s motion to compel asks the court to order the government to
respond to his petition. The court ordered the government to respond to his
original petition, [Doc. No. 97], and the government responded. [Doc. No. 101].
To the extent Mr. Bloch seeks an order directing the government to respond to
his amended petition, no response is required because the court denied his
motion to amend.
C. § 2255 Petition: First Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Suppression Motions
The first claim in Mr. Bloch’s § 2255 petition alleges that his trial counsel,
Brian May, provided ineffective assistance because he didn’t (1) file a motion to
suppress evidence seized during a search of Kristen Steven’s apartment, (2)
Mr. Bloch didn’t seek to add any other claims in his proposed amended petition and
the other proposed changes to his petition aren’t substantive, so they don’t affect the
analysis of the merits of his claims.
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challenge the seizure of Mr. Bloch, or (3) contest the validity of an anonymous
911 call. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Bloch
must show both (1) that his attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable
in its deficiency such that he was denied the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense,
rendering the outcome of the proceedings against him unreliable. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687; Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731, 736 (7th
Cir. 2018). If Mr. Bloch’s can’t make a showing on both prongs, his claims must
be dismissed. See Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 840 (7th Cir. 1996).
When a claim of ineffective assistance is premised on an attorney's failure
to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must prove that the motion would
have been meritorious, and that but for counsel=s error, he would not have been
convicted. United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2005). The
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the law enforcement officer’s
conduct violated the constitution. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104
(1980); United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1985).
1. Legality of the Search of Ms. Steven’s Apartment
Mr. Bloch first alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
didn’t move to suppress evidence seized during the search of Ms. Steven’s
apartment. Mr. Bloch doesn’t challenge the scope or the duration of the search,
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he only contends that his constitutional rights were violated because the officers
entered Ms. Steven’s apartment without a warrant.3
Warrantless searches of protected areas are generally presumed to be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the search falls within an
established exception to the search warrant requirement. United States v.
Delgado, 701 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Schmidt,
700 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2012)). “[T]he government may overcome this
presumption by demonstrating that, from the perspective of the officer at the
scene, a reasonable officer could believe that exigent circumstances existed and
that there was no time to obtain a warrant.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937).
“Exigent circumstances exist, for example, when officers must render
emergency assistance to an injured [person] or to protect a [person] from
The government argued in its response to Mr. Bloch’s petition that a Fourth
Amendment challenge isn’t cognizable in the context of a § 2255 petition and that Mr.
Bloch lacks standing to challenge the search because he didn’t have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in Ms. Steven’s apartment. These aren’t grounds for dismissing
his ineffective assistance claims. First, as Mr. Bloch correctly notes in his reply brief,
his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to suppress
is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction release. See, e.g. Owens v. United States,
387 F.3d 607, 607 (7th Cir. 2004). With regard to the standing issue, Mr. Bloch asserts
in his reply brief that he had keys to Ms. Steven’s apartment, had permission to be there
in her absence, kept clothes there, and “continuously visited and frequently stayed the
night as a[n] overnight house guest at the [apartment].” [Doc. No. 108 at 6]. Although
those factual allegations aren’t verified, the court assumes for purposes of this opinion
that Mr. Bloch would have had standing to challenge the search of Ms. Steven’s
apartment. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight guest had legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises which was protected by Fourth Amendment and
thus had standing to challenge warrantless entry, even if guest has no legal interest in
premises).
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imminent injury.” United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937 (quoting Kentucky
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). See also Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751
F.3d 542, 557–558 (7th Cir. 2014). Whether exigent circumstances existed is a
mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d at 937. “This
emergency aid exception does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the
seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. It
requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing . . . that a person
within [the house] is in need of immediate aid.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45,
47 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Undisputed evidence showed that officers were justified in entering and
searching Ms. Steven’s apartment without a warrant. The evidence presented at
trial showed that the police received not one, but two reports of gunshots fired
in the area. The first identified the general vicinity of the shooting and the second
specifically identified Ms. Steven’s apartment as the location of the shooter.
When officers arrived at the apartment, Mr. Bloch appeared to be intoxicated
and was verbally combative. The officers were told that there was at least one
other person—a child—inside the apartment.
Mr. Bloch hasn’t presented any facts which, if true, would show that the
warrantless entry and search wasn’t justified.4 He doesn’t dispute that a gun
Mr. Bloch makes the argument, without citing to supporting evidence, that the officers
deliberately created the exigency when they knocked on the door, seized him, and
searched the apartment, which would vitiate the grounds for the search. The court
disagrees. Mr. Bloch doesn’t deny that shots were fired, argue that the officers fired the
shots that were reported, or present any other evidence that would allow the court to
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was fired, that officers were responding to a “shots fired” call at night in a
residential neighborhood, that the officers hadn’t yet located the gun, or that the
officers hadn’t conclusively determined that there were no shooting victims in
the apartment. “[P]olice officers and other emergency personnel must be able to
assist persons in danger or otherwise in need of assistance . . . [and] [w]hen
police are acting in a swiftly developing situation . . . a court must not indulge
in unrealistic second-guessing.” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542,
559 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted).
The officers reasonably believed that shots had been fired, that the shooter
was located in Ms. Steven’s apartment, and that the gun hadn’t been recovered,
but they didn’t know who the shooter was, how many people were inside the
apartment, or if anyone had been hurt. The court of appeals described what the
officers encountered at Ms. Steven’s apartment as exigent circumstances, United
States v. Bloch, 718 F.3d at 640, and has found that similar circumstances
justified officers’ warrantless entry into a protected area to determine if there
were any injured victims inside. See e.g., United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934
(a report of gunshots in the neighborhood, bullet holes in a nearby car and the
duplex, and a trail of spent casings justified the warrantless search of a home’s
curtilage to determine if anyone was injured); United States v. Taylor, 179 F.
App'x 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2006) (exigent circumstances supported the warrantless
find that the officers deliberately created the exigency. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
at 462.
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search of a home to determine if anyone was injured where a dispatcher told
police of gunshots in the home and spent and live casings were found on the
property); United States v. Kempf, 400 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (a
warrantless search was reasonable when police officers “did not know the exact
details of the shooting, where the gun was located, whether the gun was loaded,
who else may have been in the house, or whether anyone in the house may have
been involved in the shooting”); United States v. Collins, 110 F. App'x 701, 704
(7th Cir. 2004) (911 call reporting shots fired at an apartment complex, police
hearing shots upon arrival, and the only activity observed in the defendant’s
apartment justified the warrantless search to determine if someone might be in
need of aid).
Based on the record before it, the court finds that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless search and, accordingly, Mr. Bloch can’t prove that a
motion to suppress on this issue would be meritorious, so this ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails. See United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353,
360 (7th Cir. 2005).
2. Legality of the Seizure of Mr. Bloch
Mr. Bloch next argues that Mr. May was ineffective because he didn’t move
to suppress his statements professing ownership of the firearms made while he
was detained during and immediately following the officers’ search of the
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apartment.5 Mr. Bloch asserts that when the officers arrived at the front door of
the apartment, they seized him at gunpoint without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that he committed or was committing a crime. He contends
the statements attributed to him at trial professing ownership of the firearms
should have been suppressed because they were made while he was unlawfully
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Trial testimony demonstrated that the officers detained Mr. Bloch and
would not allow him to leave while they searched the apartment, so he was seized
for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758,
772 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981)). “An
official seizure is ordinarily unreasonable unless it is supported by probable
cause, even where no formal arrest is made,” id., but in some circumstances, a
seizure of a person absent suspicion of criminality won’t offend the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (holding that the
seizure of a person incident to the execution of a search warrant doesn’t violate
the Fourth Amendment). This is such a case. “[J]ust as exigent circumstances
permit a warrantless home entry, emergencies may justify a warrantless seizure
[of an occupant] in the home.” Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601
To the extent Mr. Bloch contends that his trial counsel should have challenged the
detention itself as unlawful or the manner of detention (that he was handcuffed) as
excessive, those arguments aren’t persuasive because he can’t demonstrate prejudice.
“[T]he proper remedy [for such a claim] would have been a suit against the officers under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,” not a claim pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Howard, 729
F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2013).
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F.3d 1065, 1073 (10th Cir. 2010). The court already found that exigent
circumstances supported the warrantless search of Ms. Steven’s apartment, so
the officers’ seizure of Mr. Bloch incident to that search didn’t violate his Fourth
Amendment rights. See id. Accordingly, he can’t show that a motion to suppress
would have been successful in suppressing his statements made while seized.
Mr. Bloch’s brief doesn’t specifically argue that his Fifth Amendment rights
were violated, but he contends that he was under de facto arrest when he made
the statements he seeks to suppress. Construing his petition liberally, as the
court must, see Gaylord v. United States, 829 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2016), the
court understands him to also claim that his trial counsel should have moved to
suppress his statements while he was detained outside of Ms. Steven’s
apartment because he was in custody and his statements were elicited in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.
A statement made during a custodial interrogation by a person who has
not been informed of, and waived, his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel isn't admissible in a criminal proceeding. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). The suspect must be both in custody and subject to
interrogation to trigger the Miranda warning requirement. Id. at 467.
“For Miranda purposes, a suspect is ‘in custody’ when he is ‘deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” United States v. Snodgrass, 635
F.3d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 496 F.3d 807,
810 (7th Cir. 2007)). Mr. Bloch was handcuffed and Officer Haigh testified at trial
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that he was detained and couldn’t leave, so he was “in custody” for Miranda
purposes.
Interrogation means express questioning as well as “any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). The
test is “whether a reasonable objective observer would have believed that the law
enforcement officer’s statements to the defendant were reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response.” United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). “[V]oluntary incriminating statements
are not subject to Miranda warnings and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at
1001–1002.
Mr. Bloch doesn’t point to any evidence that would allow the court to
conclude that he was interrogated. He notes that the “officers stated in their
police reports[ ] and trial testimony that the petitioner claimed ownership of the
two weapons.” [Doc. No. 79 at 23–24]. But he doesn’t claim that any officer’s
words or actions elicited his statements. Officer Lanzen’s police report indicates
that he was speaking with Mr. Bloch when the statements were made, but it
describes them as “spontaneously uttered statements about his guns and having
them to protect his family.” [Doc. No. 78–1 at 6]. This suggests that they were
voluntary incriminating statements rather than statements elicited by an
officer’s questioning, so they wouldn’t have been subject to suppression. Absent
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evidence that Mr. Bloch was subject to interrogation when he made the
incriminating statements, Mr. Bloch can’t show that a motion to suppress on
Fifth Amendment grounds would have been successful.
3. Cause Provided by the Anonymous 911 Call
Mr. Bloch also argues that his trial counsel was unconstitutionally
deficient because he didn’t file a motion to suppress on the theory that the
anonymous 911 call didn’t provide the officers cause to search Ms. Steven’s
apartment and detain him. Mr. Bloch relies on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266
(2000), in which the Supreme Court held that that an uncorroborated
anonymous tip couldn’t justify a Terry stop.
To the extent J.L.—a case about a Terry stop—applies to the officers’
search of Ms. Steven’s apartment and the seizure of Mr. Bloch, this case is quite
different. First, in J.L. there was a single, uncorroborated anonymous call to
police; in this case there were two separate calls about gunshots fired in the area,
the second of which identified Ms. Steven’s apartment as the source of the
gunfire. Second, J.L. “did not hold that all anonymous or uncorroborated tips
are unreliable,” United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555, 558–559 (7th Cir. 2008),
or address a call reporting an emergency, rather it “dealt with a situation in
which there was no apparent need for haste.” United States v. Wooden, 551 F.3d
647, 650 (7th Cir. 2008). After reviewing relevant court of appeals’ decisions,
Judge Pallmeyer concluded that “the emergency exception clearly applies where
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an anonymous caller reports shots fired.” Williams v. Edwards, No. 10 C 1051,
2012 WL 983788, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2012). The court agrees and,
accordingly, Mr. Bloch can’t demonstrate that a motion to suppress on this issue
would have been meritorious and his claim fails.
D. § 2255 Petition: Second Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Failure to Call a Witness
Mr. Bloch’s next claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
didn’t call Ms. Steven as a witness in his defense.6 Ms. Steven was Mr. Bloch’s
girlfriend and the lessee of the apartment in which the firearms were discovered
by police. Mr. Bloch didn’t include an affidavit from Ms. Steven describing the
testimony she would have offered at trial, but argues in his petition that she
would have been a star witness for the defense and would have testified, as she
told the police officers at the scene, that she owned the firearms, not Mr. Bloch.
“The Constitution does not oblige counsel to present each and every
witness that is suggested to him,” United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1294
(7th Cir. 1990), but an attorney representing a criminal defendant has a duty to
make “some investigation into the prosecution’s case and into various defense
strategies”
or
to
“make
a
reasonable
decision
that
makes
particular
To the extent Mr. Bloch seeks to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective because
he didn’t call other witnesses, those arguments aren’t persuasive because he didn’t
identify the potential witnesses and make a specific, affirmative showing of the
testimony those witnesses would have offered at trial. See Patel v. United States, 19
F.3d 1231, 1237 (7th Cir. 1994).
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investigations unnecessary.” Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 691 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986)). “Where a petitioner
claims his trial counsel failed to call a witness, he must make a specific,
affirmative showing as to what the missing evidence would have been and prove
that this witness’s testimony would have produced a different result.” Patel v.
United States, 19 F.3d 1231, 1237 (7th Cir. 1994).
To succeed on this claim, Mr. Bloch must show prejudice. “To establish
prejudice, the defendant must show that ‘there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’ ” United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694). Ms. Steven’s potential testimony, as
described by Mr. Bloch in his petition, falls short of that showing. First,
testimony by Ms. Steven regarding the ownership of the firearms wouldn’t bear
on whether Mr. Bloch possessed the firearms for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) because a defendant can possess a firearm without owning it. See
United States v. Lane, 267 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2001). Mr. Bloch doesn’t
indicate that Ms. Steven’s would have testified that he never was in physical
contact with or constructively possessed the firearms recovered from her
apartment, which is what the government was required to prove for the jury to
convict Mr. Bloch of illegal possession of a firearm. See United States v. Bloch,
718 F.3d at 642.
And Mr. Bloch can’t show that there is a reasonable probability that the
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jury wouldn’t have convicted him if the jurors heard Ms. Steven’s testimony. The
jury heard a recording of Mr. Bloch claiming ownership of the firearms and
demanding that the officers return them to him at the scene of the search, which
“is quite reliable as evidence of possession.” Id. at 643. The jury also heard
testimony that Mr. Bloch told his chess partner at the county jail that he kept
the guns at Ms. Steven’s apartment and lamented not having hid them more
effectively. The court of appeals held that “[Mr.] Bloch’s own statements at the
scene and in the jail, considered separately or together, were easily sufficient to
establish his possession of the firearms.” Id. Mr. Bloch hasn’t shown that it is
reasonably probable that Ms. Steven’s testimony would have led to a different
result, so he can’t demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, this claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel also fails.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the court:
1) DENIES the motions to amend and/or supplement the § 2255
petition [Doc. Nos. 109, 114];
2) DENIES the motion to compel [Doc. No. 124]; and
3) DENIES the motion to vacate [Doc. No. 78].
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
September 18, 2018
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge, United States District Court
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cc:
J. Bloch, III
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